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UNVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON 
ABSTRACT 
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SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT 
Doctor of Philosophy 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE, CORPORATE CASH HOLDING AND DIVIDEND POLICY IN 
AFRICAN COUNTRIES. 
By Joseph Yensu 
This thesis centres on capital structure, corporate cash holdings, and dividend policy in 
African countries. Three different areas of research are followed and, employing different 
estimation techniques and methods, this thesis offers the following results: Firstly, the 
leverage trends across the countries are very low and stable, with country and firm specific 
factors playing a significant role in determining the level of leverage. Secondly, corporate 
cash holdings in the countries are significantly determined by the firm level factors with 
stable trends. Thirdly, dividend payers are more profitable, have larger firm size, greater 
investment, high retention of earnings and less financial leverage than non-paying firms. In 
countries where GDP is low, firms are likely to pay dividends, and non-payers of dividends 
have high levels of corruption. Country and firm factors are significant in determining 
dividend.  
The thesis makes the following contributions to the literature: First and foremost, the 
dataset used covers a much longer period and a larger sample of African firms. Secondly, 
there is a cross-country comparison, which is rare in most previous studies. Also, both firm 
and country specific factors were considered when determining the relationships. More 
importantly, the thesis is the first research to confirm that Pecking order and Trade off 
theories are robust vehicles for explaining differentials in capital structure and corporate cash 
holdings in Africa.  
In conclusion, this thesis provides the following public policy recommendations: 
Governments should strengthen their institutional frame-works for good governance and rule 
of law, and support the capital and stock markets to attract investment, and also have a 
positive effect on business and industry. They should also ensure efficient management of the 
banking sector operations in order to reduce the interest rate by reducing inflation, and 
encourage domestic savings and their sustainability, thereby boosting the financing of firms 
and private sector development to create more job opportunities and growth. Finally, policy 
makers need to set up special funds which firms can tap into for research and development, to 
develop innovative ideas, introduce policies against political instability, corruption and 
political manipulation, to ensure total economic growth. iii 
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  Introduction  Chapter 1:3 
 
1.1  Aim 
The aim of this thesis is to examine trends in, and determinants of, capital structure, corporate 
cash holdings and dividend policies of listed non-financial firms in Africa countries. It 
examines the effects of firm and country specific factors on capital structure, corporate cash 
holdings and dividend policy. The thesis also investigates whether existing theories are 
applicable for explaining capital structure, cash holdings and dividend policy in African 
countries.  
1.2  Overview 
Compared to the developed world, very little research has been done in African countries 
about the capital structure of firms, dividend policy and corporate cash holdings. Even though 
there have been several individual studies, they have been limited in scope. Most of these 
studies have been limited to determinants of the capital structure, dividend policy, and 
corporate cash holdings of firms in specific, individual countries, or, at best, looked at the 
relationships of these to firm specific factors. There is a growing need for African countries 
to wean themselves away from the Breton Woods Institutions, but the only way out is for 
indigenous African firms to lead the way by increasing the pace of manufacturing. This has 
several benefits, or ripple effects, for gross domestic product growth, employment creation, 
expansion of government revenue through taxation, retention of foreign exchange through the 
reduction in import of consumer goods, and general expansion of the economy and sustained 
growth. These can be achieved when firms are well positioned to increase productivity and 
investments, which is possible when enough capital is available to the firms. Capital, and 
how it is distributed and used in a firm, has been found to be the single most important factor 
for firm growth in Africa (Abor, 2008). It is therefore important that firms avail themselves 
of the information and knowledge about corporate financing issues to operate effectively. 
However, the limited research in R&D among African firms has made it difficult for firms to 
acquire the necessary information.  
This study therefore provides the necessary information about the determinants of 
capital structure, dividend policy and corporate cash holdings, at both the firm and country 
level, to help firms in their capital or finance decisions in African countries. The study was 
also motivated by the trends’ effects of shocks and risks at specific times. Therefore, the 
growth and performance of firms in African countries would be made known to investors and 
also provide a thorough understanding of how country and firm factors influence capital 4 
structure (leverage), dividend policy and cash holding in African countries. Since most 
countries in Africa aim to attract direct foreign investment and also to reassure investors 
when investing in firms in Africa, the trends will provide complete evidence about the 
direction for potential investors and new competitors, to enable them to make conclusive 
decisions to invest in Africa. There was also the need for a single study with wider 
application across Africa, and this study, covering several African countries, provides this, to 
enable investors to make informed decisions regarding investment in these countries. The 
research also provides opportunities for future research into capital structure, corporate cash 
holdings and dividend policy in African countries. 
Using a panel dataset of 608 non-financial listed firms from 14 African countries, and 
employing different estimation techniques and methodologies, the relationship between firm 
level characteristics, as well as country level characteristics and capital structure, corporate 
cash holdings and dividend policy, has been established in the African context. The impact of 
financial systems, firm and governance factors on capital structure, dividend policy and cash 
holdings have also been examined.  
This thesis extends the literature about capital structure, dividend policy and corporate 
cash holding by considering the dataset over a longer time period and undertaking a cross-
country comparison. The thesis is also unique, especially in the context of African countries, 
because of how it combines both firm and country level factors and characteristics. It can be 
said also that this research is the first to confirm that Pecking Order and Trade-off theories 
are robust vehicles for explaining differentials in capital structure and corporate cash holdings 
in Africa.  
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1.3  Theoretical foundation linking the three empirical chapters 
This section provides a summary theoretical link between the empirical chapters in the thesis 
and the gap they fill in the current literature in the context of Africa. Three different, but 
related, areas of research have been studied in this thesis. The first paper deals with Capital 
structure trends, the second paper concerns Corporate cash holdings, and the third, Dividends 
policy. Even though these three topics are distinct from each other, they are, to some extent, 
related  
The first link is between Dividend policy and capital structure. A Dividend Policy is 
the decision made by the directors of a company and relates to the amount and timing of any 
cash payments made to the company's stockholders. The decision is an important one for the 
company as it may influence its capital structure and stock price. On the other hand, Capital 
structure is a term that describes the proportion of a company's capital, or operating money, 
that is obtained through debt versus the proportion obtained through equity.   
   It is argued that a dividend announcement provides shareholders and the marketplace 
with the missing piece of information about current earnings, upon which their estimation 
of the company's future earnings is based. These expected future earnings have been found to 
determine the current market value of a company. The dividend announcement, therefore, 
provides the missing piece of information and allows the market to ascertain the company's 
current earnings. These earnings are then used in predicting future earnings. In a study by 
John and Williams (1985), a signaling model was constructed in which the source of the 
dividend information is liquidity driven.  
Faulkender et al. (2006, p. 1) state that‎“for the most part, theories of dividend policy 
differ from theories of capital structure, since, the literature has treated dividend policy and 
capital structure as two distinct choices, even though there is reason to believe that there are 
common‎factors‎affecting‎both”.  
According to Faulkender et al. (2006), a key aspect of this theory is that capital 
structure and dividend policy are jointly determined as part of a continuum of control 
allocations between managers and investors and, hence, cross-sectional variations in both are 
driven by the same underlying factors. The endogenously-determined allocation of control 
between the manager and investors is crucial, not because of agency or private information 
problems, but because of potentially divergent beliefs that can lead to disagreement about the 
value of the project available to the company. The key underlying factor is past corporate 
performance. Better past performance leads to less disagreement, and thus affects the costs 
and benefits of different control allocations. Capital structure and dividend policy thus 6 
constitute an implicit governance mechanism that determines how much control over the 
company’s‎real‎(investment)‎decisions is exercised by the manager vis a vis the shareholders, 
and‎the‎company’s‎past‎performance‎impinges‎on‎this‎governance‎mechanism. 
Faulkender et al. (2006) thus present that we are left without a theory of dividends 
that squares well with these stylized facts. The evidence concerning capital structure is even 
more troubling, according to them. The two dominant capital structure theories are the (static) 
Trade-off theory and the Pecking Order‎theory.‎The‎tradeoff‎theory‎states‎that‎a‎company’s‎
capital structure balances the costs and benefits of debt financing, where the costs include 
bankruptcy and agency costs, and the benefits include the debt tax shield and reduction of 
free-cash-flow problems. They are supported in their argument by Jensen (1986), Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Stulz (1990).  
A prediction of the theory is that an increase in the stock price, because it lowers the 
company’s‎leverage‎ratio,‎should‎lead‎to‎a‎debt‎issuance‎by‎the‎company‎to‎bring‎its‎capital‎
structure back to its optimum. The Pecking Order theory, according to the work of  Myers 
and Majluf (1984),  assumes that managers have private information that investors do not 
have, and goes on to show that companies will finance new investments, firstly from retained 
earnings, then from riskless debt, then from risky debt, and finally, but only in extreme 
circumstances such as financial distress, from equity. This implies that equity issues should 
be quite rare, particularly when the company is doing well and its stock price is high. 
Faulkender et al. (2006) point out that empirical evidence is, however, perplexing in 
the light of these theories. According to Graham and Harvey (2001)s’ survey evidence, 
companies issue equity rather than debt when their stock prices are high. This contention is 
corroborated by  Asquith and Mullins (1986), Marsh (1982),  and  Mikkelson and Partch 
(1986). It would appear that the existing theories are under threat. For example, Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) found‎out‎that‎the‎level‎of‎a‎company’s‎stock‎price‎is‎a‎major‎determinant‎of‎
which security to issue. In addition, Welch (2004) finds that companies let their capital 
structures change with their stock prices, rather than issuing securities to counter the 
mechanical effect of stock returns on capital structure. In contrast, Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
ascribe their findings to managers attempting to time the market. Dittmar and Thakor (2005) 
demonstrate theoretically and empirically that companies may issue equity when their stock 
prices are high, even when managers are not attempting to exploit market mispricing. This 
contention is also shared by Schultz (2003), with empirical evidence. 
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Fama and French (2005) provided direct evidence against the Pecking Order 
hypothesis and concluded that this hypothesis cannot explain capital structure choices. They 
found that equity issues are not as infrequent as the pecking order hypothesis predicts, and 
that between 1973 and 2002 the annual equity decisions of more than half the companies in 
their sample violated the Pecking Order. These empirical studies of dividend policy and 
capital structure raise the question: why do companies work with lower leverage and 
dividend payout ratios when their stock prices are high?  
Franc-Dabrowska (2009), in‎trying‎to‎answer‎the‎question‎“Does Dividend Policy 
Follow the Capital Structure Theory?”,  posits that decisions concerning the most optimal 
choice of financing sources and dividend policy are some of the most difficult financial 
decisions. In his paper, where he tried to identify the relationships between two capital 
structure theories (hierarchy theory and substitution theory) and dividend payment policies in 
Polish stock companies in the agricultural and foodstuff sector, he arrived at a positive 
relationship. He concluded that company management limits dividend payment according to 
the hierarchy theory and prefers internal sources of financing economic activities. He again 
found that most Polish joint stock companies in the agricultural and foodstuff industry did 
make a decision about not paying dividends, preferring to set aside the achieved profit for 
injecting equity capital. Also, he found a strong statistical relationship between the amount of 
paid dividends and the value of equity capital. This confirms the assumption of an 
interrelationship between theories of capital structure and dividend policies, indicating at the 
same time the dominance of the hierarchy theory and the smaller practical importance of the 
substitution theory (from the point of view of decisions to pay dividends). 
Investing shareholders and companies have the common goal of increasing wealth. 
Shareholders can only make money from stocks in two ways, either from dividend payments 
or from selling their shares to other investors. The trading of stock to other shareholders is 
natural to the business — it does not make or lose money from the trade. A shareholder will 
sell stock if the price drops or if she thinks the price will drop. Poor financial health, 
perceived fiscal failing, and the possibility of reduced dividends are all reasons for stock 
prices to fall (Tebogo, 2008)   
Of the two ways that shareholders make money from stocks, dividend payments have 
a‎greater‎potential‎to‎increase‎the‎company’s‎funds.‎This‎is‎because‎increased‎dividends‎may‎
cause shareholders to purchase more stock from the business rather than trading the stocks on 
the market. The connection between capital structure and dividend policy becomes more 8 
complex‎because‎increasing‎dividends‎reduces‎the‎amount‎of‎cash‎financing‎the‎company’s‎
financial‎structure.‎A‎company’s‎financial‎manager‎probably‎will not risk raising dividend 
payments unless he expects the company to be able to raise more in stock sales than was 
spent in dividends (Murekefu and Ouma, 2009)  
According to Dhanani (2005), the primary goal of most corporations is to maximize 
shareholder value to keep up an inflow of investment money. Paying dividends may 
temporally appease shareholders, but the spending could decrease the amount of cash 
available for operating and capital expenditures. This means that corporate financial 
managers must attempt to strike a balance between capital structure and dividend policy. 
Spending on increased dividends has the potential to both increase and decrease the amount 
of‎funding‎in‎the‎company’s‎financial structure (Baker et al., 2001)  
Regarding the relationship between dividend and cash holdings, Grossman and Hart 
(1980), Easterbrook (1984), and Jensen (1986)  suggest that dividends may help reduce the 
agency problem by reducing the amount of cash that management have at their disposal. Thus, 
investors may react positively to dividend initiations because executives have less cash to 
waste. An increase in the dividend payout is considered to be good news, as the firm is 
demonstrating that it not only has positive cash flows, but that these cash flows are increasing 
enough‎to‎justify‎a‎higher‎payout‎to‎shareholders.‎The‎firm‎“proves”‎its‎cash‎flow‎by‎paying‎
out some of that cash to its shareholders. Higher dividends may signal permanent higher 
earnings for the firm. 
The famous classic study by Miller and Modigliani (1961) proved that the dividend 
policy and the firm value are irrelevant. On the other hand, the notable study by Jensen (1986)  
argued that when firms have larger amounts of surplus cash, payout is an effective way to 
reduce the agency costs between corporate managers and shareholders. According to this 
suggestion, the evaluation of the corporate payout would depend on the state of the firm.  
Further, Pinkowitz et al. (2006) suggested that in countries where investor protection 
is weak, payout was more highly valued than cash accumulation.  Faulkender and Wang 
(2006) argued that cash holdings were valued more in firms that repurchased their own shares 
than in firms that implemented dividend payouts. Moreover,  Harford et al. (2008) discussed 
how, for firms under appropriate corporate governance, high cash holdings were positively 
related to dividends. Finally, Al-Najjar and Belghitar (2011) concluded that after their 
empirical analyses, the linkage between cash holdings and dividends was unclear. 9 
John (1993) recognised that‎leverage‎plays‎a‎significant‎role‎in‎shaping‎firms’‎cash‎
policies and found that there is a negative relation between leverage and cash holdings. That 
is to say, firms can use borrowing as a substitute for cash holdings. Baskin (1987) suggested 
that firms with high leverage ratios have a higher cost of funds and hold less cash because of 
the higher costs of leverage. Kim et al. (1998) and Ferreira and Vilela (2004) demonstrated a 
reduction in cash levels when firms increase their financial leverage, which is a negative 
relationship. 
Opler et al. (1999) found evidence that cash holdings are negatively correlated to debt, 
which means that high cash levels are associated with low debt. Graham and Harvey (2001) 
suggest in their survey study that firms can maintain financial flexibility through having large 
cash reserves and unused debt capacity (low leverage), implying a negative relationship 
between‎firms’‎cash‎reserves‎and‎leverage.‎These‎results‎are‎also‎confirmed‎by Ozkan and 
Ozkan (2004). Focusing on leverage and cash reserves, Guney et al. (2007) argue that the 
relationship between cash reserves and leverage can be non-monotonic, implying that the 
marginal effect of increased leverage depends on the current level. That is to say, with high 
levels of leverage firms are more likely to face financial distress and thus accumulate larger 
cash holdings in order to minimize the risk of costly bankruptcy and financial distress. 
On the other hand, it has been advocated that lower cash assets create the need to 
reduce the probability of costly default by lowering the leverage, which means a positive 
relationship. Williamson (1988)  and Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that more cash assets 
increase optimal leverage. Specifically, Williamson (1988)  documents that those assets that 
are more liquid, or more redeployable, should be financed with debt more often, because 
banks and public debt markets incur lower costs from financing these assets. With a similar 
idea, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) predicted the relation between asset liquidity and capital 
structure, arguing that asset liquidity affects the expected costs of distress because less liquid 
assets sell at higher discounts relative to their fair values. Harris and Raviv (1991) argued that 
as asset liquidity increases the costs of default drop, and investors are more likely to use debt 
to obtain information about the firm.  
As has been argued by Ferreira and Vilela (2004), the relationship of cash holdings 
with leverage can have two possible forms. Firstly, because more levered firms want to 
reduce the risk of financial distress, as the cost of amortization plans of debt is likely to put a 
burden‎on‎firm’s‎treasury,‎they‎could‎hold high quantities of cash. On the other hand, because 10 
the leverage ratio is a proxy for the credit status of a firm or its ability to issue debt, higher 
leverage can be associated to lower cash holdings. However, as suggested by D'Mello et al. 
(2008), cash holdings could be endogenous to leverage. The argument is that, because the 
determinants of cash are so closely related to the determinants of leverage, it is interesting to 
assess whether they are two sides of the same coin. A similar discussion was developed by 
Acharya et al. (2007),  who suggested that cash could be negative a debt. 
Caldeira and Loncan (2013) found evidence that leverage and cash holdings are 
negatively related at the margin. Higher levels of cash balances are associated with less 
leverage, and more levered firms are likely to hold less cash. Their finding was in line with 
the findings of Acharya et al. (2007) and D'Mello et al. (2008), and can also be interpreted in 
light of the Pecking Order theory, as firms would prefer to finance investments with retained 
earnings (encompassed by cash holdings), referring to debt as a second option to finance 
investments when they run short of cash. Hence, it makes sense for those higher levels of 
cash to be associated with less debt ratios, and vice-versa. 
Caldeira and Loncan (2013) also found evidence that higher levels of leverage end up 
constraining firms to issuing more debt, as the gross cash generated that is committed to 
repay debt, once it reaches a given threshold, causes debt to fall at the margin. In their 
estimation, if they considered that small and risky firms are more likely to be financially 
constrained, as past research and theory suggest, they found indirect evidence that more 
constrained firms hold more cash. 
In terms of motivation, the first paper (Capital structure trends) was motivated by the 
fact that there is a growing need for African countries to wean themselves from the Breton 
Woods Institutions, but the only way out is for indigenous African firms to lead the way by 
increasing the pace of manufacturing. This has many implications for gross domestic product 
growth, employment creation, expansion of government revenue through taxation, retention 
of foreign exchange through a reduction in the import of consumer goods, and general 
expansion of the economy. These can only be achieved when these firms are positioned to 11 
increase productivity and investments, which is possible when enough capital is available to 
the firms. Capital has been found to be the single most important factor in firm growth in 
Africa (Abor, 2008). It is therefore important that firms avail themselves of the information 
about, and knowledge of, capital structure issues. However, lack of research in this area, 
coupled with very little research into R&D by African firms, has made it difficult for firms to 
have the necessary information. This study therefore provides that information about the 
determinants of capital structure at both the firm level and the country level to help firms in 
their capital structure decisions. The study was also motivated by trends in the effects of 
shocks and risks at specific times. Therefore, the growth and performance of firms in African 
countries would be made known to investors and also provide a thorough understanding of 
how country and firm factors influence capital structure (leverage) decisions in African 
countries. Since most countries in Africa aim at attracting direct foreign investment and also 
at encouraging investors to invest in firms in Africa, the trends will provide complete 
evidence about the direction for potential investors and new competitors, to enable them to 
make conclusive decisions to invest in Africa. There was also the need for a single study with 
wider application across Africa, and this study, covering several African countries, provides 
this, to enable investors to make informed decisions regarding investments in these countries. 
The paper contributes to the literature in various ways: it covers a longer time period 
of 18 years, and 14 selected African countries, which enables a conclusive statement to be 
drawn from the findings about the trends in capital structure in Africa. Another important 
contribution is that larger numbers of firms have been considered which makes the sample 
more representative. Most papers consider only firm specific factors, but this study considers 
both firm and country specific factors, which broadens the limited scope of research 
previously conducted into capital structure. This study could be used as a stepping stone for 
future research, to help in understanding, or explaining in detail, how the country specific 
factors contribute to leverage as countries continue to develop. It would also be useful for 
indicating how firms can make efficient financial decisions. 
The second paper (corporate cash holdings) was motivated by the fact that there was a 
need for better understanding of the concept of cash holdings the African context, especially 
considering the fact that not much work has been done in this area compared to Western 
economies and the emerging economies of Asia. Therefore, the benefit of holding cash in 
firms’‎operations‎is‎lacking.‎Again,‎because‎the‎study‎focused‎on‎the‎trends‎in‎cash‎holdings‎
due to the temporary effects of shocks and risks at a specific time period, it will provide the 12 
necessary information for managers and investors regarding how solid and liquid the firms 
are in Africa countries, in terms of undertaking profitable projects at any point in time. This 
will benefit the firms and shareholders and give a more detailed understanding of the 
magnitude of country and firm factors’ impact on corporate cash holding. The trends will 
further provide direction and encourage firms and regulators of African countries to make 
decisions regarding cash holdings when the observed factors are considered in the firms’‎
operations and management. It will enable investors to evaluate the performance of the firms 
and make well informed decisions when investing in Africa countries, knowing that the firms 
are better positioned in their operations to avoid an unexpected financial burden. Additionally, 
because firms in African countries faced high constraints and high costs in accessing capital, 
there was a need to provide information about firms and an insight into cash holding policies 
to avoid unexpected losses and the risk of turning down worthwhile investments. It is 
therefore believed that the results of this study will shed light on the factors influencing 
corporate cash holdings, which will be beneficial to corporate managers and will also serve as 
a basis for research into corporate cash holding. 
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways: (1) It considers panel 
data from 14 African countries over an 18 year period, which, as far as is known, is the first 
time research looking at cash holdings in Africa that has been conducted. (2) It also provides 
an understanding of how listed non-financial firms in these selected African countries 
manage their cash holdings. (3) Additionally, it contributes to the literature by investigating 
the determinants of cash holdings in these selected Africa countries. Finally, (4) it combines 
both country and firm specific factors analysis with dynamic panel data estimates, which, as 
far as is known, has not occurred in previous research papers about Africa. This paper will 
also serve as the impetus for a much wider interest in cash holdings in Africa and the basis 
for theory formation regarding firms in Africa. 
The third and final paper, which is about dividend policy, was motivated by the fact 
that most of the research about corporate dividends has been in advanced countries. With the 
exception of a few studies into corporate dividend payment in individual countries, such as 
Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa, there has not been a single study of dividend 
payouts decisions in several African countries, also detailing the trends across a time period. 
This study therefore attempts to look at the issue of corporate dividend policy decisions 
across 14 African countries. As the study also looks at the temporary effects (trends) of risks 
and shocks at specific times, it will therefore provide information for investors regarding the 13 
performance of firms in African countries over a period of time, and give a comprehensive 
understanding of how macro and micro factors impact on dividend policy decisions. The 
trends, will again, provide a clear direction for potential investors, and new entrants as well, 
and will go a long way towards encouraging firms and regulators in the individual countries 
to make decisions about dividend policies, especially when the relationships between the 
observed variables are taken into consideration. Furthermore, since most African countries 
have put in place measures to attract direct foreign investment and also encourage investors 
to invest in existing firms across Africa, this study will serve as basis for research into 
corporate dividend payout in the African context, which will enable investors to make 
informed decisions regarding their investments across Africa.   
The contributions of this paper are that it covers a longer time period (18 years), and 
includes 14 African countries, which the researcher believes to be the first analysis of its kind. 
From the findings, it will therefore provide a conclusive statement regarding the trends in 
dividend payout. Another important contribution is that the larger number of firms included 
in the study makes the sample more representative. A further contribution of the study is that 
it takes into consideration country specific factors in addition to the firm factors, which 
broadens the limited scope of previously conducted research into dividend payout in 
individual countries. This study could be used as a stepping stone for future research to help 
in understanding, or explaining in detail, how the country specific factors contribute to 
dividend payout as countries continue to develop. 
1.4  Structure of this Thesis  
This thesis is structured into three separate segments. A chapter is dedicated to each of the 
three issues related to capital usage and distribution, in terms of determinants of capital 
structure, dividend policy and corporate cash holdings in African countries. However, what is 
common to these three separate lines of research is their emphasis on the impact, on finance 
of firms and economic growth in African countries.  
Chapter II describes the data, sources, definitions and distributional properties of the 
variables in the thesis. The chapter also provides the research methodology considered for all 
the three separate chapters (capital structure, cash holdings and dividend policy). 
Chapter III comprises an analysis of trends in capital structure (leverage), the 
relationship between leverage, profitability, target pay-out, non-debt tax shield, firm size, 
investment opportunities, banking development, economic development, and governance of 14 
the firms selected in Africa, using a panel dataset of 608 non-financial listed firms. The 
chapter measures the relationship between leverage (capital structure), firm and country 
specific factors and empirically tests whether firm and country level factors affect capital 
structure. The chapter demonstrates robust support for the relationship between leverage, firm 
and country level factors and pecking order and trade-off theories. It also provides evidence 
of low and stable trends in leverage.  
Chapter IV examines the trends and analyses whether country level factors (rule of 
law, gross domestic product and domestic credit of banks) affect corporate cash holdings. 
The results provide evidence in support of previous studies, that corporate cash holdings are 
significantly determined by leverage, net working capital, capital expenditure and return on 
asset. Firms with leverage tend to hold less cash. Firms with capital expenditure, net working 
capital and return on asset hold large amounts of cash. The results of the coefficients suggests 
that both the trade-off and pecking order theory are applicable in explaining firm factors, but 
are more supportive of the pecking order. Firm factors explain differentials in cash holdings, 
but country factors do not impact significantly, after controlling for firm specific factors and 
trends are stable. 
Chapter V of this thesis examines differentials in firm and country specific factors for 
payers and non-payers of dividends policy. Secondly, it examines the predictors concerning 
the amount of dividends paid by listed non-financial firms in African countries. The research 
found that dividend payers are more profitable, have larger firm size, greater investment, high 
retention of earnings and less financial leverage than non-paying firms. The results also show 
that in countries where gross domestic product is low, firms are likely to pay dividends, and 
that the corruption level is high for non-payers of dividends. The conclusion, therefore, 
indicates that, although firm specific factors are important in Africa in determining dividend 
policy regarding payout, country specific factors, such as corruption and the GDP per capita, 
play very significant roles. The results support the results of previous studies. 
Chapter VI captures the general conclusions of this thesis by outlining and providing the 
policy implications of the chapters. The chapter also considers the essential limitations of the 
current thesis, and also recommends areas for future research. 
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  Data and Research Methodology  Chapter 2:17 
2.1 Data and sources 
2.1.1  Data  
 
The study uses firm and country level panel (1994-2011) data of listed non-financial firms in 
African countries. The firms were obtained from African stock markets (online sources) and 
Datastream. Firms with a registered International Securities Identifying Number (ISIN) and 
codes  were  selected.  The  ISIN  code  is  a  unique  international  code  which  identifies  the 
security in which a firm trades. Firms without ISIN codes were eliminated, since their data 
would be difficult to collect from a database, and also to make sure the firms listed in Africa 
were  identified  and  recognised  by  the  international  community,  which  also  provided 
credibility  for  the  existence  of  the  firms.  Financial  firms,  insurance  and  utilities  were 
excluded, as their financial decisions and rules undertaken are affected by different factors 
than  listed  non-financial  firms.  This  is  supported  by  Gonzalez  and  Gonzalez  (2012)  and 
Wiwattanakantang (1999). To avoid double counting of firms, the firms were grouped into 
their headquarters (African and foreign countries) and the countries in which they operate. 
Only the latter group was considered. Firms with similar ISIN codes and similar names were 
eliminated. Sample firms were selected from 14 African countries. These countries  were: 
Botswana,‎Cote‎D’Ivoire,‎Egypt,‎Ghana,‎Kenya,‎Morocco,‎Namibia,‎Nigeria,‎South‎Africa,‎
Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda,  Zambia, and  Zimbabwe  throughout  the  eighteen  year period, 
1994-2011. These countries were selected because of data availability covering the study 
period and the fact that the countries were a mixture of middle and low income countries, 
high  and  low  populations,  war  and  non-war  countries,  to  provide  a  general  and 
comprehensive understanding of how firms operate regarding their capital structure, cash 
holding  and  dividend  policy,  and  the  fact  that,  because  they  are  African  countries,  their 
environment is different from developed countries. The final sample for the study contained 
608 firms with data periods of 18 years, which provided 10944 firm year observations based 
on the selection criteria.  
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Table ‎2.1 Total number of firms in each country 
Country  No of firms  Data periods (1994-2011)  No. of 
Observation 
Botswana  19  18   342 
Cote‎D’Ivoire  29  18  522 
Egypt  91  18  1638 
Ghana  24  18  432 
Kenya  42  18  756 
Morocco  61  18  1098 
Namibia  27  18  486 
Nigeria  117  18  2106 
South Africa  129  18  2322 
Tanzania  3  18  54 
Tunisia  30  18  540 
Uganda  8  18  144 
Zambia  14  18  252 
Zimbabwe  14  18  252 
Total  608    10944 
An excel file showing firm’s name, ISIN, start date, sources and country was constructed, 
which facilitated the collection of the data. 
2.1.2  Sources 
Using a template with ISIN codes, the firm level data was retrieved from the Bloomberg 
database as  the main source of data  extraction for firm  factors from their balance sheet, 
income  statement  and  cash  flows  from  1989  to  2011,  but  the  period  1994  to  2011  was 
selected  because  of  data  availability.    The  defining  parameters  in  the  template  for  data 
download from Bloomberg were the firm’s ISIN, the Bloomberg start year of the data (1989), 
the  currency  used  (U.S.  dollars,  in  millions),  and  the  Bloomberg  field  (Mnemonic)  and 
description.  Yearly data was used.  
The  country  level  factors  consisted  of  macroeconomic  and  governance  data.  The 
macroeconomic, data including gross domestic product, gross domestic product per capital 
and domestic credit provided by the banking sector, was extracted from the World Bank 
(2012) World Development Indicators. Governance data, including rule of law, control of 
corruption and political stability was extracted from the World Bank website (Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, 2012) over the period 1996-2011. 1994 and 1995 were not considered 
for governance factors because of the unavailability of data. Yearly data was used and was 
US  dollars.  These  were  necessary  for  accessing  the  governance  indicators  and  the 19 
development indicators of the various countries in order to access their impact on capital 
structure, corporate cash holdings and dividend policy in Africa.  
2.1.3  Variables and definitions  
Table ‎2.2 Paper One variables and definitions: Capital structure 
Paper one of the thesis considers the capital structure trends and the choice of the variables 
and proxies were guided by previous studies. The dependent variable Leverage (LEV) and 
independent variables used in this study followed Fama and French (2002), with some 
modifications. Leverage as used in this study was defined as total debt to total assets 
Variables  Label  Definition 
 Dependent variable: 
Leverage   Lev  Total debt divided by total assets 
Independent variables: 
Investment opportunity  Inv. opp.  Market value of assets divided by the total 
assets 
Profitability   Prof  Earnings before interest and tax divided by 
total assets 
Firm Size  Size  Natural logarithm of assets 
Non-debt tax shield  NDTS  Depreciation expenses divided by total assets 
Target payout  Tag. payt  Dividend divided by earnings per share 
Gross domestic 
product (real GDP)  GDPcons  Gross domestic product at constant price (in 
real terms), measuring economic development 
Domestic credit  
of banks to  GDP  DCB%GDP 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector as 
a percentage of GDP  (measure banking 
development) 
Rule of law  RoL 
Perception of extent of confidence and law 
abiding in society, quality of contract 
enforcement, courts, property rights, crime and 
others 
Corruption  Cor  Perception of the extent to which public power 
is exercised for private gain and others 
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Table ‎2.3 Paper Two variables and definitions: Corporate cash holding 
Paper Two of the thesis looked at corporate cash holdings. The selection of the variables used 
in this study was guided by the literature. The dependent and independent variables were 
defined so as to be consistent with those of Bates et al. (2009). The dependent variable cash 
holding was, defined as cash and marketable securities divided by total assets. 
Variables  Label  Definitions      
Dependent variable: 
Cash holding (Cash ratio) 
         CASHR  Cash and marketable securities divided by total 
assets 
Independent variables: 
Financial leverage  LEV  Total debt divided by total assets (proxy for  
financial distress)   
Market-to-book ratio  MKTBR  Market value of equity divided by total assets 
(measure for investment opportunities) 
Cash flow  CF 
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization divided by total assets (proxy for 
internal source of finance)  
Net working capital  NWC 
Working capital  less cash and marketable 
securities divided by total assets (proxy for liquid 
asset) 
Capital expenditure  CE  Capital expenditure divided by total assets (proxy 
for investment or demand for cash)  
Firm size  SIZE  Natural logarithm of total assets  
Dividend payout  DIV  Dividend payout divided by total equity  
Return on assets  ROA  Net income divided by total assets (proxy for 
profitability) 
Rule of law  ROL 
Perception of the extent of confidence and law 
abiding in society, quality of contract 
enforcement, courts, property rights, crime and 
others.) 
Gross domestic product 
(real GDP)  GDPC  Gross domestic product at constant price (for 
measuring economic development) 
Domestic credit of banks 
to GDP   DCB%GDP  Domestic credit of banks as a percentage of GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 21 
Table ‎2.4 Paper Three variables and definitions: Dividend policy 
Paper three is concerned with dividend policy across African countries. The selection of the 
variables used in this study was guided by the literature.  The dependent variable was 
dividend policy (DPY3), defined as dividend per share to total assets.  
Variables  Label  Definition 
Dependent variable: 
Dividend policy  DPY3  Dividend per share divided by total assets  
Independent variables: 
Profitability  PROF  Earnings before tax and interest divided by total 
assets 
Financial leverage    FLEV  Total debt divided by total assets 
Investment opportunity  INV  Total market value of equity divided by total 
assets 
Firm size  SIZE  Natural logarithm of assets 
Corruption  COR  Perception of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain and others 
GDP per capita (log)  lnGDPperca  Log of gross domestic product per capita  
 
Country level factors: (Macroeconomic and Governance) 
Gross‎domestic‎product‎(real‎GDP)‎is‎the‎gross‎domestic‎product‎at‎purchaser’s‎prices, and is 
the sum of the gross value added by all resident producers in the economy, plus any product 
taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products.  Data was in constant 
2000 U.S. dollars. Gross domestic product per capita (real GDP) is gross domestic product 
divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of the gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy, plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the 
value of the product. Domestic credit provided by the banking sector (percentage of GDP) 
includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the exception of credit to the 
central government, which is net as a percentage of GDP. The banking sector includes 
monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other banking institutions where 
data is available (including institutions that do not accept transferable deposits, but incur such 
liabilities as time savings deposits). Real values were considered, to take into account 
inflation (that is adjustment for price changes). GDP per capita and the domestic credit of 
banks as a percentage of GDP are measures for economic growth and banking development 
respectively (Levine and Zervos, 1998). Macroeconomic variables were in real values. The 22 
real values were considered because they are normally distributed. (See appendix B for 
details on variable definitions from data source).  
From the World Bank (2012) Worldwide governance indicators database, Rule of law is an 
index that reflects the perception of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract of enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Corruption 
is an index that reflects the perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private‎gain,‎including‎both‎petty‎and‎grand‎forms‎of‎corruption,‎as‎well‎as‎‘capture’‎of‎the‎
state by elites and private interests. The composite estimates of governance indicators’ rule of 
law and corruption are in units of a standard normal distribution, with a mean of zero,  a 
standard deviation of one and ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong), with 
high values corresponding to better governance performance. The indication is that countries 
with positive or higher values show higher regard for the rule of law and have strong control 
over corruption. (See appendix C for details on variable definitions from data source) 23 
2.2  Distributional properties for variables 
 
Table ‎2.5 Distributional properties for all selected variables 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. 
Dev. 
Min  Max  JB Statistic 
Firm factors: 
 
 
     
 
Leverage  0.17  0.12  0.18  0.00  3.27  1.29 x 10^5 
Investment opp.  1.54  1.01  9.35  -0.46  491.27  1.03 x 10^9 
Profitability  0.10  0.10  0.25  -13.69  1.37  6.67 x 10^8 
Firm size   4.97  4.88  2.10  -3.37  22.69  5.29 x 10^2 
Target payout  10.84  0.37  771.16  -100  58823  8.20 x 10^9 
Non-debt tax shield  0.11  0.03  5.40  0.00  392.17  6.04 x 10^9 
Cash ratio  0.12  0.08  0.13  0.00  1.00  1.91 x 10^4 
Market-to-book ratio  1.54  1.01  9.36  -0.46  491.27  1.03 x 10^9 
Cash flow  0.14  0.15  0.27  -13.68  1.39  5.11 x 10^8 
Net working capital  676049.2  10.21  54.2  -4363.06  4.35*10
9  1.11 x 10^10 
Capital expenditure  0.07  -0.05  0.08  -3.15  0.01  2.41 x 10^7 
Dividend payout  1506.38  0.33  64474.8  -25.89  3363630  1.21 x 10^9 
Returns on assets  0.06  0.07  0.27  -11.02  2.26  1.78 x 10^8 
Dividend policy  0.04  0.01  1.57  0.00  90.95  1.47 x 10^9 
Country factors:             
Real GDP  70.80  53.10  56.80  2.82  193.00  9.21 x 10^2 
Domestic credit of   
Banks to GDP  53.56  36.09  46.08  3.09  161.98  1.83 x 10^3 
Corruption  -0.38  -0.39  0.64  -1.36  1.25  4.19 x 10^2 
Rule of law  -0.43  -0.12  0.63  -1.82  0.67  7.38 x 10^2 
GDP per capita (log)  6.98  7.19  0.90  5.32  8.37  1.05 x 10^3 
NB: Jarque-Bera test statistic was rounded in 3 significant figures. 
The table above shows the distributional properties of all the variables used in the thesis. For 
ease of reading, gross domestic product (Real GDP) and net working capital are reported in 
billions and millions respectively. It provides the mean, median, standard deviation, 
minimum, maximum, and Jarque_Bera test statistic. The mean and median values of the 
leverage were 0.17 and 0.12, respectively. The standard deviation was 0.18, with a minimum 
and maximum of 0.00 and 3.27 respectively. The mean and median values of investment 
opportunities were 1.54 and 1.01, respectively, with a variation of 9.35 and minimum and 
maximum of -0.46 and 491.27 respectively. Profitability had a mean and median value of 
0.10 and 0.10, with a standard deviation of 0.25 and minimum and maximum of -13.69 and 
1.37 respectively. 24 
Firm size had a mean and median of 4.97 and 4.88 respectively and a variation of 2.10, with a 
minimum and maximum of -3.37 and 22.69 respectively. The mean and median values of the 
target payout were 10.84 and 0.37, respectively, with a standard deviation of 771.16. The 
minimum and maximum were -100 and 58823 respectively. The non-debt tax shield had a 
mean and median value of 0.11 and 0.03 respectively, with a standard deviation of 5.40. The 
minimum and maximum were 0.00 and 392.17 respectively. Cash ratio had a mean of 0.12 
and a median of 0.08, with a standard deviation of 0.13. The minimum and maximum values 
were 0.00 and 1.00 respectively. The market to book ratio had a mean of 1.54 and a median 
of 1.01 with a standard deviation of 9.36. The minimum value was -0.46 and it had a 
maximum of 491.27. Cash flow had a mean value of 0.14 and a median of 0.15, with a 
standard deviation of 0.27. The minimum and maximum values were -13.68 and 1.39. The 
net working capital had a mean of 676069.20 and a median of 10.21, with a standard 
deviation of 54.20. The minimum and maximum values were -4363.06 and 4.35*10
9 
respectively. The mean and median values of capital expenditure were 0.07 and -0.05, with a 
standard deviation of 0.08. The minimum and maximum values were -3.15 and 0.01 
respectively. Dividend payout had a mean of 1506.38 and a median of 0.33, with a standard 
deviation of 64474. The minimum and maximum values were -25.89 and 33630 respectively. 
Return on assets had a mean of 0.06 and median of 0.07, with a standard deviation of 0.27. 
The minimum and maximum were -11.02 and 2.26 respectively. Dividend policy had a mean 
of 0.04 and a median of 0.01, with a standard deviation of 1.57. The minimum and maximum 
values were 0.00 and 90.95 respectively. The gross domestic product (Real GDP) had a mean 
value of 70.80 and a median value of 53.10 and a variation of 56.80, with minimum and 
maximum values of 2.82 and 193.00 respectively. Domestic credit of banks to GDP had a 
mean value of 53.56 and a median value of 36.09, with a standard deviation of 46.08. 
Minimum and maximum values were 3.09 and 161.98 respectively. Corruption index showed 
a mean value of -0.38 and median value of -0.39, with a standard deviation of 0.68. The 
minimum and maximum values were -1.36 and 1.25 respectively. The mean and median 
values of rule of law were -0.43 and -0.12 respectively, with a standard deviation of 0.63. The 
minimum and maximum values were -1.82 and 0.67 respectively. Gross domestic product per 
capita, measured as the log of GDP per capita, had a mean value of 6.98 and a median of 
value of 7.19, with a standard deviation of 0.90. The minimum and maximum values were 
5.32 and 8.37 respectively. As the results indicate from the Jarque_Bera test statistic (JB), the 
variables in the dataset are not normally distributed and therefore the hypothesis of normal 
distribution is rejected at 5% level of significance, with a critical value of 5.99 at 2 degrees of 25 
freedom. The Jarque-Bera test statistic results for variables in each country show non-
normality, with the exception of Tanzania, with the JB test of some variables less than the 
critical‎value‎of‎5.99.‎For‎each‎individual‎country’s‎specific‎distributional properties of 
variables, see Appendix D for details). 27 
2.3  Research Methodology  
This section considers the methods applied throughout the thesis for examining the 
determinants of the capital structure, cash holdings and dividend policy of firms in African 
countries. A significant body of study, for example studies by Mankiw et al. (1992) and  
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003), have investigated some of these relationships using cross-
sectional data. Such studies have averaged the dependent and the independent variables over 
a suitably long period, which is meant to capture the steady state relationship between the 
variables concerned. Cross-sectional estimation methods may capture the long-run 
relationship between the variables of interest. However, they do not take advantage of the 
time series variations in the data, which potentially could increase the efficiency of the 
estimation. In this study, the basic empirical strategy was to predict the dependent variables 
of firms using a dynamic panel data estimation technique, because of its ability to overcome 
problems such as omitted variable bias due to heterogeneity as well as endogeneity. The 
estimating equations were formulated below:  
Fixed Effect 
(A) Firm fixed-effect 
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(B) Country fixed-effect 
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General Method of Moment (GMM) 
                      
         
                 
Where: 
     = Dependent variable for the firm   at the time  . 
   
    = Vector of explanatory variables for the firm level factors  
    
    = Vector of explanatory variables for country level factors 
       = Lag of the dependent variable 
  = Constant 
      Firm dummies 
   =   Time dummies  
            = Error terms 
The models above were estimated using two econometric methods: Firstly, panel data fixed 
effect and secondly, general method of moment (GMM). Firstly, equation (1) was estimated 
using firm fixed effect, secondly, equation (2) was estimated using country fixed effect and  
thirdly, equation (3) was estimated using GMM, by combining both firm and country level 
factors.  
The evaluation of the formula for the technique used was based on the fact that, accounting 
for only the firm factors, the estimated R-Squared statistics show that the model explains only 
2% of the within group variability, 1% of the between group variability and 2% of the overall 
variability. Accounting for only the country level factors, the estimated R-Squared statistics 
show that the model explains only 2% of the within group variability and less than 1% of the 
between group and overall variability. However, when both the firm and country level 
variables are included in the model, the estimated R-Squared statistics show that the model 
explains 10% of the within group variability, 4% of the between group and the overall 
variability. Although the estimated R-Squared statistics are not very high, there is evidence to 
suggest that the general method moment (GMM) model, with both the firm and country level 29 
factors including the lag of the dependent variable, fits the data better than the separate 
models. 
The completed final models for each of the papers are shown below.  
Paper One: Capital structure (Leverage is the dependent variable) 
        
                                                                         
                                                                                   
                                                                                                                         (2) 
 
Paper Two: Corporate cash holding (Cash holding is the dependent variable) 
        
                                                                           
                                                                                         
                                        +                +             +                                     (3)  
 
Paper Three: Corporate dividend policy (Dividend policy is the dependent variable) 
        
                                                                          
                                                                                                            (4) 
Where: 
 
        Leverage ratio (total debt/total assets) for firm   at time   
          The lagged leverage of firm   at time   
           Investment opportunities (market value of assets/ total assets) for firm   at time   
          Profitability (EBIT / total assets) for firm   at time   
          Non-debt tax shield (Depreciation expenses / total assets) for firm   at time   
        Size of the firm (logarithm of total assets) for firm   at time   
              Target payout (Dividend per share /earnings per share) for firm   at time            
          Cash holding (cash and marketable securities /total assets) for firm   at time   
           Lagged of cash holding of firm   at time   
         Market to book ratio ( market value of equity / total assets) for firm   at time   
      Cash flow (EBITDA / total assets) for firm   at time   
       Networking capital (working capital - cash and marketable securities/total assets) 
for firm   at time   
      Capital expenditure (capital expenditure/total assets) for firm   at time   
       Dividend payout (dividend payout / total equity) for firm   at time   
        Return on asset (net income/total assets) for firm   at time            
          Dividend policy (dividend per share /total assets ) for firm   at time   
          Lagged of leverage of firm   at time   
           Gross domestic product at constant price for country   at time   
           Domestic credit provided by banking sector as a percentage of GDP for country 
  at time   30 
       Rule of law for country   at time   
        Corruption for country   at time   
               Log of gross domestic product per capita for country   at time   
     The error term 
 
2.3.1 Estimator Choice 
In the estimations, two methods were employed, which were the fixed effects and the general 
method of moment (GMM), but with different dependent and independent variables. The first 
model examined the impact of firm level factors on the dependent variable, whilst the second 
model examined the impact of country level factors. The third model combined firm and 
country level factors, and the last model used the GMM by combining firm and country level 
factors. All the models are estimated using the fixed effects estimator as the benchmark, 
which was done to control for unobserved heterogeneity across firms. The fixed effect 
estimations were also adopted to take into account the individuality of each firm specific 
effect or cross-sectional unit included in the sample, by allowing the intercept to vary for 
each firm, while assuming that the slope coefficients were constant across firms. The reason 
for this was that the panel data incorporated observations on the same cross sectional unit 
over several time periods, meaning that it is more likely that there would be cross sectional 
effects on each firm, or a set of firms, so using fixed effects would address the issue. 
However, the fixed effect was flawed, due to the endogeneity of the variables in the model 
(Gupta et al., 2005). The OLS estimator was upward biased and inconsistent, due to the 
dynamic structure of the model, since the lag of the dependent variable was correlated with 
the error term. However, the fixed effect estimator transformed the models by substracting 
the out the time series means of each variable for each firm, and had the advantage of wiping 
out firm (country) specific effects that were time invariant. However, the coefficients were 
likely to be downward biased, as Nickell (1981) has shown that for finite T, the fixed effect 
estimator is biased and inconsistent. To address this problem, Anderson and Hsiao (1981) 
proposed the first difference transformation of the the model and the use of the past level of 
the dependent variable as an instrument for the first difference. This instrumental variable 
technique leads to consistent, but not necessarily efficient, estimates, because it does not use 
all the available moment condition  (Baltagi, 1995). Therefore in this study, the general 
method of moment (GMM) technique, developed for the dynamic panel data using both the 
Differenced-GMM estimator by (Arellano and Bond, 1991), was considerd. The Arellano and 
Bond (Differenced-GMM) estimator estimates the difference equations, which gets rid of the 31 
time invariant effects, and extends the Anderson-Hsiao idea considering also the lagged past 
values.  
The Arellano-Bond estimator (Differenced-GMM) uses all the possible lagged values of the 
predetermined variables as valid instruments, and it obtains more efficient and consistent 
(asymptotically) estimates than the Anderson-Hsiao IV estimator. 
In summary, the GMM was adopted to solve the problems of: (1) the presence of unobserved 
firm effects, and (2) the autoregressive process in the data (Gonzalez and Gonzalez, 2012). 
GMM‎also‎provides‎robust‎estimates,‎since‎it‎eliminates‎firms’‎non-observable individual 
effects and controls endogeneity issues, as the lagged values are used as instruments. GMM 
eliminates the issue of possible correlation between the lags of the dependent variable and the 
error term, given the orthogonal conditions between the lagged variables and the error term. It 
has the ability to overcome problems such as omitted variable bias due to heterogeneity as 
well as endogeneity. Two tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) were also used. The 
first was the Sargan and Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions.  
In the regression, a formal test was conducted on the first three models using the Wooldridge 
test for autocorrelation to check whether the results were free from serial correlation. The test 
suggested that serial correlation was an issue and, therefore, it was necessary to consider the 
GMM, as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) to further enhance the efficiency and 
robustness of the results. The Sargan and Hansen tests for overidentifying restrictions proved 
that second order autocorelation was not an issue and overidentifying restrictions were 
satisfied. The null hypothesis of no serial correlation could, therefore, not be rejected.     
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ABSTRACT  
This chapter explains the empirical analysis of the capital structure trends for listed non-
financial firms in African countries. Using a panel dataset of 608 firms from 14 African 
countries over the period 1994-2011 and employing Fama and French (2002)s’ approach with 
modifications, the study measures the relationship between leverage, and firm and country 
specific factors. The study found a positive relationship between leverage, investment 
opportunities, non-debt tax shield, firm size, the domestic credit of banks, and the rule of law. 
However, a negative relationship was reported between leverage, profitability, target payout, 
corruption, and gross domestic product. The study found that lagged leverage, investment 
opportunities, profitability, firm size, domestic credit of banks, gross domestic product, 
corruption and the rule of law were significant in determining the capital structure of firms in 
the selected African countries. The study also found that the leverage trends across the 
countries under examination were very low and stable. The conclusion, therefore, indicates 
that, although firm specific factors are important in Africa in determining leverage, country 
specific factors, such as the institutional environment and governance, play a very significant 
role in determining the level of leverage. The signs of these relationships suggest that pecking 
order and trade-off theories of capital structure models derived from the developed countries 
provide help in explaining financial behaviour of firms in the selected African countries. 
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3.1  Introduction 
Capital structure is necessary for the growth of firms and economic development. Capital 
structure has been defined as the mix of securities and financing sources used by firms to 
finance real investment (Myers, 2001).‎Ever‎since‎the‎‘irrelevance’‎propositions‎by‎
Modigliani and Miller (1958), interest in studies about capital structure has grown, with many 
divergent views reported about the relationships between the characteristics of firms, such as 
profitability, tangibility, size, investment opportunities, the non-debt tax shield, target payout, 
and size as determinants of leverage. 
Leverage has also been defined by Ward and Price (2006) as the proportion of capital 
which is financed by debt rather than equity. With the assertion made by Modigliani and 
Miller (1958), many studies have reported  strong relationships between leverage and other 
firm characteristics. Compared to the developed world, very little research has been done on 
African countries about the capital structure of firms except, for example, studies by Abor 
(2008), Salawu and Agboola ( 2008), Ramlall (2009), Amidu (2007), Dawood et al. (2011), 
Olayinka (2011), and Buferna et al. (2005). Even these few studies have mainly concentrated 
on determinants of the capital structure of firms in specific individual countries.  
The objective of this study is to examine the capital structure trends in Africa, with 
consideration‎of‎both‎firms’‎and‎country‎specific‎variables, and it discusses and examines the 
determinants of capital structure in 13 selected Africa countries. Country specific factors, 
such as the development of banking, economic development and the governance of a country, 
are employed to examine and understand their impact on firm corporate financing behaviour 
across the selected countries in Africa, as well as considering the firm specific factors, such 
as investment opportunities, profitability, the non-debt tax shield, firm size and target payout. 
Both the firm and country specific factors were used to identify the extent to which these 
relationships confirm, or reject, the predictions of the pecking order and the trade-off theories 
and their impact on leverage in the selected African countries. 
This study is motivated by the fact that there is a growing need for African countries 
to wean themselves from the Breton Woods Institutions, but the only way out is for 
indigenous African firms to lead the way by increasing the pace of manufacturing. This has 
many implications for gross domestic product growth, employment creation, expansion of 
government revenue through taxation, retention of foreign exchange through the reduction in 
import of consumer goods, and general expansion of the economy. These can only be 38 
 
achieved when these firms are positioned well to increase productivity and investments, 
which is possible when enough capital is available to the firms. Capital has been found to be 
the single most important factor in firm growth in Africa (Abor, 2008). It is therefore 
important that firms avail themselves of the information and knowledge of capital issues. 
However, lack of research in this area, coupled with very little research in R&D among 
African firms, has made it difficult for firms to have the needed information. This study 
therefore provides that information about the determinants of capital structure at both the firm 
level and the country level to help firms in their capital structure decisions. The study is also 
motivated by trends’ effects of shocks and risks at specific times. Therefore, the growth and 
performance of firms in African countries would be made known to investors and also 
provide a thorough understanding of how country and firm factors influence capital structure 
(leverage) decisions in African countries. Since most countries in Africa aim at attracting 
direct foreign investment and also reassuring investors to invest in firms in Africa, the trends 
will provide complete evidence about the direction for potential investors and new 
competitors, to enable them make conclusive decisions to invest in Africa. There is also the 
need for a single study with wider application across Africa, and this study, covering several 
African countries, provides that to enable investors to make informed decisions regarding 
investments in these countries. 
The contributions of this study are that it covers a longer time period of 18 years, and 
13 selected African countries, which enables a conclusive statement to be drawn from the 
findings about the trends in capital structure in Africa. Another important contribution is that 
larger numbers of firms have been considered which makes the sample more representative. 
Most papers consider only firm specifics factors, but this study considers both firm and 
country specific factors, which broadens the limited scope of research previously conducted 
into capital structure. This study could be used as a stepping stone for future research to help 
in understanding or explaining in detail how the country specific factors contribute to 
leverage as countries continue to develop, and also for efficient financing decisions of firms. 
The paper has been organized into six sections. Section one introduces the area of 
research. This is followed by a review of the literature in sections two and three. Section four 
describes the methodology, followed by a discussion of the results in section five. The 
conclusions of the paper are presented in section six. 39 
 
3.2  Theories and definition of capital structure 
Capital structure has been defined as the mix of securities and financing sources used by 
firms to finance real investment (Myers, 2001). Actual mention has been made of debt and 
equity Abor (2008) and other intermediate securities (Brounen et al., 2006) as sources of 
finance.  
It was in 1958, when Modigliani and Miller (1958) presented a paper on the 
irrelevance of capital structure, that researchers became motivated to investigate it. The 
interest is on-going, but, with the passage of time, new ideas have been added to the question 
of the relevance, or irrelevance, of capital structure. Modigliani and Miller (1958) stated that 
in a world of frictionless capital markets, capital structure would not be necessary (Schwartz 
and Aronson, 1967). This theory later became known as the "Theory of Irrelevance'.  
Modigliani and Miller (1958)s’ argument was that no capital structure mix is better 
than another. Modigliani and Miller (1958)s’, Proposition-II attempted to solve the problem 
which occurs when an increase in the debt ratio also leads to an increased rate of return. They 
stated that the expected rate of increase in return generated by debt financing is exactly offset 
by the risk incurred, regardless of the financing composition chosen.  
Following Modigliani and Miller (1958)s’‎assumptions, two theories have been 
suggested‎to‎explain‎capital‎structure‎as‎being‎very‎relevant‎to‎a‎firm’s‎value.‎These‎theories‎
are the Pecking Order theory and the Trade-off theory. The Pecking Order Theory and the 
Trade-off theory followed Miller (1977)'s seminal paper. The Pecking Order theory (Myers, 
1984) gave a structured way of considering financing instruments. Pecking Order theory 
takes into consideration the results of the debt equity of firms. It stated that firms will explore 
all financial sources at their disposal, but in the end will select the lowest source first (Myers, 
1984). It therefore recommended that a project be undertaken based on the following 
methodologies: by using internal equity, followed by the use of debt and, lastly, by using 
external equity (Titman and Wessels, 1988).  
  The major distinction is that equity has two categories, namely, internal equity and 
external equity. Internal equity is that which is readily available for investment, whereas 
external equity is that which must be obtained from outside sources.  
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3.2.1  Trade-off theory 
The Trade-off theory of capital structure indicates that the decision of a company to choose 
how much debt and equity financing that is required is based on the balancing of the costs 
and benefits of each form of funding (Gurcharan, 2010). According to Gurcharan (2010), 
there is an advantage to finance through debt (interest tax shield benefit) but this needs to 
include consideration of the costs of financial distress, including the bankruptcy costs of debt 
and non-bankruptcy costs. Therefore, the empirical relevance of the trade-off theory is still 
been questioned (Frank and Goyal, 2003). On the other hand, Miller (1977) and Graham 
(2003) argue that the tax savings obtained do appear large enough and certain, while the 
deadweight bankruptcy costs seem minor. 
The Trade-off theory suggests that firms having huge intangible assets must use 
equity financing in their business, and firms with tangible assets should seriously consider 
debt  financing (Milton and Raviv, 1990). It is evident that the merits and demerits of 
offering excessive debt are significant. Trade-off theory acknowledges the tax advantages of 
debt, whilst also considering the threat of bankruptcy associated with it. The Agency Cost 
theory Jensen and Meckling (1976), cited in Chakraborty (2010) proposes that the optimal 
capital structure is determined by agency costs, which include the costs for both debt and 
equity issues. The costs related to equity issues may include (a) the monitoring expenses of 
the‎shareholders,‎(b)‎the‎bonding‎expenses‎of‎the‎managers,‎and‎(c)‎‘residual‎loss’‎due‎to‎the‎
divergence‎of‎managers’‎decisions‎from‎those‎of‎the‎shareholders Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), cited in (Chakraborty, 2010). On the other hand, according to this theory, debt issue 
increases‎the‎shareholders’‎and‎managers’‎incentives to invest in high-risk projects that yield 
high returns to the shareholders, but increase the likelihood of failure that the bond holders 
will have to share if it is realised. If debt holders anticipate this, a high premium would be 
charged, which, in turn, would increase the cost of the debt. Thus both equity and debt incur 
agency costs, and hence the optimal capital structure involves a trade-off between these two 
types of cost. 
3.2.2  Pecking Order theory 
Frank and Goyal (2003) describe the Pecking Order theory of capital structure as one of the 
most influential theories of corporate leverage. The theory maintains that due to adverse 
selection, firms prefer internal to external finance (Myers, 1984).When outside funds are 
necessary, firms prefer debt to equity because of lower information costs associated with debt 
issues. This presents a structured way of considering financing instruments. The Pecking 41 
 
Order theory (Myers, 1984) gives a structured way of considering financing instruments. It 
recomends that a project be undertaken based on the following methodologies: by using 
internal equity, followed by the use of debt and, lastly, by using external equity (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988).  Equity is rarely issued (Frank and Goyal, 2003). 
  Frank and Goyal (2003) tested the Pecking Order theory in the period between 1971 
and 1998. They found that, on average income within the business is not adequate to finance 
any investment, that external sources of funding are highly regarded, and, therefore, debt and 
equity are important sources of funding. On the issue of determinants of capital structure, 
Bancel and Mittoo (2004) intimated that large firms do not take bankruptcy costs into much 
consideration, whilst high-growth firms  consider common stock to be the lowest source of 
funds and use windows of opportunity to issue common stock. 
  Chen (2004) found that in the Chinese economy short-term finance is more 
considered and, therefore, less attention is paid to long term debt. A paper by Rao et al. (2007) 
also stated that neither the Trade-off model nor the Pecking Order hypothesis, both based in 
Western settings, considered the capital structure options of Chinese firms. This could also be 
true for the present study of firms in Africa, which may be due to the fact that the African 
financial market is in a developmental stage and, unlike Western countries, there are the 
issues of an undeveloped financial market, lack of funding, high cost of debts, and the 
inexperience of firm managers of the dealings within the financial market. 
A study by Hovakimian et al. (2004) also found that studies of corporate financing 
choices showed that the importance of stock returns was unrelated to target leverage, and was 
likely to be due to the Pecking Order theory. The study by Rao et al. (2007) also found that 
profitability has no effect on target leverage. According to them, unprofitable firms issue 
equity to offset the excess leverage due to accumulated losses. Thus, their study supported 
the notion that firms have a target capital structure. However, preference for internal 
financing and the temptation to time the market by selling new equity when the share price is 
relatively high interfere with the tendency to maintain the firm's debt ratio close to its target 
(Rao et al., 2007). 
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3.3  Determinants of capital structure: and hypotheses development 
3.3.1  Leverage  
Leverage has been defined by Ward and Price (2006) as the proportion of capital which is 
financed by debt rather than equity. They maintained that the higher the leverage, the higher 
the amount of debt in the capital structure of a firm. Also, Firer et al. (2004) stated that 
capital structure refers to the relative amount of debt and equity a firm utilizes to finance its 
operations. Muradoglu and Sivaprasad (2007) advocated for low leverage as the best 
financial policy for firms. They explain that low leverage is able to mitigate agency problems 
and at the same time preserve financial flexibility. According to them, profitable firms may 
want to keep low leverages so as to prevent a higher proportion of profit being used for 
interest payment. They were however also concerned with the school of thought that maintain 
that firms in their attempt to keep leverage levels low, avoid taking on profitable 
opportunities and investments, hence throwing away their firm value (Muradoglu and 
Sivaprasad, 2007). Nonetheless, Muradoğlu‎and‎Sivaprasad‎(2012) maintain that investing in 
low-leverage and low-market-to-book-ratio firms yields abnormal returns to the firms.  
It has been noted by Long and Malitze (1985) and Frank and Goyal (2009) that leverage is 
limited‎to‎firms‎with‎a‎high‎proportion‎of‎intangible‎assets.‎However,‎if‎a‎firm’s‎investments‎
are primarily made up of tangible assets, such as capital equipment, that firm can support 
higher leverage. They concluded that the type of investment opportunities facing the firm 
determines its financial leverage. 
3.3.2  Leverage and investment opportunities 
The relationship between leverage and investment opportunities has been a contentious 
subject matter for many finance scholars (Ahn et al., 2006). Ahn et al. (2006) indicated that 
leverage and investment were unrelated in the original Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
propositions. In the Modigliani and Miller (1958) propositions, if a firm had profitable 
investment opportunities, it could obtain funding for these opportunities, regardless of the 
nature of its current balance sheet.  
Subsequently, however, capital structure literature has argued that leverage and 
investment opportunities are strongly related. Ahn et al. (2006) concluded that within 
diversified firms, the negative impact of leverage on investment is significantly greater for 
high q than for low q segments, and significantly greater for non-core than for core segments. 
This is consistent with the view that diversified firms allocate a disproportionate share of 44 
 
their debt service burden to their higher q and non-core segments. They also found that 
among low growth firms, the positive relation between leverage and firm value is 
significantly weaker in diversified firms than in focused firms. Myers (1977), for example, 
demonstrates that with sufficiently high leverage, positive net present value (NPV) projects 
can‎go‎unfunded,‎due‎to‎the‎‘debt‎overhang’‎created‎by‎prior‎debt‎financing.‎Jensen (1986) 
and Stulz (1990) also predict a negative relation between leverage and investment, but 
emphasize that this can be beneficial to shareholders of low growth firms because debt limits 
managerial discretion over free cash flows. Yuan and Kazuyuki (2011) also found that the 
total debt ratio (bank loan ratio) does have a negative impact on fixed  investment by 
companies, an  indication that the effect of debt on fixed investment exists for Chinese listed 
companies‎as‎well.‎They‎again‎found‎that‎companies‎with‎a‎higher‎Tobin’s‎Q‎and‎a‎larger‎
cash flow make larger amounts of investment, and also that the total debt ratio (bank loan 
ratio) has a stronger negative impact on investment by low-growth companies than on that by 
high-growth companies. Their analysis suggests that, in China, the total debt ratio (bank loan 
ratio) works as a factor that restrains excessive fixed investment by companies. It was also 
found that the restraining effect of the bank loan ratio on over-investment was larger than that 
of the total debt ratio. These results are consistent with those relating to U.S. companies from 
Lang et al. (1996), as well as the results about Japanese companies from Arikawa et al. 
(2003). Based on the above empirical evidence, the paper hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms’ in the selected African countries leverage is positively associated with 
the investment opportunities. 
3.3.3  Leverage and profitability 
Due to the relative importance of profitability to firm growth and survival, this issue has been 
examined thoroughly, both empirically and theoretically. The major theoretical developments 
in profitability analysis include the establishment of a link between market structure and 
profitability (Akinlo and Asaolu, 2012). Akinlo and Asaolu (2012) added that in the earlier 
stages of theory development, inter-industry differences in profitability were, or could, be 
explained in terms of a single element of market structure i.e. concentration. However, over 
the years, the literature has identified several other factors as determinants of profitability, 
including firm growth, capital intensity, advertisement intensity, the age of the firm, and 
business cycle trends, amongst others. 45 
 
The relationship between leverage and profitability has extensively been established 
in many empirical studies. However, the findings from these studies are mixed. Some studies 
found positive relationships between leverage and profitability, while others identified a 
negative relationship. A few others found no relationship at all between the two. Studies by 
Robb and Robinson (2010), Ruland and Zhou (2005) believe that there is a positive 
relationship between leverage and profitability. According to Jensen (1986), profitable firms 
signal quality by leveraging up, resulting in a positive relation between leverage and 
profitability. This agrees with Modigliani and Miller (1963). Robb and Robinson (2010) 
found that gains from leverage are quite significant, and the use of debt‎enhances‎the‎firm’s‎
market‎value.‎They‎argued‎that‎financial‎leverage‎has‎a‎positive‎effect‎on‎the‎firm’s‎return‎on‎
equity,‎provided‎the‎earning‎powers‎of‎the‎firm’s‎assets‎are‎greater‎than‎the‎average‎interest‎
cost of debt to the firm. 
A research paper by  Chandrakumarmangalam and Govindasamy (2010) found that 
leverage‎is‎positively‎related‎to‎profitability,‎and‎that‎shareholders’‎wealth‎is‎maximized‎
when firms are able to employ more debt. Also, Abor (2005) reported a significantly positive 
relationship between total debt, total assets and profitability, measured as return on equity. In 
the‎same‎way,‎a‎firm’s‎debts’‎level‎and‎value‎is‎positively‎related‎when‎shareholders‎have‎
total‎control‎over‎the‎firm’s‎business,‎and‎it‎is‎negatively‎related‎when‎debt‎holders‎have‎the‎
power to influence the course of the business (Berkovitch and Israel, 1996). 
Hence,‎the‎impact‎of‎debt‎on‎a‎firm’s‎value‎is‎a‎function‎of‎the‎balance‎of‎power‎
within the firm. In a situation where debt holders have more power, a negative leverage 
would be obtained. However, the reverse is the case where shareholders have more power 
(Akinlo and Asaolu, 2012). The use of high levels of debt in the capital structure leads to a 
decrease‎or‎increase‎in‎the‎return‎on‎shareholders’‎capital‎(return‎on‎owner’s‎equity). 
Other studies, however, contrast with the above findings. Some studies have found 
negative relationships between leverage and profitability (Myers, 2001; Negash, 2001; 
Phillips and Sipahioglu, 2004). Negash (2001) found that debt had a negative impact on the 
profitability of firms quoted on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. He argued that the 
potential gains from leverage over an infinite period were significant, and comparable to 
what has been reported in studies from developed countries, in support of the Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) theory. However, the actual gains were not as implied by the 1963 theory, as 
the effective tax rate for most firms in South Africa were lower than the statutory rate. 46 
 
  Titman and Wessels (1988) observed that highly profitable firms have lower levels of 
leverage than less profitable firm, because they first use their earnings before seeking 
external capital. Moreover, stock prices reflect how the firm performs. Some other studies, 
including Sheel (1994), Sunder and Myers (1999) and Wald (1999), have corroborated these 
findings. For example, Wald (1999) found that profitability has a negative effect on debt to 
asset ratios in a heteroskedatic Tobit regression model. Sheel (1994) reported a negative 
relationship between the debt to asset ratio and the non-debt‎tax‎shield,‎and‎between‎a‎firm’s‎
leverage behaviour and its past profitability. Fama and French (1998) reported that debt does 
not concede tax benefits. Other studies that reported negative relationships between leverage 
and profitability include Myers (1984), Michaelas et al. (1999), Cassar and Holmes (2003), 
and Gedajlovic et al. (2003). The negative findings are in line with the Pecking Order theory. 
Consequently, with the above evidence, the study therefore hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative relationship between the profitability and leverage of firms 
across the selected African countries 
3.3.4  Leverage and firm size 
Abor (2008), citing Castanias (1983), Titman and Wessels (1988), and Wald (1999), 
emphasized‎the‎size‎of‎a‎firm‎as‎a‎determinant‎of‎a‎firm’s‎capital‎structure. The general 
assertion has been that larger firms are more diversified, and hence have lower variance of 
earnings, making them able to tolerate high debt ratios. Smaller firms, on the other hand, may 
find it relatively more costly to resolve information asymmetries with lenders, and thus, may 
present lower debt ratios (Castanias, 1983). Lenders to larger firms are more likely to get 
repaid than lenders to smaller firms, thus reducing the agency costs associated with debt. 
Therefore, larger firms will have higher debts. Abor (2008) found that size of the firm has a 
significantly positive relationship to the short-term debt ratio of SMEs. Size is also 
significantly and positively related to both the long-term and short-term debt ratios of quoted 
firms. Also, Kayo and Kimura (2011) found a positive and significant relationship between 
size and leverage. Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009), analysing data from France, Greece and 
Portugal, found a positive relationship between size and leverage. Nor et al. (2011) also 
found a significant positive relationship between size and target leverage in Thailand firms 
and Singapore firms, but none in Malaysian firms. Accordingly, the next hypothesis is 
proposed: 
Hypothesis 3: The selected African countries’ leverage is positively related to the firm size  47 
 
3.3.5  The non-debt tax Shield  
Hossain and Ali (2012) identified another type of expenses that has the power of generating a 
tax shield similar to interest expenses, namely, depreciation expenses, which, according to 
Hossain and Ali (2012), can be considered as tax deductible expenses. Therefore, some of the 
literature, such as that by Wiwattanakantang (1999) and Ozkan (2001), found an inverse 
relationship between non-debt tax shields and debt. But, contrary to the results of above 
studies, Graham and Harvey (2001) and AL-Shubiri (2010) found a positive relationship 
between the non-debt tax shield and leverage. Hence, this study has tried to discover whether 
the non-debt tax shield affects leverage. Following Ozkan (2001), the ratio of depreciation 
over total assets has been used as a measure of the non-debt tax shield. The trade-off predicts 
a negative relationship between the non-debt tax shield and leverage. Based on the theoretical 
and empirical results, this study therefore hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 4: The leverage of firms of the selected African countries is negatively related to 
the non-debt tax shield  
3.3.6  Target payout  
Ahmad et al. (2011) were concerned about the apparent neglect of dividend policy in 
empirical studies when determining capital structure. There are, however, several studies that 
have looked at the relationship between target payout and leverage. For instance, Ahmad et al. 
(2011) found a negative relationship between the two. They concluded that when target 
payout increases, the leverage level decreases. However, Beattie et al. (2006) and Frank and 
Goyal (2004) indicated that dividend payment by firms decreases the level of internal funds, 
resulting in an increase in demand for external financing. This, according to them, results in a 
positive relationship between leverage and target payout. The Pecking Order theory supports 
the positive relationship, but strongly disagrees when the firm has sufficient internal funds. 
Based on the literature, the study hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 5: Firms in the selected African countries have a positive relationship between 
target payout and leverage. 
Country specific variables 
In addition to firm specific factors and their relationship with leverage, many studies have 
also been concerned with how country specific factors have also influenced leverage. 
Findings have been varied for all types of economies - developed, emerging and developing. 48 
 
Fan et al. (2008) found that‎a‎firm’s‎capital‎structure‎is‎affected‎by‎the‎strength‎of‎a‎country’s‎
legal system and public governance. They maintained that there is a correlation between 
weaker laws and more government corruption, and higher corporate debt ratios and shorter 
debt maturity. This assertion had been made earlier by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1999). 
3.3.7  Country governance factors (rule of law and corruption) 
Studies‎into‎the‎relationship‎between,‎and‎influence‎of,‎a‎country’s‎corporate‎governance‎on‎
firm leverage have been undertaken by de Jong et al. (2008) and Deesomsak et al. (2004). 
Their findings have established that corporate governance has a positive influence on the 
corporate financing of firms in a country. La Porta et al. (2000), and Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) have also stated that the firms’ stakeholders and the operations of the 
firm would be affected by the country’s governance, such as legal, regulatory and 
institutional‎environment.‎They‎added‎when‎investors‎are‎protected‎by‎the‎country’s‎laws,‎
there is willingness on their part to finance firms in that country. This, according to them, will 
definitely increase a‎firm’s‎leverage.‎ 
  Cheng and Shiu (2007) made the assertion that investor protection plays an important 
role in the determinants of capital structure. Their conclusion was that firms in countries with 
better creditor protection have higher leverage, while firms in countries where shareholder 
rights are better protected use more equity funds. Therefore, corporate governance is 
positively‎related‎to‎a‎firm’s‎leverage.‎Other‎studies‎have‎found‎mixed‎results‎in‎terms‎of‎the‎
relationships. For example, Nor et al. (2011) found a positive relationship between 
governance and firm leverage in Malaysia and Singapore, but that a negative relationship 
existed in Thailand. They affirmed the position taken by de Jong et al. (2008), Deesomsak et 
al. (2004) and Cheng and Shiu (2007). In contrast to the positive relationship, they also found 
strong evidence that firms in countries with weaker shareholder rights, such as Thailand, 
relative to Malaysia and Singapore, may be forced to use more internally generated funds 
(Thailand has lower shareholders rights of 2, as against 4 for Malaysia and Singapore (La 
Porta et al., 2000). This is because external capital is likely to be expensive, thus reducing the 
leverage of firms in that country (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999).  
Corruption has been defined by the international community as the abuse of public 
office for private gain. It has been measured in the form of the Corruption Perception Index 
by Transparency International, and it reflects the extent to which corruption is perceived to 
exist amongst public officials and politicians. Over the years most African countries have 49 
 
been performing badly on the index. The question is how corruption influences leverage. Fan 
et al. (2012) used the corruption index and proxies to measure the threat of all, or part, of 
investor rights being expropriated by managers or public officials. In their estimation, debt is 
expected to be used relatively more than equity when the public sector is more corrupt, since, 
according to them, it is easier to expropriate outside equity holders than debt holders. 
Similarly, they argued that since short-term debt is more difficult to expropriate, it will be 
used relatively more frequently than long-term debt in more corrupt countries. Their findings, 
using regression analysis, were that corruption is associated with higher debt ratios. 
  Fan et al. (2008), in a study in China entitled “Public governance and corporate 
finance: Evidence from corruption cases,” found that because of high level corruption among 
particular firms,  their financial leverage, measured by total debt over total assets, was 
significantly less than that of the unconnected (or matching) firms, subsequent to the arrest of 
the corrupt bureaucrats. They explained the decline by attributing it to the decrease in long-
term debt rather than to the decrease in short-term‎debt.‎These‎‘corrupt/bribing’‎firms’‎debt‎
maturities were significantly shortened subsequent to the arrest of the bureaucrats. Fan et al. 
(2008) indicated that being connected with corrupt bureaucrats provides firms with a 
comparative advantage in obtaining access to debt, and, in particular, long-term debt. 
However, this debt financing advantage disappears when the connection is broken due to the 
arrest of the bureaucrat in question.  The rule of law and corruption were used to measure the 
level of governance in the country. Based on the literature, the study derived the hypothesis 
on the governance indicators, rule of law and corruption that: 
Hypothesis 6: Governance factors, such as the rule of law and corruption of the selected 
African countries affect firms’ leverage more and less respectively. 
Economic development 
For the country specific variable of GDP, papers, for example by  Frank and Goyal (2004), 
Korajczyk and Levy (2003), have used GDP growth in their analysis of aggregate 
nonfinancial corporate profit growth to proxy the growth opportunities and the overall 
economic conditions. To them, GDP growth is expected to be positively related to leverage. 
Gurcharan (2010), in a Review of Optimal Capital Structure Determinant of Selected Asian 
countries, found that the GDP growth rate variable yields a negative impact on leverage and 
the coefficients are significant at 1% level. This is in contrast to Booth et al. (2001), who 
found a positive correlation between the real GDP growth rate and the total debt ratio, but a 
negative one with the long-term market debt ratio in developing countries. Gurcharan also 
cited Song and Philippatos (2004), who studied the OECD countries and found a negative 50 
 
relationship. Gurcharan (2010) concluded that his finding is an indication that in countries 
with relatively higher rates of economic growth, firms are using lower levels of debt to 
finance new investments. The gross domestic product was used to measure economic 
development.  Based on the empirical research, the study hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 7: There is a negative relationship between the economic development (GDP) 
and leverage 
3.3.8  Banking development 
The domestic credit of banks in the private sector refers to financial resources provided to the 
private sector, such as through loans, purchases of non-equity securities and trade credits, and 
other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment. Frank and Goyal (2004) 
maintained also that the ratio of domestic credit provided by the banking sector to GDP 
proxies’‎funds‎available‎in‎the‎local‎market‎is‎expected‎to‎be‎positively‎related‎to‎leverage.‎
Jõeveer (2006), using empirical data from Eastern European countries, found that less local 
credit causes lower leverage levels. Therefore the domestic credit of banks was used to 
measure the level of banking development.  This study therefore hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis  8:  There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  bank  development  (GDP)  and 
leverage. 
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3.4  Empirical findings 
Table ‎3.1 Summary variables and definitions 
Variables  Label  Definition 
 Dependent variable: 
Leverage   Lev  Total debt divided by total assets 
Independent variables: 
Investment opportunity  Inv. opp.  Market value of assets divided by the total assets 
Profitability   Prof  Earnings before interest and tax divided by total 
assets 
Firm Size  Size  Natural logarithm of assets 
Non-debt tax shield  NDTS  Depreciation expenses divided by total assets 
Target payout  Tag. Payt  Dividend divided by earnings per share 
Gross domestic 
product (real GDP)  GDPcons  Gross domestic product at constant price (in real 
terms), measuring economic development 
Domestic credit  
of banks to  GDP  DCB%GDP 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector as a 
percentage of GDP  (measure banking 
development) 
Rule of law  RoL 
Perception of extent of confidence and law 
abiding in society, quality of contract 
enforcement, courts, property rights, crime and 
others 
Corruption  Cor  Perception of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain and others 52 
 
3.4.1  Descriptive statistics 
Table ‎3.2 Summary statistics median trends of variables across firms 
This table present median values of capital structure (Leverage) and other firm and country specific factors from 14 selected African countries over the period 
1994-2011. The firm specific variables are as follows. Leverage (Lev), which is the dependent variable and is defined as the total debt to total assets. 
Investment opportunities (Inv. opp) are the ratio of market value of assets to Total assets. Profitability (Prof) is defined as earnings before interest and tax to 
total assets. Size (Size) is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets. Non-debt tax shield (NDOTSO1) is measured as depreciation expenses to total 
assets. Target payout (Tag. payt) is defined as dividend to earnings per share. The country specific factors are as follows. Gross domestic product at constant 
price (GDPcons), used as a proxy for measuring economic development. Domestic credit of banks to GDP (DCB%GDP), used as a measure of banking 
development. Rule of law (RoL) is a vector for governance. Corruption (Cor) is a vector governance 
Year  Lev  Inv.opp  Prof.  Tag.payt  NDTS  Size  GDP.Con  DcB.GDP  Cor  RoL 
1994  0.09  1.11  0.12  0.34  0.03  5.38  3.86  27.90  -  - 
1995  0.09  1.12  0.12  0.31  0.03  5.32  3.95  32.70  -  - 
1996  0.09  1.14  0.12  0.32  0.03  5.04  4.12  31.20  -0.07  -0.01 
1997  0.12  1.20  0.10  0.35  0.03  5.18  4.24  39.70  -  - 
1998  0.10  0.98  0.11  0.35  0.04  4.85  4.32  43.90  -0.25  -0.03 
1999  0.12  0.87  0.10  0.41  0.03  4.68  4.36  47.70  -  - 
2000  0.13  0.81  0.09  0.35  0.04  4.77  4.60  51.00  -0.39  -0.01 
2001  0.14  0.75  0.10  0.40  0.04  4.66  4.74  44.60  -  - 
2002  0.14  0.72  0.09  0.40  0.03  4.67  4.81  43.40  -0.29  -0.01 
2003  0.13  0.81  0.09  0.41  0.03  4.72  5.31  42.40  -0.47  -0.05 
2004  0.12  0.94  0.10  0.38  0.03  4.68  5.87  42.60  -0.54  -0.02 
2005  0.11  1.08  0.10  0.37  0.03  4.65  6.19  46.20  -0.52  -0.12 
2006  0.13  1.22  0.11  0.34  0.03  4.77  6.57  48.60  -0.66  -0.22 
2007  0.13  1.44  0.10  0.35  0.02  4.88  7.00  45.50  -0.67  -0.20 
2008  0.12  1.16  0.11  0.36  0.02  5.02  7.42  42.80  -0.71  -0.09 
2009  0.13  1.07  0.08  0.36  0.02  5.03  7.94  38.60  -0.4  -0.09 
2010  0.12  1.12  0.09  0.40  0.02  5.09  8.56  33.10  -0.56  -0.11 
2011  0.12  0.96  0.09  0.39  0.02  5.27  9.13  31.30  -0.68  -0.42 53 
 
From Table 3.2 above, the leverage ratios for the firms across the 14 African countries 
showed an upward trend, with median leverage ranging from 0.09 to 0.13. Observing the 
formal test of normality, all the leverage ratios showed non-normality in the error term, and 
hence transformation was performed for the leverage variables. In terms of the firm specifics, 
Table 3.2 shows that investment opportunities rose, fell and thereafter rose. Profitability 
indicated downward and upward changes over time. Firm size ranged from 5. 38 to 5.27. The 
firm size shows a consistent rise from 1994 to 1997, but thereafter falls and rises again. 
Target payout ranged between 0.31 to 0.39, indicating a general upward trend. The non –debt 
tax shield also ranged from 0.03 and 0.04. It rose initially from 1994 to 2006 and fell from 
2007 to 2012. For the country specific analysis, gross domestic product had a range of 3.86 to 
9.13, indicating an upward trend for the firms across these countries under examination. The 
domestic credit of banks as a percentage of gross domestic products ranged between 27.9 to 
48.6 even though it indicated up and downs. The corruption levels ranged between -.07 to .68 
for all the firms in the study. This implies that there is a corruption level in Africa since, 
according to World Bank Data Base, the level of corruption and a rule of law ranges between 
-2.5 (weak) and 2.5 (strong) indicating that a corruption level of -2.5 shows a high level of 
corruption and 2.5 shows a low level of corruption, with the higher scores corresponding to 
better outcomes The rule of law ranged between -.01 to -.42, which implies that the 
governance practiced in Africa is very low. 
Figure 3.1 Trends in median logarithm leverage across firms in the sample 
 
Source:‎Bloomberg‎and‎author’s‎calculation 
In Figure 3.1, the trends in the median logarithmic leverage indicated a generally upward 
trend, albeit with some significant fluctuations. In particular, in the years 1998 and 2005, 
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Figure 1: Trends in Median Logarithmic Leverage Across Firms54 
 
there were sharp declines in the median leverage across firms. Some periods also witnessed 
the median leverage remaining constant. On the whole, periods after 1998 recorded high 
levels of leverage amongst the firms under consideration. 
Figure 3.2 Trends in median investment opportunities across firms in the sample 
 
Source:‎Bloomberg‎and‎author’s‎calculation 
In Figure 3.2, as far as investment opportunities were concerned, the median trends indicated 
a long wave of fluctuations. That is to say, a decline in investment opportunities was 
followed by a consistently long decline, whereas a rise was accompanied by consistently long 
periods of rise. In general, however, the trends indicated a vacillating posture, as illustrated 
above.                                                                
Figure 3.3 Trends in median profitability across firms in the sample 
 
Source:‎Bloomberg‎and‎author’s‎calculation 
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With Profitability as a component of leverage across firms, the median trends indicated 
significant downwards and upwards changes over time. There were rapid falls in 1997 and 
2009.  
Figure 3.4 Trends in the median target payout across firms in the sample 
 
Source:‎Bloomberg‎and‎author’s‎calculation 
The trends indicated a generally upward movement with some significant fluctuations. The 
period between the years 2003 and 2006 witnessed a sharp decline in the median target 
payout across firms. On a whole, periods following 1999 recorded high levels of target 
payout amongst the firms under consideration. 
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Table ‎ 3.3 Leverage trends across countries 1994-2011 
Table 3.3 reports the median leverage trends across the 14 selected African countries under study using data of 1994-2011. Leverage (Lev), which is the 
dependent variable, is defined as the total debt to total assets. There was a total of 608 firms across all the countries and the data was sourced from 
DataStream, Bloomberg and International Monetary Fund 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
BOTSWANA  0.10  0.02  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.05  0.06  0.01  0.01  0.07  0.06  0.02  0.02  0.04 
EGYPT  0.00  0.00  0.09  0.13  0.20  0.19  0.30  0.30  0.24  0.20  0.19  0.15  0.15  0.14  0.09  0.07  0.07  0.06 
GHANA  0.06  0.08  0.08  0.12  0.08  0.18  0.14  0.15  0.13  0.14  0.19  0.15  0.16  0.19  0.21  0.18  0.27  0.19 
IVORY_COAST  -  -  0.11  0.13  0.14  0.20  0.18  0.15  0.18  -  -  0.11  0.12  0.10  0.14  0.09  0.06  0.08 
KENYA  0.05  0.08  0.06  0.05  0.11  0.18  0.13  0.10  0.0  0.13  0.09  0.09  0.08  0.13  0.16  0.10  0.11  0.10 
MOROCCO  0.51  0.49  0.13  0.13  0.07  0.08  0.07  0.08  0.08  0.09  0.14  0.13  0.13  0.16  0.13  0.16  0.17  0.16 
NAMIBIA 
NIGERIA 
0.08        
0.10 
0.08 
0.19 
0.14 
0.13 
0.13 
0.15 
0.04 
0.07 
0.10 
0.07 
0.11 
0.06 
0.12 
0.15 
0.13 
0.16 
0.11 
0.11 
0.07 
0.04 
0.09 
0.10 
0.06 
0.14 
0.05 
0.16 
0.03 
0.14 
0.05 
0.11 
0.09 
0.06 
0.10 
0.05 
SOUTH_AFRICA  0.13  0.11  0.09  0.10  0.10  0.11  0.12  0.15  0.13  0.15  0.13  0.11  0.13  0.12  0.14  0.17  0.16  0.12 
TANZANIA  0.13  0.18  0.13  0.15  0.08  0.16  0.09  0.02  0.05  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.15  0.04  0.02  0.15  0.01  0.10 
TUNISIA  -  0.20  0.25  0.27  0.29  0.14  0.11  0.10  0.101  0.14  -  0.16  0.20  0.22  0.23  0.16  0.15  0.14 
UGANDA  0.07  0.18  0.13  0.08  0.06  0.15  0.05  0.04  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.04  0.06  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.07 
ZAMBIA  0.07  0.05  0.06  0.06  0.03  0.14  0.10  0.02  0.06  0.08  0.01  0.03  0.09  0.13  0.17  0.18  0.20  0.14 
ZIMBABWE  0.06  0.05  0.05  0.10  0.06  0.11  0.12  0.10  0.07  0.08  0.05  0.10  0.12  0.08  0.01  0.07  0.06  0.15 
Source:‎Bloomberg,‎and‎author’s‎calculation 
 
Countries 
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From Table 3.3 above, the leverage ratios for the 14 selected African countries are relatively 
very low and stable across all the countries between 1994 to 2012. The Botswana leverage 
ranges between 0 to 0.10, Egypt between 0 to 0.30, Ghana between 0 to 0.27, while Ivory 
Coast is between 0 to 0.20. The Kenya leverage ratio is between 0 to 0.18. Morocco has a 
leverage ratio ranging between 0 to 0.51, Nigeria between 0 to 0.19, South Africa 0 to 0.17, 
Tanzania between 0 to 0.18, Tunisia between 0 to 0.29, Uganda between 0 to 0.15, Zambia 
between 0 to 0.20 and Zimbabwe between 0 to 0.15.  58 
 
Figure 3.5 Trends in median leverage across countries in the sample (1994 - 2011) 
 
Source:‎Bloomberg‎and‎author’s‎calculation‎ 
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In Figure 3.5 above, the trends in the median leverage across all the countries indicated a 
range of between 0 and 0.6 in the selected African countries. The leverage trend of the 
individual countries showed the following: Botswana ranging between 0 and 0.2, Egypt 
between 0 and 0.2, Ghana 0 and 0.2, Ivory Coast had leverage between 0 and 0.2. The 
Kenyan leverage was between 0 and 0.2 but was very high in the years 1999 and 2008.  
Morocco, between 1994-1995, recorded the highest leverage ratio, ranging between 
0.4 and 0.6, but it had been stable‎for‎the‎remaining‎years‎between‎0‎and‎0.2.‎Nigeria’s‎
leverage was between 0 and 0.2, South Africa ranging between 0 and .02, Tanzania and 
Zambia both had leverage between 0 and 0.2 and had a very cyclical leverage across all years. 
Tunisia recorded leverage‎between‎0‎and‎.04.‎Uganda’s‎leverage‎ranged‎between‎0‎and‎0.2‎
but was cyclical up to 2001. Zambia also had leverage between 0 and 0.2 and became stable 
throughout the remainder of the years. Zimbabwe had leverage between 0 and 0.2 and was 
very slow and stable. 
The leverage ratio was between 0 and 0.2 for Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, the Ivory 
Coast, Zambia and Tanzania, whilst Botswana, Morocco and South Africa had the highest 
leverage in their early years on average. Botswana, Tanzania and Uganda between 2000-2005 
had a median leverage level of zero.  
From the analysis, the general trends showed a very low and stable leverage across all 
the countries selected. One major reason for the very low leverages across Africa is the 
unwillingness of the banks to grant long term financing, which occurs for several reasons, 
including political stability/instability across Africa.  Banks are nervous about granting 
credits to firms in an environment of political uncertainties (Demetriades and Fielding, 2009). 
Another reason, put forward by Boyd et al. (2001), is that countries with long experience of 
inflationary surges tend to have lower monetary depth, and, therefore, financial institutions in 
such countries are unable to provide the needed capital. According to Honohan and Beck 
(2007), monetary depth is lowered by the tendency of wealth holders to hold their liquid 
assets outside Africa: the ratio of offshore deposits to domestic bank deposits is significantly 
higher in Africa than in other regions of the world (Honohan and Beck, 2007). This tendency 
points to capital flight as one factor exacerbating the low rate of domestic savings (Collier 
and Gunning, 1999; Ndikumana and Boyce, 2002; Collier et al., 2004), though additional 
factors are at work, including the requirement imposed by some foreign financiers for 
African importers to post cash collateral abroad. 60 
 
  Honohan and Beck (2007) mentioned a low intermediation ratio (that is, the low share 
of deposits intermediated into private sector credit) as another striking feature of the African 
financial system. In Africa, the median banking system allocates more of its resources to 
liquid assets and lending to government than do systems in other regions, thus implying a 
lower share of credit allocated to the private sector. Given the importance of private sector 
credit for economic growth, finding effective ways of ensuring that the banks channel more 
of their resources into the domestic private sector is crucial for financial sector development. 
However, firms in Africa finance less investment with equity finance than do firms in any 
other region, most likely reflecting the underdevelopment of capital markets, and they 
finance less investment with trade finance than firms in any other region, which might reflect 
low levels of trust (Honohan and Beck, 2007). 61 
 
3.4.2  Determinants of capital structure 
Table ‎3.4 Summary results of fixed effect and general method of moment 
This Table presents a summary of the results of the panel data regression for both the firm and 
country specific factors, using data from 1994-2011. The firm specific variables are as follows: 
Leverage (Lev), which is the dependent variable and defined as the total debt to total assets, 
Investment opportunities (Innopp.), which are the ratio of market value of assets to total assets, 
Profitability (Prof), which is defined as earnings before interest and tax to total assets, Size (Size), 
which is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets, Non-debt tax shield (NDOTS), which is 
measured as depreciation of expenses to total assets, and Target payout (Tag.payt), which is defined 
as dividend to earnings per share. The country specific factors are as follows: Gross domestic product 
at constant price (GDPcons), used as a proxy for measuring economic development, Domestic credit 
of banks to GDP (DCB%GDP), used as a measure of banking development, the Rule of law (RoL), 
which is a vector for governance, and. Corruption (Cor), which is a vector for governance. All 
regressions were estimated using panel data estimation, fixed effects and general method of moments. 
The superscripts ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
The following tests are also reported: (1) Observation, (2) The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation, 
which was significant for the first three models (3) The Sargan and Hansen test for over identification 
restrictions, which confirmed the absence of an exogeneity problem (4) The Arellana-Bond test for 
second order serial correlation, which indicated no serial correlation. Model 4 (GMM) coefficients 
were used for interpretation 
Variables  Fixed effect 
(1) 
Fixed effect  
(2) 
Fixed effect lag 
(3) 
GMM 
(4) 
Lag leverage  -  -  -   0.35*** 
Lnv.opp  -0.01**  -   0.01***   0.01 
Prof  -0.04***  -  -0.31***  -0.17*** 
NDTS   0.00  -   0.00  -0.00 
Size   0.02***  -   0.03***   0.03*** 
Tag.payt  -0.01  -  -0.01  -0.01 
GDP (real GDP)  -  -0.00***  -.001***  -.001** 
DCB%GDP  -   0.01***   0.01**   0.01* 
Cor  -  -0.05***  -0.08***  -0.06* 
Rol  -   0.04**   0.06*   0.03 
Constant   0.05***   0.16***   0.02   
Observation   4177   5282   3155   1866 
R-squared:Within   0.02   0.02   0.10  - 
Between   0.01   0.00   0.04  - 
Overall   0.02   0.00   0.01  - 
1
st order corr AR(1)  -  -  -   0.00 
2
nd order corr AR(2)  -  -  -   0.13 
Sargan test over. rest.  -  -  -   0.02 
Hansen test over. rest.  -  -  -   0.78 
 
From the regression Table 3.4, in the first model, where the country factors are not taken into 
account, there is a negative effect by investment, but when country factors are considered in 
the model, investment changes to positive. This suggests that the effect of investment on 62 
 
leverage is dependent on the country factors. Therefore, in Africa there is a positive effect of 
investment when country variables are taken into account. The high corruption level effect on 
investment will be negligible. When there is low corruption and good rule of law, then the 
actual, positive, impact of investment is recognised. The observations reduced when GMM is 
applied, due to the fact it uses lag as an instrument where year data is excluded and, therefore, 
reduces the number of observations.  
The results showed that lag of leverage, profitability, firm size, gross domestic product, 
domestic credit provided by the banking sector, and corruption, were significantly associated 
with leverage. Model 4 (GMM) coefficients were used for interpretation and the estimated 
parameters were interpreted holding all other variables in the model constant. 
3.4.2.1  Lag leverage 
. From Table 3.4 Model 4, the estimated coefficient of the lagged leverage was significant at 
the 1% level for firms in Africa. The coefficient for lag leverage was 0.35, which gives a 
positive relationship between lag leverage and leverage. The implication is that a unit 
increase‎in‎the‎firm’s‎previous‎leverage‎increased‎the‎current‎year‎leverage‎by‎0.35,‎holding‎
all other factors constant. The size of the coefficient impacts largely on current year leverage. 
Theoretically, the result is consistent with the findings of Nor et al. (2011) in their analysis of 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. They maintained that if a firm’s‎actual‎leverage‎deviates‎
from the target leverage, the firm will undertake some adjustment process to attain the target 
leverage. This might be the situation for firms in Africa. Fischer et al. (1989), however, 
contend that capital market imperfections may prevent an instantaneous adjustment of the 
actual leverage to the desired level. 
3.4.2.2  Leverage and investment opportunities 
Table 3.4, above, provides the regression results with leverage as the dependent variable. As 
indicated in Model 4, the coefficient of investment opportunities was 0.01, but not significant. 
Economically, it does not explain leverage in Africa countries. Empirically, the result of a 
positive significance supports the expected sign for Hypothesis 1, which is consistent with the 
findings of Salawu and Agboola ( 2008), who also found a positive relationship among 
Nigerian non-financial firms. The result of the coefficient again confirms the findings of 
Frank and Goyal (2003). However, the result is not consistent with the findings of Jensen 
(1986) and Stulz (1990), Yuan and Kazuyuki (2011) and Ahn et al. (2006). The coefficient of 
a positive relationship is consistent with the Pecking Order theory, which states that 63 
 
investment in fixed assets and working capital must have a direct relationship with debt, after 
controlling for cash flow.  
3.4.2.3  Profitability and leverage 
From Table 3.4 Model 4, the results of the regression analysis for the profitability variable 
produced a significance negative coefficient of -0.17 at the 1% level of significance, 
indicating a negative relationship between profitability and leverage. The inverse relationship 
demonstrated that an increase in profitability leads to less leverage. The interpretation is that 
a unit increase in profitability decreases the leverage by 0.17, when all other variables are 
fixed. The absolute coefficient showed that profitability impacts strongly on leverage. 
Theoretically, this result supports Hypothesis 2 as a negative association, which is consistent 
with the Pecking Order model, which predicts an inverse relationship between the two 
variables. It is also a confirmation of many empirical studies, such as studies by (Myers, 
1984), (Michaelas et al., 1999), (Cassar and Holmes, 2003), (Gedajlovic et al., 2003), Sheel 
(1994), Sunder and Myers (1999), Wald (1999), Fama and French (1998),  Booth et al. 
(2001), and Titman and Wessels (1988). Their observations have been that highly profitable 
firms have lower levels of leverage than less profitable firms, because they first use their 
earnings before seeking external capital (there is no need to consider external sources of 
finance when earnings are high). This result supports the prediction of the Pecking Order 
Model, and is therefore applicable also to African firms. 
3.4.2.4  Leverage and non-debt tax shield  
The regression analysis produced a negative coefficient of -0.01. However, the relationship 
indicated that it was statistically insignificant, as reflected in Model 4. Theoretically, the 
result rejects Hypothesis 4 as a negative relationship, although it is consistent with the results 
of Graham and Harvey (2001), AL-Shubiri (2010) and Bradley et al. (1984), who indicated 
that if firms strongly undertake investment in tangible assets, both tax credits and 
depreciation would be high, and, therefore, will result in higher debt. This assertion has 
further been explained by Graham (2003), who suggested that if firms with huge earnings 
decide to undertake high investment through the use of debt, they will have a positive 
relationship between the non-debt tax shields and leverage. Because of the benefits from tax 
shields, firms normally tend to consider debt as part of their decisions in order to take 
advantage of interest deductibility (Chakraborty, 2010). However, it contradicts the results 
from Wiwattanakantang (1999) and Ozkan (2001), who found an inverse relationship 64 
 
between leverage and the non-debt tax shield. The findings of the positive relation reject the 
expectation of the Trade-off theory. 
3.4.2.5  Leverage and target payout 
Different results reporting divergent relationships have been indicated in the literature. For 
instance, while Ahmad et al. (2011) reported a negative relationship between leverage and 
target payout, Beattie et al. (2006) and Frank and Goyal (2004) reported a positive 
relationship. In this study, the regression results for target payout, as indicated in Table 3.4 
Model 4, is -0.01, indicating that the relationships established by the coefficients is negative. 
However, the result was not statistically significant. Theoretically, the result is not in line 
with the Pecking Order Theory’s‎expectation‎of‎a‎positive‎sign. The negative relationship 
could mean that the firms were interested in future investments and would accumulate all 
their earnings to undertake such investment, and also pay shareholders after accomplishing 
their investments Ahmad et al. (2011). 
3.4.2.6  Leverage and firm size 
.Regarding the relationship between leverage and size, the results of the regression from 
Table 3.4 Model 4 show a very significant positive relationship, with a P-value of 0.01 and a 
coefficient of 0.03. The direct association is an indication that an increase in the size of the 
firm, as a result of diversification, will lead to more leverage. The implication is that a unit 
increase in the size of the firm increases the leverage by 0.03, all things being equal. 
Empirically, this result supports Hypothesis 3 and confirms the findings of Castanias (1983), 
Titman and Wessels (1988), Wald (1999), cited in Abor (2008), Booth et al. (2001), Fama 
and French (2002), Kayo and Kimura (2011), and Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009). Suggested 
explanations in the literature include that large‎ﬁrms‎tend‎to‎have‎more‎leverage, perhaps 
because‎they‎are‎more‎transparent,‎that‎they‎have‎lower‎asset‎volatility,‎are‎more‎diversiﬁed,‎
that they naturally sell‎large‎enough‎debt‎issues‎so‎that‎the‎ﬁxed‎costs‎of‎public‎borrowing‎are‎
not prohibitive, and that they have a lower‎probability‎of‎default‎and‎less‎ﬁnancial‎distress‎
costs. The results support the Trade-off theory.  
3.4.2.7  Leverage and governance factors  
.Many studies have found‎that‎a‎firm’s‎capital‎structure‎is‎affected‎by‎the‎strength‎of‎a‎
country’s‎legal‎system‎and‎public‎governance.‎The‎result‎of‎the‎regression‎from‎Model 4 
indicates positive coefficients of 0.03, but it is statistically insignificant between the rule of 
law and leverage. Theoretically, the result of a positive coefficient supported Hypothesis 6, 65 
 
which has been confirmed by Fan et al. (2012), Cheng and Shiu (2007), La Porta et al. (2000), 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), de Jong et al. (2008) and Deesomsak et al. (2004), 
who have suggested that in countries where legal and regulatory frameworks protect investors, 
there is a willingness on their part to finance firms in that country. This will definitely 
increase firm leverage. Even though the relationship identified in this study was insignificant, 
the positive relationship established conforms to the literature. 
From Table 3.4 Model 4, for the governance issue of corruption, the results indicate 
a negative coefficient of -0.06 at the 10% significant level. This implies that an increase in 
corruption will cause a reduction in leverage. The implication is that a unit increase in the 
corruption index decreases leverage by 0.06, when all other factors are held constant. The 
absolute value of the coefficient indicated that the impact of corruption on leverage was very 
small. Theoretically, the finding is in line with Hypothesis 6, and confirms the findings of 
Fan et al. (2008), who suggested that because of high levels of corruption among particular 
firms, their financial leverage decreased in the long-term, but not in the short-term. They 
explained that being connected with corrupt bureaucrats gives firms the opportunity of 
getting access to debt, but this debt benefit disappears when the corruption connection is 
broken, due to the arrest of these bureaucrats. This confirms the hypothesis that governance 
factors impact on leverage. 
3.4.2.8  GDP growth and leverage 
.The result of the regression analysis gave a negative coefficient of -0.01, indicating a 
negative relationship. The coefficients, however, were very significant, showing a 
significance level of 5%. The interpretation is that a unit increase in gross domestic product 
decreased the leverage by 0.001, all things being equal. This result of a negative coefficient 
supported Hypothesis 7, but contradicts the findings of Frank and Goyal (2004). It also 
partially contradicts the work of Booth et al. (2001), who also found a positive correlation 
between the real GDP growth rate and the total debt ratio. However, in that same work there 
was a negative relationship with the long term market debt ratio in developing countries. In 
this regard, therefore, the negative coefficient obtained is consistent with the later findings of 
Booth et al. (2001) and Song and Philippatos (2004) cited by Gurcharan (2010). Gurcharan 
(2010) concluded that the negative relationship identified is an indication that countries with 
a high rate of economic growth will use lower levels of debt to finance new investments. The 
findings confirmed the hypothesis. 66 
 
3.4.2.9  The domestic credit of banks as a percentage of GDP 
The regression result for this variable was consistent with the literature, especially with the 
findings of Frank and Goyal (2004) and Jõeveer (2006), who found a positive relationship. 
The result showed a significantly positive coefficient of 0.01, at the significant level of 10%. 
The positive relationship is an indication that the ratio of domestic credit provided by the 
banks to GDP allows more funds to become available in the local market, which, therefore, 
enables individuals to access more debt  (Frank and Goyal, 2004; Jõeveer, 2006). The 
implication is that a unit increase in the domestic credit of banks increased leverage by 0.01, 
with all other factors remaining constant. The results confirmed the hypothesis. 
 
3.5  Conclusions and implications 
This study examined the trends and determinants in capital structure in some selected African 
countries. Applying regression analysis and a partial standard adjustment model, the study 
measured the relationship between the dependent (leverage) and independent variables which 
were investment opportunities, profitability, size, target payout, and the non-debt tax shield. 
The study further looked at the capital structure trends across countries and the relationship 
between leverage and country specific factors, which are gross domestic product, the 
domestic credit of banks, the rule of law and corruption. 
The study found a positive relationship between leverage and investment 
opportunities, leverage and size, leverage and the non-debt tax shield, leverage and the 
domestic credit of banks, and leverage and rule of law. However, a negative relationship was 
identified between profitability and leverage, target payout and leverage, leverage and gross 
domestic product, and leverage and corruption. The non-debt tax shield and target payout are 
not significant in determining capital structure. Moreover, lag leverage, investment 
opportunities, profitability, size, the domestic credit of banks, gross domestic product, 
corruption and the rule of law determined the capital structure at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
In general, the study also found that the leverage trends across the selected African 
countries under examination were very low and stable. There are several reasons for this. One 
is the unwillingness of the banks to grant long term credit because of political instability. 
Another reason is the long experience of inflationary surges which tend to lower monetary 
depth, and, therefore, financial institutions in such countries are unable to provide the needed 
capital. There is also the tendency of capital flight from Africa and, as a result, the ratio of 67 
 
offshore deposits to domestic bank deposits is significantly higher than other regions of the 
world, which tends to lower the rate of savings. More so, firms in these selected African 
countries finance, less investment with equity and less in trade finance which might reflect 
the underdevelopment of the capital market and the low levels of trust.  
In conclusion, capital structure decisions in Africa are not only affected by firm 
specific factors, but also by country specific variables, such as corporate governance and the 
institutional environment within which the firm operates. 
The findings have far reaching implications for firms and the individual countries 
involved in the study. First and foremost, firms have been provided with the factors that they 
must consider relevant in the capital structure decisions. Such decisions that affect firm size 
and investment opportunities, such as mergers and acquisitions could be influenced by the 
results of the study. Managers will also understand the relationship established by the Trade-
off and Pecking Order theory to manage their firms’ operations. At the country level, 
governments must understand that firms can achieve much when there is good governance, 
and that strengthening institutions in Africa will invariably have a positive effect on business 
and industry. These findings also open up more avenues for further research into capital 
structure in Africa. 69 
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ABSTRACT  
This chapter examines the determinants of corporate cash holding and identifies the levels of 
trends for listed non-financial firms across African countries. The paper considers a panel 
dataset of 608 firms from 14 African countries during the period 1994-2011. The study 
employed Bates et al. (2009)s’ model with modifications and by applying regression analysis 
and a partial standard adjustment estimations the study measured the relationship between the 
cash holdings, and firm and country specific factors. The study found a positive relationship 
between cash flow, net working capital, Capital expenditure, firm size, return on asset, rule of 
law, gross domestic product and domestic credit of banks. However, a negative relationship 
was reported between leverage, dividend payout, market to book value ratio and cash holding. 
The results provide evidence that cash holdings in these selected countries are significantly 
determined by leverage, net working capital, capital expenditure and return on asset. Firms 
with leverage tend to hold less cash. Firms with capital expenditure, net working capital and 
return on asset hold large amounts of cash. The study also found a stable trend in the cash 
holdings of firms in African countries. The result of the coefficients suggests that both the 
Trade-off and Pecking Order theories are applicable in these countries, but they were more 
supportive of the Pecking Order. The conclusion, therefore, indicates that firm specific 
factors are important in Africa for determining cash holdings, while country specific factors 
are insignificant 73 
 
4.1  Introduction 
When a firm keeps money available to spend rather than investment, that firm is said to be 
holding cash. In a World Bank Policy Research Paper, Love (2011) defines cash holdings as 
the portion of retained earnings that is not spent on expanding the business. The earliest 
studies of cash holdings have been attributed to Baumol (1952), Miller and Orr (1966) and 
Meltzer ( 1963 ). However, according to Al-Najjar (2013), interest in studying why firms 
hold cash grew after Opler et al. (1999) investigated the determinants of cash holdings. 
Opler et al. (1999) contended that it would be irrelevant to hold liquid cash if a perfect 
market existed. They added that because of the absence of a liquidity premium there is no 
opportunity cost for the holding of liquid assets. They defined a firm to be short of liquid 
asset when it had to cut back on investment, cut back on dividends, or raise funds by selling 
securities or assets. They were emphatic in saying that it is costly for a firm to be short of 
liquid assets (Opler et al., 1999). 
Why do firms hold cash at all? What are the determinants of cash holdings? The 
purpose of this study was to identify the empirical evidence about the determinants of cash 
holdings in Africa, and also to find out how theories relating to corporate cash holdings are 
relevant to firms in Africa. The objectives of the study were: 
Firstly, to identify which of the capital structure theories are relevant to cash holdings 
of African firms. Secondly, to define the determinants of corporate cash holdings and, finally, 
to identify the levels of, or trends in, cash holding across firms in these selected Africa 
countries. 
Even though much research has been done in this regard for the developed economies 
and the emerging economies of Asia and the Middle East, very little research has been done 
regarding Africa, with the exception of studies by Love (2011), Ogundipe et al. (2012a) and 
Isshaq et al. (2009). These have been individual country studies on Egypt, Nigeria and Ghana 
respectively.  
This study is motivated by the fact that there is the need for a better understanding of 
the concept of cash holdings in an African context, especially considering the fact that not 
much work has been done in this area compared to Western economies and the emerging 
economies of Asia. Therefore, the benefit of holding cash in firms’ operations is lacking. 
Again, because the study focused on the trends in cash holdings due to the temporary effects 
of shocks and risks at a specific time period, it will provide the necessary information for 74 
 
managers and investors regarding how solid and liquid the firms are in Africa countries, in 
terms of undertaking profitable projects at any point in time. This will benefit the firms and 
shareholders and give a more detailed understanding of the magnitude of country and firm 
factors impact on corporate cash holding. The trends will further provide direction and 
encourage firms and regulators of these selected African countries to make decisions 
regarding cash holdings when the observed factors are considered in the firms’ operations 
and management. It will enable investors to evaluate the performance of the firms and make 
well informed decisions to invest in Africa countries, knowing that the firms are better 
positioned in their operations to avoid an unexpected financial burden. Additionally, because 
firms in African countries faced high constraints and high costs in accessing capital, there is a 
need to provide firms’ information and insight into cash holding policies to avoid unexpected 
losses and the risk of turning down worthwhile investments. It is therefore believed that the 
results of this study will shed light on the factors influencing corporate cash holdings which 
will be beneficial to corporate managers and serve as a basis for research into corporate cash 
holding. 
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways: (1) It considers panel 
data from 14 African countries over an 18 year period, which, as far as is known, is the first 
time research looking at cash holdings in Africa has been conducted. (2) It also provides an 
understanding of how listed non-financial firms in these selected African countries manage 
their cash holdings, by testing Pecking Order and Trade-off theories. (3) Additionally, it 
contributes to the literature by investigating the determinants of cash holdings in these 
selected Africa countries. Finally, (4) it employs both country and firm specific factors 
analysis with dynamic panel data estimates, which, as far as is known, has not occurred in 
previously researched papers about Africa. This paper will also serve as the impetus for a 
much wider interest in cash holdings in Africa and the basis for theory formation regarding 
firms in Africa. 
The paper has been organized into six sections. Section one introduces the area of 
research. This is followed by a review of the theories and empirical studies in section two. 
Section three describes the methodology, followed by a descriptive analysis in section four. 
The results and discussion are in section five. The conclusions of the paper are presented in 
section six. 
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4.2  Theories of corporate cash holding  
4.2.1  The Trade-off theory  
The Trade- off theory is defined as ways of deciding how much both debt and equity should 
be captured in a company’s‎capital‎structure‎by‎balancing‎the‎cost of debt and the benefits of 
debt. 
According to Al-Najjar (2013), the argument put forward by the Trade-off theory is 
that firms maximize their values by weighing the marginal costs against the benefits of 
holding cash. The assumption has been that managers aim to maximize shareholder wealth by 
holding cash. Ferreira and Vilela (2004) outline three benefits that firms derive from holding 
cash. They mention that cash holdings reduce the likelihood of financial distress, as it acts as 
a safety reserve to face unexpected losses or external fundraising constraints. They also 
contend that cash holdings allow the pursuance of the optimal investment policy, even when 
financial constraints are met, and, finally, they add that cash holdings contribute to 
minimizing the costs of raising external funds or liquidating existing assets, as it acts as a 
buffer between the firm’s sources and its use of funds. Ferreira and Vilela (2004) contended 
that the traditional marginal cost of holding cash is the opportunity cost of the capital due to a 
low return on liquid assets. According to them, firm characteristics, such as dividend payout, 
investment opportunity, leverage, size, cash flow and debt maturity are very relevant to cash 
holding decisions.  
4.2.2  Pecking Order theory  
The Pecking Order theory, which is also called Pecking Order model, can be defined as the 
steps or the process that corporations undertake in their chosen capital structure for the 
operation of the business. It follows a ranking, or a hierarchy, by firms of their financial 
decision making relating to the firm’s capital structure. 
This theory suggests that there is no optimal level of cash holdings for a firm (Al-
Najjar, 2013). Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that firms follow a 
pecking order of financing to minimize costs, related to information asymmetry. According to 
this theory, the order starts with internal sources and firms will use external funding only 
after the internal sources are exhausted. According to Myers (1984), firms favour external 
funding by debt compared to equity issuance, since debt has lower information costs than 
equity financing (Al-Najjar, 2013). Cash can be seen as an outcome of the different financing 
and investment decisions proposed by the hierarchal pattern of financing (Dittmar et al., 76 
 
2003). Ferreira and Vilela (2004) claim that cash can be used for financing investments to 
pay‎a‎firm’s‎debt‎and,‎in‎turn,‎stockpile‎cash.‎Dittmar et al. (2003) also detect that firms with 
high levels of cash flow are those which distribute dividends, apply for debt financing, and, 
as a result, hoard cash. The theory also maintains that bigger and expanded firms are better 
structured to accumulate more cash, as they are highly profitable (Opler et al., 1999). Below 
provide a brief review of the firm characteristics that, according to the Trade-off and Pecking 
Order theories, are relevant to firm cash holdings decisions. 
4.2.3  Transactional Cost theory 
Keynes’‎(1936) Transaction Cost Motive theory of holding cash stipulates that firms are 
likely to increase their cash balances when the costs of raising funds are higher.   These costs 
are usually associated with external financing. Dittmar et al. (2003) suggest that there are 
substantial fixed costs of acquiring outside financing, as well as economies of scale in cash 
management. Opler et al. (1999) explains this theory by assuming that there are costs to 
buying and selling financial and real assets. In particularly, there is an assumption that there 
is a cost to raising external funds that takes the form of a fixed cost, plus a variable cost 
which is proportional to the amount raised. In such a case, Opler et al. (1999) maintain that a 
firm short of liquid assets has to raise funds in the capital markets, liquidate existing assets, 
reduce dividends and investment, renegotiate existing financial contracts, or some 
combination of these actions. They conclude that unless the firm has assets that can be 
liquidated at low cost, it prefers to use the capital markets. However, it is costly to raise funds, 
regardless of whether the firm does so by selling assets or using the capital markets. The 
fixed costs of accessing external markets induces the firm to raise funds infrequently, and to 
use cash and liquid asset holdings as a buffer. As a result, for a given amount of net debt, 
there is an optimal amount of cash, and cash is not simply a negative debt (Opler et al., 1999). 
According to Baum et al. (2004), this could be the reason why small firms are considered 
more likely to be financially constrained.  
Firms in Africa could particularly be vulnerable due to the underdeveloped nature of 
the financial market, and also the huge cost of securing cash outside the firm, vis a vis the 
demands for the payment of dividends to shareholders. This has huge implications for R&D, 
investments and growth. 
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4.2.4  Precautionary Cost theory 
According to Bates et al. (2009), firms hold cash to better cope with adverse shocks when 
access to capital markets is costly. The precautionary motive also suggests that firms with 
better investment opportunities hold more cash because adverse shocks and financial distress 
are more costly for them. This theory was propounded by Keynes (1936), who explained that, 
besides day-to-day transactions, there are many unforeseen contingencies in the life of firm 
for which they hold money. Rettl (2011) also explains that from an efficiency perspective, 
changes in growth opportunities and concurrent variations in the need for future financing 
capacity, induce precautious managers to adjust corporate cash balances. Firms with better 
investment opportunities hold more cash to avoid being financially constrained in the future, 
while firms with poor investment opportunities optimally choose to maintain lower levels of 
cash.  
4.2.5  Access to finance and corporate cash holdings 
Petersen and Rajan (1997) maintained that a firm’s‎willingness‎to‎provide‎trade‎credit‎has‎a‎
direct correlation on access to short-term finance. The consequence of this could be important, 
because during a financial crisis firms’ access to bank finance may be limited and the 
possibility of less trade credit by suppliers may affect their liquidity. Also, according to Sufi 
(2009), lines of credit are driven primarily by capital market frictions, and a dedicated line of 
credit overpowers these frictions by guaranteeing that funds are available to undertake 
important projects. In other words, lines of credit should address the capital market frictions 
that motivate firms to hold cash as a liquidity buffer. Sufi (2009) is of the opinion that 
because banks are the most efficient liquidity providers in the economy, firms should rely on 
lines of credit rather than internal cash. This is an argument that Gatev and Strahan (2006) 
also share. They also establish that a‎firm’s‎reliance‎on‎credit‎is‎an‎indicator‎of‎the‎level‎of‎
financial constraint facing the firm.  
  Saddour (2006), in a study about French firms, found a negative relationship between 
the cash levels of mature companies and their trade credit. This relationship confirms the 
findings of  Kim et al. (1998). Saddour (2006) asserted that if trade credit is positive, the 
firm’s‎commercial policy consists of selling on credit and paying its suppliers cash. Thus, the 
company has an immediate financing need and it uses its cash holdings to pay its suppliers. 
Consequently, its cash level decreases. On the other hand, when the trade credit is negative, 
the company requires short term payments from its customers and obtains long term 78 
 
payments from its suppliers. Therefore, it does not have immediate financing needs, and it 
will consequently accumulate cash to be able to pay its suppliers in the following period. 
4.2.6  Access to finance and economic development  
Access to finance is critical for sustainable economic growth and social development. Micro, 
Small and Medium Enterprises are able to capture entrepreneurial opportunities when 
financial products and services, designed according to their demand, are available to them. 
According to a report by Nasr and the World Bank (2004), access to finance is important for 
growth and economic development. They noted that having an efficient financial system that 
can present essential services can have huge impacts on a‎country’s‎economic development. 
Greater financial development increases growth, reduces economic volatility, creates job 
opportunities and improves income distribution, as has been established by a large body of 
empirical literature. A well-functioning financial market plays a critical role in channeling 
funds to their most productive uses, and allocates risks to those who can best bear them. 
There is ample macroeconomic evidence suggesting that the development of a country is 
strongly correlated with the development of financial markets  (Banerjee, 2001; Levine, 
2004). 
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4.3  The determinants of cash holding and hypotheses development. 
4.3.1  Financial leverage 
Many researchers have found a negative relationship between corporate cash holding and 
leverage, for example, Bates et al. (2009), D'Mello et al. (2008), Ferreira and Vilela (2004), 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Kim et al. (2011a), Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001), Harford et 
al. (2008) etc.  
  Al-Najjar (2013) also found a negative relationship between cash holding and 
leverage for Indian firms, but did not find leverage to be a significant determinant in Brazil. 
However, in a study by  Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008) on the determinants of 
cash holdings of SMEs in Spain, and also work by Ogundipe et al. (2012b) relating to 
Nigerian firms, a positive relationship was found between cash ratio and leverage. The link 
between leverage and cash holding is that leveraged firms are more likely to hoard cash, due 
to the higher probability of financial distress. It is suggested that cash levels decrease with 
more debt (Baskin, 1987). Accordingly, firms with more liquid assets can convert these assets 
into cash and, in turn, hold lower levels of cash (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Al-Najjar, 2013). 
Al-Najjar (2013), quoting Ferreira and Vilela (2004), suggests that firms with high levels of 
debt are less able to stockpile cash. The reason given is that they are better monitored when 
compared to firms with relatively low debt. Based on the literature, this study hypothesizes 
that: 
  Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between the leverage and cash holdings of    
African Firms.  
4.3.2  Cash flow 
As with leverage, there is no unanimity in the findings regarding the relationship between 
cash flow and cash holdings (Kim et al., 2011b). While some empirical studies find negative 
relationships, others find positive relationships. According to Jensen (1986), managers are 
restrained when external financiers withhold cash for new investment. On the other hand, 
managers become free to make new investment when there is increased cash flow. Kim et al. 
(1998), Bao et al. (2012) and Shah (2011) find a negative relationship. However, Ferreira and 
Vilela (2004), Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008), Couderc (2005), Ozkan and Ozkan 
(2004), Opler et al. (1999) suggest a positive relationship. The argument, for example by 
Opler et al. (1999), is that firms experiencing increased cash flows are likely to hold back 
some earnings, amassing cash holdings that can later fund investment or be put to use in 80 
 
times of stress. This paper will follow the argument of Opler et al. (1999),  Ferreira and 
Vilela (2004) and  Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) in hypothesizing that: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between cash flow and cash holdings 
4.3.3  Capital expenditure 
Bates et al. (2009) maintain that because of the negative relationship between the need to 
hold cash and the ease of borrowing, capital expenditure is expected to reduce cash holdings. 
Kim et al. (2011a) make the assertion that capital expenditures improve or create new assets 
for a firm and, since these assets can become collateral if needed, they also enhance 
borrowing capacity and undercut the need to hold cash. On the other hand,  
Riddick and Whited (2009) suggest that since capital expenditure can potentially proxy for 
financial distress  and investment  opportunities, firms  with greater capital  expenditure are 
more likely to hold cash. 
Empirically, Kim et al. (2011a), Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012), Bates et al. (2009) 
found support for the existence of a negative relationship between capital expenditure and 
cash holdings. However, Kusnadi (2005), Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) Opler et al. 
(1999) found a positive relationship between capital expenditure and cash holdings, in that 
cash holdings increase significantly as capital expenditure increases. Based on Kim et al. 
(2011a), Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) and especially  Bates et al. (2009) findings, it is being 
hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relationship between capital expenditure and cash holdings 
for firms in Africa. 
4.3.4  Firm size 
The relationship between firm size and cash holdings has remained a critical aspect of all 
cash holdings studies (Kim et al., 2011a). It has been proposed, for example by Miller and 
Orr (1966), that economies of scale in cash management lead smaller firms to hold more cash 
than larger firms. They added that fees charged in connection with borrowing are not 
correlated with loan size, making them a fixed cost that is relatively more burdensome to 
small firms than to large ones. According to them, small firms, therefore, tend to hold more 
cash. This negative relationship has been confirmed by empirical studies such as Ozkan and 
Ozkan (2004), and Kim et al. (2011a). Another reason for such a relationship has been put 
forward by Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Titman and Wessels (1988), who assert that larger 81 
 
firms hold less cash than smaller firms because their diversification gives them a lower 
probability of financial distress. 
The study of publicly traded firms in the United States by Opler et al. (1999) and a 
study of non-financial UK firms by Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), D'Mello et al. (2008), Bates et 
al. (2009), Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Harford et al. (2008), all confirm the negative 
relationship between firm size and cash holdings. Therefore this paper hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relationship between firm size and cash holdings. 
4.3.5  Dividend payout 
The Trade-off theory predicts a negative relationship between dividend payments and cash 
holdings (Al-Najjar, 2013).‎The‎reason‎adduced‎by‎the‎theory‎is‎that‎‘‘dividend-paying‎firms’’‎
can trade-off the costs of holding cash by reducing dividend payments. In other words, firms 
that distribute dividends to their shareholders are more able to raise funds at lower costs when 
needed by reducing their dividend payments (Al-Najjar and Belghitar, 2011). This view has 
also been shared by Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), who argue that these costs can be avoided by 
firms facing low internal financing resources by issuing equity or even reducing payment of 
dividends.‎They‎state‎that:‎‘‘firms‎that‎currently‎pay‎dividends‎can‎afford‎to‎hold‎less‎cash‎as‎
they‎are‎more‎capable‎of‎raising‎funds‎when‎needed‎by‎cutting‎dividends’’(Ozkan and Ozkan, 
2004 p.2108). Other studies, such as one by Opler et al. (1999), also support this negative 
relationship when they state that if the firm has a shortage of liquid assets, it can survive by 
either decreasing investment or dividends, or by raising external funds through security 
issuances or asset sales when there is a shortage of the liquid assets. In view of this evidence, 
this study hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 5:  There is a negative association between dividend payment and cash holdings. 
4.3.6  Net working capital 
Net working capital (NWC) consists of assets that substitute for cash (Bates et al, 2009). The 
assumption, according to Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012), is that firms holding more working 
capital will hold less cash. D'Mello et al. (2008) also found a negative relationship between 
net working capital and cash holdings. Other studies by Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Pinkowitz 
and Williamson (2001), Opler et al. (1999) and Ogundipe et al. (2012a) all found a negative 
relationship between net working capital and cash holdings. Based on the above empirical 
evidence, the paper hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 6: Networking capital is negatively related to cash holdings 82 
 
4.3.7  Market-to-book ratio 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) have argued that firms with high cash flow also have a high 
market-to-book ratio. This condition occurs because these firms can be expected to be 
profitable in the future. This positive relationship has been confirmed by Kim et al. (1998), 
Opler et al. (1999), Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Drobetz and 
Grüninger (2007), Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008), Kim et al. (2011a), Kusnadi 
(2005), Ogundipe et al. (2012b), and Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012). Myers and Majluf (1984) 
point out that firms whose value is largely determined by their growth opportunities incur 
higher external financing costs. Additionally, Harris and Raviv (1991), Shleifer and Vishny 
(1992) argue that firms with more growth opportunities may also be expected to incur higher 
costs for financial distress and bankruptcy because their value depends on their growth 
opportunities, rather than on tangible assets or specific cash flows. Thus, this type of firm will 
keep higher cash holdings to avoid these costs. Therefore this paper hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 7: There is a positive relationship between market-to-book ratio (growth 
opportunity) and cash holdings. 
4.3.8  Return on assets 
Return on assets (ROA) has been measured by the ratio of net profits to the book value of 
assets. The Trade-off theory predicts a negative relationship between return on assets and 
cash holdings, claiming that profitable firms have enough cash flow to avoid underinvestment 
problems (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007). However, the Pecking Order 
theory predicts a positive relationship, by indicating that cash holdings fluctuate with cash 
flow (Kim et al., 1998). Ogundipe et al. (2012a), however, found a positive relationship 
between cash holdings and return on assets. This paper therefore predicts that:  
Hypothesis 8: There is a positive relationship between cash holdings and return on assets. 
4.3.9  Rule of law 
Analysis by Ferreira and Vilela (2004) suggests that firms in countries with superior investor 
protection mechanisms hold less cash. This assertion had been made earlier by Dittmar et al. 
(2003), who extended their analysis to include not only shareholders’ rights, but also the 
creditors’‎rights‎and‎the‎quality‎of‎law‎enforcement.‎These‎findings‎have‎also been confirmed 
by Guney et al. (2003) However, Pinkowitz et al. (2003) also said that countries with poor 
investor protection have incentives to make decisions that enable them to appropriate more 
private benefits from control. Because it is easier to expropriate cash than fixed assets, firms 83 
 
in countries with poor investor protection are predicted to hold more cash. From this, 
therefore, it is hypothesized that:  
Hypothesis 9: There is a negative relationship between the rule of law and cash holdings.  
4.3.10  Gross domestic product and cash holdings 
Literature on the relationship between Gross Domestic Product and cash holdings is scanty. 
However, Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solana (2008), using interest rates as a measure of 
economic growth, maintain that when the interest rates in the economy increase firms reduce 
their cash holdings. However, Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solana (2008) found no 
relationship between cash holdings and GDP growth. Regarding the domestic credit of banks, 
they mention that the cash level of a firm falls when the use of bank debt rises (Garcia-Teruel 
and Martinez-Solano, 2008) 
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4.4  Empirical findings 
Table ‎4.1 Summary variables and definitions 
Variables  Label  Definitions      
Dependent variable:     
Cash holding (Cash ratio) 
         CASHR  Cash and marketable securities divided by total 
assets 
Independent variables:     
Financial leverage  LEV  Total debt divided by total assets (proxy for  
financial distress)   
Market-to-book ratio  MKTBR  Market value of equity divided by total assets 
(measure for investment opportunities) 
Cash flow  CF 
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation 
and amortization divided by total assets (proxy 
for internal source of finance)  
Net working capital  NWC 
Working capital  less cash and marketable 
securities divided by total assets (proxy for 
liquid asset) 
Capital expenditure  CE  Capital expenditure divided by total assets 
(proxy for investment or demand for cash)  
Firm size  SIZE  Natural logarithm of total assets  
Dividend payout  DIV  Dividend payout divided by total equity  
Return on assets  ROA  Net income divided by total assets (proxy for 
profitability) 
Rule of law  ROL 
Perception of the extent of confidence and law 
abiding in society, quality of contract 
enforcement, courts, property rights, crime and 
others.) 
Gross domestic product 
(real GDP)  GDPC  Gross domestic product at constant price (for 
measuring economic development) 
Domestic credit of banks 
to GDP   DCB%GDP  Domestic credit of banks as a percentage of 
GDP 
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4.4.1  Descriptive statistics 
Table ‎4.2 Summary statistics of firm and country characteristics across firms in the 
sample 1994-2011 
This table shows descriptive statistics for the median values for the firm and country specific 
factors from 14 selected African countries over the period 1994-2011. The firm specific 
variables are as follows. Corporate cash holding (CASHR), which is the dependent variable, 
defined as cash and marketable securities to total assets. Market-to-book ratio (MKTBR), 
measured by the total assets less total equity plus market value of equity to total assets. 
Financial leverage (LEV), which is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Cash flow (CF), 
which is the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total 
assets. Net working capital (NWC), defined as the working capital less cash and marketable 
securities to total assets. Capital expenditure (CE), defined as capital expenditure to total 
assets. Firm size (SIZE), which refers to the natural logarithm of total assets. Dividend 
payout (DIV), defined as the dividend payout to total equity. Return on asset (ROA), defined 
as the net income to total assets. The country specific factors are as follows. Rule of Law 
(RoL), which is a vector for governance indicator defined as the perception of extent of 
confidence and law abiding in society, quality of contract enforcement, courts, property rights, 
crime etc. Gross domestic product at constant price (GDP cons), which is a proxy for 
measuring economic development. Domestic credit of banks as a percentage to GDP 
(DCB%GDP), used as a measure of banking development. The table shows the approximate 
average from the investigated variables across firms. Data was sourced from DataStream, 
Bloomberg and World Bank Development Indicators. NB: GDP is in billions. 
See over. 86 
 
 
Table 4.2 Summary statistics of firm and country characteristics across firms in the sample 1994-2011 (Cont.) 
 
YEAR  CASHR  LEV  MKTBR  CF  NWC  CE  SIZE  DIV  ROA  RoL  GDP   DCB% 
1994  0.06  0.09  1.11  0.15  10.41  -0.05  5.38  0.44  0.05  -  38.6  27.90 
1995  0.07  0.09  1.12  0.15  10.18  -0.06  5.32  0.22  0.06  -  39.5  32.70 
1996  0.06  0.09  1.14  0.16  13.37  -0.05  5.04  0.32  0.08  -0.01  41.2  31.20 
1997  0.07  0.10  1.20  0.14  12.90  -0.05  5.18  0.36  0.07  -  42.4  39.70 
1998  0.08  0.10  0.99  0.16  12.33  -0.05  4.85  0.39  0.08  -0.03  43.2  43.90 
1999  0.08  0.12  0.88  0.14  8.98  -0.06  4.68  0.63  0.07  -  43.6  47.70 
2000  0.08  0.13  0.82  0.14  8.26  -0.05  4.77  0.48  0.07  -0.01  46.0  51.00 
2001  0.08  0.13  0.76  0.14  7.57  -0.06  4.66  0.53  0.07  -  47.4  44.60 
2002  0.08  0.13  0.73  0.14  8.53  -0.05  4.67  0.58  0.06  -0.01  48.1  43.40 
2003  0.07  0.13  0.82  0.12  7.99  -0.04  4.72  0.44  0.06  -0.05  53.1  42.40 
2004  0.07  0.12  0.94  0.15  6.84  -0.04  4.68  0.55  0.06  0.02  58.7  42.60 
2005  0.07  0.10  1.09  0.15  7.33   -0.04  4.65  0.33  0.07  -0.12  61.9  46.20 
2006  0.08  0.12  1.22  0.15  7.73  -0.04  4.77  0.28  0.08  -0.22  65.7  48.60 
2007  0.08  0.12  1.44  0.14  9.77  -0.04  4.88  0.20  0.08  -0.20  70.0  45.50 
2008  0.07  0.12  1.17  0.15  13.09  -0.06  5.02  0.26  0.08  -0.09  74.2  42.80 
2009  0.07  0.13  1.08  0.12  10.59  -0.04  5.03  0.24  0.06  -0.09  79.4  38.60 
2010  0.08  0.11  1.13  0.14  12.71  -0.04  5.09  0.17  0.06  -0.11  85.6  33.10 
2011  0.07  0.11  0.97  0.13  12.13  -0.04  5.27  0.09  0.06  -0.42  91.3  31.30 87 
 
 
From Table 4.2 above, the cash ratio (cash holdings) for the firms across the African 
countries showed an upward trend between 1994-2000, a downward trend between 2000-
2005 and thereafter increases, but at a decreasing rate between 2006-2007, with the median 
cash holding ranging from 0.06 to 0.09. The cash holding reached its highest in 1999. Overall, 
the trend indicated that the median cash holding in Africa was stable, which is in sharp 
contrast with the US and UK (Bates et al., 2009) and (Opler et al., 1999). Observing the 
formal test of normality, all the cash ratios showed non-normality in the error term and, hence, 
transformation was performed for the cash ratio variables. In terms of the firm specifics, 
Table 4.2 shows that leverage (proxy for financial distress) increased, but was very low and 
stable. The market to book ratio range was between 0 to 1.44. The cash flow ranged from 
0.12 to 0.16. Net working capital (proxy for liquid asset) indicated a range of 6.84 to 13.37. 
Firm size (proxy for transactional cost) and dividend payout (proxy for dividend payment to 
shareholders) ranged between 5.38 to 5.27, 0 to 0.68 respectively. Capital expenditure (proxy 
for demand for cash or investment opportunity) and Return on assets (proxy for profitability) 
ranged from -0.04 to 0.063. For the country specific analysis, Gross Domestic Product had a 
range of 3.86 to 9.13, indicating an upward trend for the firms across these countries under 
examination. The domestic credit of banks as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product ranged 
between 27.9 to 48.6, even though it indicated fluctuations. The rule of law ranged between -
.01 to -.42, which implies that there was a low level in governance in Africa since, according 
to the World Bank Data Base, if the rule of law ranges between -2.5 and 2.5, it implies that 
countries with -2.5, and 2.5, show a low and high level of rule of law, respectively. The rule 
of law ranged between -.01 to -.42, which implies that the governance practiced in Africa 
with regard to rule of law was very low. 
See over. 88 
 
Table ‎4.3 Evolution of corporate cash holding across African countries examined in the sample 1994-2011 
YEAR  BOT  EGY  GH  IVC  KEN  MOR  NIG  SA  TAN  TUN  UGAN  ZAM  ZIM 
1994  0.37  0.34  0.08  -  0.09  0.02  0.12  0.05  0.01  -  0.01  0.10  - 
1995  0.09  0.17  0.04  -  0.09  0.01  0.05  0.06  0.01  -  0.01  0.14  - 
1996  0.11  0.07  0.07  -  0.14  0.01  0.05  0.06  0.01  0.14  0.01  0.16  - 
1997  0.22  0.18  0.07  -  0.09  0.03  0.09  0.06  0.01  0.03  0.02  0.07  0.24 
1998  0.28  0.13  0.09  0.06  0.06  0.08  0.08  0.09  0.03  0.05  0.02  0.01  0.32 
1999  0.13  0.11  0.06  0.08  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.10  0.05  0.05  0.02  0.08  0.15 
2000  0.10  0.10  0.08  0.05  0.07  0.03  0.07  0.10  0.07  0.06  0.01  0.06  0.08 
2001  0.17  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.04  0.02  0.08  0.11  0.06  0.07  0.06  0.11  0.07 
2002  0.10  0.06  0.10  0.06  0.06  0.05  0.04  0.11  0.18  0.08  0.06  0.04  0.07 
2003  0.18  0.12  0.11  0.09  0.08  0.09  0.07  0.13  0.19  0.14  0.10  0.05  0.06 
2004  0.30  0.13  0.04  0.12  0.06  0.08  0.06  0.14  0.17  0.13  0.11  0.18  0.07 
2005  0.12  0.12  0.02  0.06  0.06  0.03  0.03  0.10  0.07  0.09  0.04  0.07  0.06 
2006  0.23  0.13  0.04  0.08  0.08  0.05  0.04  0.10  0.05  0.10  0.03  0.06  0.15 
2007  0.21  0.16  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.07  0.04  0.0  0.25  0.10  0.07  0.14  0.06 
2008  0.23  0.15  0.05  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.05  0.08  0.19  0.08  0.09  0.09  0.05 
2009  0.10  0.13  0.06  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.09  0.10  0.08  0.02  0.06  0.04 
2010  0.18  0.11  0.04  0.06  0.05  0.02  0.05  0.10  0.20  0.10  0.04  0.03  0.06 
2011  0.16  0.10  0.05  0.02  0.05  0.03  0.04  0.09  0.09  0.07  0.06  0.04  0.07 
Botswana  (BOT),  Egypt  (EGY),  Ghana  (GH),  Ivory  Coast  (IVC),  Kenya  (KEN)  Morocco  (MOR),  Nigeria  (NIG),  South  Africa  (SA), 
Tanzania (TAN),Tunisia (TUN), Uganda (UGAN), Zambia (ZAM) and Zimbabwe (ZIM). 
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From Table 4.3 above, the general cash ratio (cash holding) for the selected African countries 
were relatively stable. The cash holdings for Botswana and Egypt range between 0.09 to 0.37 
indicated the highest level of cash holding but stability. Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Morocco, 
Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe ranged between 
0.01 to 0.24, indicating stable cash holding. Generally, the ranges of cash ratio across these 
countries showed that firms across the selected countries in Africa had stable cash holdings. 
The stability of the cash holdings across the selected countries is illustrated below. 90 
 
Figure ‎ 4.1 Evolution of median cash holdings across countries in the sample 1994-2011 
 
      Source:‎Bloomberg‎and‎author’s‎calculation 
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Figure 4.1 above shows the median cash to assets ratio for the 1994-2011 period in the 
selected countries in Africa. The pattern indicated a range in the cash ratio between 0 and 0.4 
in the selected Africa countries. The general pattern in the cash holding across all the 
countries appears very stable. It was only Botswana and Egypt that had high cash holdings 
for 1994, but this dropped to a very stable level afterwards. The cash holdings of the 
individual countries showed the following: The cash ratio pattern for Botswana, Egypt, 
Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, Uganda, Morocco, Ghana, Tunisia, Tanzania, 
Zimbabwe and Zambia were ranged between 0 and 0.4, and was stable, but Botswana and 
Egypt recorded very high cash holdings for 1994 and thereafter became stable. 
Generally, it can be seen from the above analysis, both Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1 
showed that cash ratios (cash holdings) in the selected African countries were stable, apart 
from Botswana and Egypt, with high levels of cash holding during the 1994 period. 
One reason for the stability of the cash holdings is due to lack of research and 
development expenditures in these selected African countries, which do not compel them to 
hold large amounts of cash as a protection against future unexpected events or shocks. Bates 
et al. (2009) and D'Mello et al. (2008) argue that firms that undertake greater research and 
development need to keep a larger cash holding against shocks. Bates et al. (2009) also put 
forward that the cash movement from firms towards acquisition signifies that firms have to 
keep larger cash balances for outflow in terms of acquisition. The evidence from the data 
suggests that firms across African countries lack acquisition activity, and therefore do not 
need to have enough cash, which emphasizes the point of stability of cash holdings in Africa 
across the firms.  
As indicated by Opler et al, 1999; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Ozakan and Ozkan, 2004, 
lack of investment by African firms is another reason for the low and stable cash holdings. 
According to Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008), firms with more investment 
opportunities keep higher liquidity levels, in order not to limit or cancel their profitable 
investment projects. Since most of these firms have very low investment opportunities, they 
hold very low and stable cash. 
Another reason for the recorded stable cash holdings could be attributed to the 
country specific factors of good governance and the rule of law. Almost all countries 
included in the study had strong legal regimes that protected the rights of investors. As 92 
 
indicated by the literature (Dittmar et al., 2003; Guney et al., 2003; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004), 
countries with strong investor protection laws hold less cash. The results of the analysis 
appears to confirm this assertion. 
As indicated by the United Nations (2002) report, the fundamental reasons why 
Botswana‎and‎Egypt‎had‎high‎cash‎holdings‎were‎that‎the‎two‎countries’‎governments‎
supported the private sector in their progress, and offered protection by which investors also 
became more secure in doing business or investing in the country. The report also stated that 
these two countries were highly dominated by diamond mining companies, which offer them 
high levels of cash as a result of good management. They had also embarked on research and 
development, which enabled them to anticipate future shocks and therefore reserve more cash 
towards the future to prevent a negative impact on the economy. The median patterns for the 
firm specific factors determining the corporate cash holdings of firms across the selected 
countries are as follows: 
Figure ‎ 4.2 Cash holding across firms in the sample 
 
            Source:‎Bloomberg‎and‎author’s‎calculation                      
The pattern in the cash ratio indicated very slight increases and decreases from 1994 to 1999, 
and 2000 to 2005 respectively, with a decline thereafter. On the whole, 1999 recorded high 
levels of cash holding amongst the firms under consideration, but the changes look stable. 
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Figure ‎ 4.3 Cash flow across firms in the sample 
            Source:‎Bloomberg‎and‎author’s‎calculation 
Median cash flow, as a determinant of cash ratio across firms, indicated both a downward  
and upward trend over time. There were rapid falls in 2010 and 2011.  
Figure ‎ 4.4 Capital expenditure across firms in the sample 
 
               Source:‎Bloomberg‎and‎author’s‎calculation 
For the capital expenditure, the median trends indicated a long wave of fluctuations, 
decreasing throughout, but at negative levels for all years.                       
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Figure ‎ 4.5 Return on assets across firms in the sample 
 
               Source: Bloomberg and‎author’s‎calculation 
The return on assets showed an initial rise between 1994 and 1997. It showed a gradual 
decline from 1998 to 2003 and rose again from 2004 to 2007, but with a sharp fall from 2008 
to 2011.     
4.4.2  Determinants of corporate cash holdings 
Table ‎4.4 Summary results of fixed effect and general method of moment (GMM) 
.This Table presents a summary of the results of the panel data regression for both the firm and 
country specific factors, using data from 1994-2011. The firm specific variables are as follows: 
Corporate cash holding (CASHR), which is the dependent variable, defined as cash and marketable 
securities to total assets. Market-to-book ratio (MKTBR), measured by the total assets less total equity 
plus market value of equity to total assets. Financial leverage (LEV), which is the ratio of total debt to 
total assets. Cash flow (CF), which is the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) to total assets. Net working capital (NWC), defined as the working capital 
less cash and marketable securities to total assets. Capital expenditure (CE), defined as capital 
expenditure to total assets. Firm size (SIZE), which refers to the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Dividend payout (DIV), defined as the dividend payout to total equity. Return on asset (ROA), 
defined as the net income to total assets. The country specific factors are as follows. Rule of Law 
(RoL), which is a vector for governance measurement. Gross domestic product at constant price (GDP 
cons), which is a proxy for measuring economic development. Domestic credit of banks as a 
percentage to GDP (DCB%GDP), used as a measure of banking development.  
All regressions were estimated using panel data estimation, fixed effects and the general method of 
moments. The superscripts ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. The following tests are also reported: (1) Observation, (2) The Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation, which was significant for the first three models and, therefore, the null hypothesis of 
no serial correlation was rejected (3) The Sargan and Hansen test for over identification restriction, 
which confirmed the absence of an exogeneity problem (4) The Arellano-Bond test for second order 
serial correlation, which indicated no serial correlation. The Model 4 (GMM) coefficients were used 
for interpretation.  
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Table 4.4 Summary results of fixed effects and gmm (cont.) 
Variables  Fixed effect  
(1) 
Fixed effect 
(2) 
Fixed effect  
(3) 
GMM 
(4) 
CASH_lag  -  -  -   0.46*** 
LEV  -0.13***  -  -0.12***   0.02 
MKTBR  -0.00  -  -0.00  -0.00 
CF  -0.01  -   0.02   0.12** 
NWC   0.00  -   0.00**   0.00 
CE   0.17***  -   0.18***   0.21*** 
SIZE   0.00**  -   0.00*   0.02** 
DIV  -0.00  -  -0.00  -0.00 
ROA   0.16***     0.17***   0.03 
RoL  -  0.02   0.01   0.03 
GDP (real GDP)  -  0.00***  .001  .001*** 
DCB%GDP  -  0.01***  -0.00   0.00 
Constant   0.11***  0.13***   0.08***   
Observation.   3778  5146   2921   1691 
R-squared:
           
Within   0.08  0.00   0.07  - 
Between   0.15  0.04   0.16  - 
Overall   0.13  0.03   0.14  - 
1
st Order Cor (AR) 1    0.00  0.00   0.00   0.00 
2
nd Order Cor (AR) 2   -  -  -   0.15 
Sargan of over rest.  -  -  -   0.00 
Hansen test of over rest.  -  -  -   0.12 
 
The results show that lag of cash holding (CASH lag), financial leverage (LEV), Cash flow 
(CF), Capital expenditure (CE), Firm Size (SIZE) and Gross domestic product (GDP) are 
significantly associated with corporate cash holding. The Model 4 (GMM) coefficients were 
used for interpretation and the estimated parameters were interpreted, holding all other 
variables in the model constant. 
4.4.2.1  Lag cash holding  
 From Table 4.4 Model 4, the estimated coefficient of the lagged cash holding was positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level for firms in Africa. The coefficient was 0.46, 
which gives a positive relationship between cash holding and lagged cash holding. The 
implication‎is‎that‎a‎unit‎increase‎in‎the‎firm’s‎previous‎corporate‎cash‎holding‎increased‎the‎
current year corporate cash holding by 0.46, holding all other factors constant. The size of the 
coefficient value in absolute terms was very large, indicating that changes in the lag cash 
holdings have a greater impact on the current year corporate cash holdings of firms. 
Empirically, a similar variation is observed in the literature, including Harford et al. 
(2008).They maintained that lag cash explains variation in current cash holdings much better. 96 
 
This might be the situation of firms in Africa, since the lag cash holding explained the model 
much better, with significantly positive relationships emerging across the firms. The result is 
also consistent with the findings of  Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Couderc (2005), Ogundipe et 
al. (2012b), Shah (2011), and Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008), who identified a 
positive relationship between previous year cash holding and current year cash holding. 
However, the result is inconsistent with the findings of Bates et al. (2009), who found a 
negative relationship between cash holding and lag cash holding.  
4.4.2.2  Cash ratio and financial leverage   
The Table provides the regression results, with cash holding as the dependent variable. As 
indicated in Model 4, the coefficient of financial leverage (proxy for financial distress) was 
 -0.02 and it was significant at the 1 percent level. Thus, there was a positive correlation 
between financial leverage and cash holding. The interpretation is that a unit increase in 
financial leverage increased the cash holding by 0.02, when all other factors were fixed. This 
The absolute coefficient value showed that financial leverage impacts less on cash holdings. 
Theoretically, the positive coefficient rejects Hypothesis 1 of a negative relation. The results 
are consistent with the findings of Ogundipe et al. (2012a), Ogundipe et al. (2012b), Garcia-
Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008), and Kim et al. (2011b) who found that  leveraged firms 
are more likely to hoard cash, due to the higher probability of financial distress. However, it 
contradicts  the findings of Paskelian et al. (2010), Shah (2011), Iskandar-Datta and Jia 
(2012), Opler et al. (1999), Kusnadi (2005), Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001),  Ozkan and 
Ozkan (2004),  Ferreira and Vilela (2004), and Drobetz and Grüninger (2007) 
4.4.2.3  Cash holding and market to book ratio  
From Table 4.4 Model 4, the results of the regression analysis for market to book ratio 
variable, which is a proxy for investment or growth opportunities, produced a negative 
coefficient of -0.00, but were insignificant in explaining cash holding in Africa, indicating a 
negative relationship between market to book ratio and cash holding. The insignificant result 
is consistent with the studies by Jani et al. (2004) and Opler et al. (1999), who suggested that 
firms use their internal resources as the first sources of funds, implying low levels of cash. 
The coefficient therefore supports the Pecking Order theory. The reason for the negative 
coefficient was also due to the fact that large firms accumulate cash, but their motive is to 
undertake any investment that comes their way. The negative coefficient  could also be 
possibly due to the fact that lower  market value firms do not distribute excess cash (Jani et 97 
 
al., 2004). The relationship is also in keeping with the studies by Pinkowitz and Williamson 
(2001), Opler et al. (1999), Paskelian et al. (2010) and Shah (2011). 
However, the finding is inconsistent with the studies of Bates et al. (2009), Ferreira 
and Vilela (2004)  and Ogundipe et al. (2012b), who found a positive significant relationship 
between cash holding and market to book value.   
4.4.2.4  Cash holding and cash flow  
The regression analysis from Table 4.4 Model 4 showed that cash flow, which is a proxy for 
internal source of finance or investment opportunity, produced a positive coefficient of 0.12 
and it was statistically significant at the 5% level. The interpretation is that a unit increase in 
cash flow increased the cash holding by 0.12, when all other factors were fixed. The result 
showing a positive relationship is in line with previous studies by Bao et al. (2012), Ferreira 
and Vilela (2004), Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008), 
Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001), Couderc (2005), Opler et al. (1999), Paskelian et al. (2010) 
and Ogundipe et al. (2012a). The positive coefficient of the cash flow supports the Pecking 
Order theory (hierarchy theory), which suggests that in the presence of information 
asymmetries firms are interested in and will prefer, using internal sources to finance their 
operations. This means that firms with greater cash flows will keep high cash holdings. 
However, the findings contradict that of Ozkan and Ozkan (2004).  
4.4.2.5  Cash holding and net working capital   
 In this study, the regression result for net working capital, which is a proxy for liquid asset, 
indicated in Table 4.4 Model 4, showed a positive coefficient of 0.00, but was statistically 
insignificant. Theoretically, the result rejected Hypothesis 6, but it is consistent with, and also 
confirms, the findings of Bao et al. (2012). However, it contradicts previous studies, 
including D'Mello et al. (2008), Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Kim et al. (2011a), and Opler et 
al. (1999). The result of a positive coefficient, although not significant, could mean that firms 
in African countries may not have high value for networking capital and therefore hold more 
cash, because converting net working to cash could be a problem in terms of delays and low 
payment for net working capital assets (Uremadu et al., 2012). 
4.4.2.6  Cash holding and capital expenditure 
Regarding the relationship between cash holding and capital expenditure, which is a proxy 
for investment or demand for cash, the results of the regressions from Table 4.4 Model 4 
show a very significant positive relationship, with significant levels of 1% and a coefficient 98 
 
of 0.21.This means that an increase in capital expenditure leads to an increase in corporate 
cash holding. The implication is that a unit increase in capital expenditure increased the cash 
holding by 0.21, when all other factors were fixed. The absolute coefficient indicated that 
capital expenditure impacts greatly on cash holdings. This result of a positive relationship 
rejected Hypothesis 3, but confirms the findings of  Kusnadi (2005), and Opler et al. 
(1999).The finding is in support of the Trade-off theory, which indicates that firms with high 
levels of capital expenditure (spending) should hold more liquid assets (cash). This also 
means that for  firms with expectations of high investments, it is not financially sound to 
finance their anticipated investments out of operating income, and they therefore need to hold 
more cash to avoid the  high cost of borrowing to undertake their profitable projects (D'Mello 
et al., 2005).The result, however, is not in line with the findings of Bates et al. (2009), Bao et 
al. (2012), Kim et al. (2011a), Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001), and Paskelian et al. (2010) 
4.4.2.7  Cash holding and firm size  
 From Table 4.4 Model 4 the results of the regression analysis for firm size, which is a proxy 
for transactional cost, indicated a positive significant relationship at the 5% level, with a 
coefficient of 0.02. The interpretation is that a unit increase in firm size increased the cash 
holding by 0.02, when all other factors were fixed. The positive coefficient between the cash 
holding and size supports the Pecking Order theory, which specifies that larger firms are 
better positioned to accumulate cash, as they are more profitable Opler et al. (1999). 
However, the findings contradict the results of Bao et al. (2012), Drobetz and Grüninger 
(2007), Ferreira and Vilela (2004), and  Kim et al. (2011a).  
4.4.2.8  Cash holding and dividend payout   
Table 4.4 Model 4 indicated a positive, but statistically insignificant, relationship between 
these two factors. This result implies that dividend payment does not have a relationship with 
cash holding and that these are both insignificant determinants of cash holding in Africa, 
which is consistent with the studies of Drobetz and Grüninger (2007), Al-Najjar (2013) and 
Couderc (2005). However, it contradicts the results from Kim et al. (2011a), and  Pinkowitz 
and Williamson (2001).  
4.4.2.9  Cash holding and return on assets  
The regression analysis from Table 4.4 Model 4 produced a positive coefficient of 0.03, but 
was statistically not significant. The positive relationship is an indication that an increase in 
the return on assets will lead to a corresponding increase in cash holdings.  99 
 
Theoretically, the positive coefficient supported Hypothesis 8. The result is consistent with 
the findings of Ogundipe et al. (2012a), who found that a positive relationship between cash 
holdings and return on assets 
4.4.2.10 Cash holding and rule of law  
For the governance issue of rule of law, it was difficult to find previous studies about how 
country specific factors affect the cash holdings, as very few studies, even in developed 
countries, have investigated how country specific factors, or‎a‎country’s‎legal‎system‎and‎
public governance, affect the cash holdings. The result of the regression from Table 4.4 
Model 4 indicates positive coefficients, but was statistically insignificant. This means that the 
rule of law does not affect the cash holdings of firms in Africa. This result contradicts the 
finding of Ferreira and Vilela (2004), who found a positive and significant relationship, 
suggesting that countries with investor protection measured by rule of law hold large amounts 
of cash. 
4.4.2.11 GDP Growth and cash holding 
The result of the regression analysis gave a positive coefficient of 0.01, indicating a positive 
relationship. The coefficient, however, very significantly, showed a significance level of 1%. 
The implication is that a unit increase in gross domestic product increased corporate cash 
holding by 0.001, all things being equal. This finding contradicts with that of Garcia-Teruel 
and Martinez-Solano (2008), who found a positive relationship between cash holding and 
GDP growth, and explained that the reason could be due to the fact that the economy is 
affected by change. 
4.4.2.12 Domestic credit of banks as a percentage of GDP 
The regression result for this variable showed a positive but statistically insignificant support 
of cash holding in Africa. This measures the size of the banking development and credit 
market and, therefore, the finding indicates that cash holding has nothing to do with the size 
of the domestic credit of market in Africa 
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4.5  Conclusion and implications  
This study examined the trends and determinants of corporate cash holding across selected 
African countries. Applying regression analysis and a partial standard adjustment model, the 
study measured the relationship between the dependent (cash holding) and independent 
variables, which were leverage, cash flow, net working capital, capital expenditure, firm size, 
dividend payout, return on asset and market to book value as firm specific factors. The study 
also considered the relationship between cash holding (dependent) and country specific 
factors, which were the rule of law, Gross Domestic Product and the domestic credit of banks 
as a percentage of GDP. The study further analysed the corporate cash holding trends across 
the selected African countries.  
The study found a negative relationship between cash holding and leverage, dividend 
payout, and market to book value. However, positive relationships were identified between 
cash holding and cash flow, net working capital, capital expenditure, firm size, return on 
assets, rule of law, domestic credit of banks and Gross Domestic Product.  
In general, the cash flow, firm size, dividend payout, market to book value, Rule of law, 
domestic credit of banks and Gross Domestic Product were not significant in determining 
corporate cash holdings in these selected African countries. Moreover, lag cash holding, 
leverage, net working capital, capital expenditure and return on asset did determine the 
corporate cash holding in these African countries. Overall, the study found that both the 
Trade-off and Pecking Order theories play important roles in explaining corporate cash 
holdings in Africa, but the Pecking Order explained more than the Trade-off. 
In conclusion, corporate cash holdings in the selected Africa countries were stable 
across all years under study, excepting Botswana and Egypt, which had surprisingly higher 
cash holdings between 1994-1995, but which became stable afterwards. The reasons for this 
stability was due to the fact that firms in Africa  lack research and development expenditures 
and therefore are not compelled to hold large amounts of cash as preparation against future 
shocks. The stability is also due to lack of acquisition, which indicates no movement of cash 
and therefore necessitates the stability of the cash ratio. Furthermore, there are low 
investment opportunities which does not motivate them to keep more cash. In Botswana and 
Egypt, the high levels of cash holding were due to the fact that the‎countries’‎governments‎
supported the private sector, offered investors protection, and also were dominated by huge 
diamond mining companies under good management. 101 
 
The study also concluded that corporate cash holdings are only affected by firm 
specific factors and not country specific variables, and that the results of these findings are 
consistent with the literature .Also, the factors that determine cash holdings in these African 
countries are almost similar to those identified in developed countries. The study confirms 
and denies some of the findings of earlier researches as well as coming out with very 
particular ones of its own.  
The study also has some implications. Since capital expenditure create new assets for 
firms and improves collateral security, it increases access to credit (Bates et al., 2009). 
Therefore firms in African countries that have lower capital expenditure encounter a reduced 
borrowing capacity and therefore they tend to hold more cash. Firms with larger investment 
opportunities have greater incentives to hold cash, as they suffer higher borrowing costs due 
to their increased risks of financial distress and bankruptcy. 
The results and empirical evidence, also suggest the expansion of the financial sector 
in African countries to enable firms to obtain finance, and also progress the functioning of 
trade credit as a short-term financing instrument. This implies that continued expansion of the 
financial environment by governments in African countries will ease firms’ financial 
constraints and thus boost economic efficiency. 
Furthermore, knowledge of the relationship between cash holding levels and firm 
specific factors will enable investors to become more informed in their decisions about the 
cash balances held by their investment target. For example, firms having a high return on 
assets should hold more cash. Low cash holding in such a firm could lead to the firm loosing 
profitable projects when they arise. 
The study will open up discussions of the determinants of corporate cash holding by all firms, 
especially small and medium scale ones across Africa and what specific factors managers 
need to be aware of. The results of the study will be useful for when a firm wants to know 
whether to hold more cash or less cash during for example, a financial crisis or a period of 
high inflation. It is important for firms to know which factors of their firms will have a 
positive or negative influence on their cash holdings decisions. 103 
 
 
  Dividends policy across African  Chapter 5:
countries 
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ABSTRACT  
This chapter firstly provides analysis of the dividend policy and differentials in firm and 
country specific factors for payers and non-payers of dividends. Secondly, it examines the 
predictions concerning the amount of dividends paid by listed non-financial firms in African 
countries. Using a panel dataset of 608 non-financial listed firms from 14 African countries 
over the period 1994-2011, the study found that dividend payers are more profitable, have 
larger firm size, greater investment, higher retention of earnings and less financial leverage 
than non-paying firms. The results show that in countries where the GDP per capita is low, 
firms are more likely to pay dividends. The level of corruption is high for non-payers of 
dividends. The results demonstrate that the selected countries rely on both current earnings 
and past dividends to determine the dividend payment. The study also found a positive 
significant relationship between dividend payout, profitability, investment opportunities and 
firm size. However, a significant negative relationship was reported between dividend payout, 
financial leverage, corruption and gross domestic product per capita. The study further found 
that the dividend trends were very low and stable, The conclusion, therefore, indicates that 
although firm specific factors are important in Africa in determining dividend policy 
regarding payout, country specific factors, such as corruption and the GDP per capita, play 
very significant roles in determining the dividend payout of African firms.  
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5.1  Introduction  
Baker et al. (2001) define dividend policy as the payout policy that managers follow when 
deciding the size and pattern of cash distributions to shareholders over time. Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) argue that given perfect capital markets, the dividend decision does not 
affect firm value and is, therefore, irrelevant. However, subsequent studies have disproved 
the notion of a perfect capital market and have offered theories about how dividends affect 
firm value, and how managers should make dividend policy decisions (Baker et al., 2001). 
For instance, Dhanani (2005) outlined four types of market imperfections, thus rendering 
Miller‎and‎Modigliani’s‎(1961)s’‎assertion‎untenable.‎Dhanani (2005) outlined these 
imperfections to be: constraints and conditions on capital availability and capital structure, 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, agency problems between 
managers and shareholders and, finally, differing shareholder circumstances (including 
different tax statuses). 
Many researchers have described the issue of dividend policy as contentious, and, in 
fact, a puzzle (Black, 1976; Brealey and Myers, 2005). Dividend policy has been described 
by such researchers as Al-Kuwari (2009), Ahmed and Javid (2008), and Abor and Bokpin 
(2010) as one of the most intriguing topics in financial research. Al-Kuwari (2009) maintains 
that even though researchers have paid considerable attention to solving the dividend puzzle, 
this has resulted in a large number of conflicting hypotheses, theories and explanations.  
The current study seeks to examine trends in dividend payout and the differentials in firm and 
country specific factors for payers and non-payers of dividends. Secondly, it examines the 
predictions of the amount of dividends paid by listed non-financial firms in Africa taking into 
account both firm and country factors.  
This study was motivated by the fact that most of the research about corporate 
dividends has been in advanced countries. With the exception of a few studies into corporate 
dividend payment in individual countries, such as Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa, 
there has not been a single study of dividend payouts decisions in several African countries, 
also detailing the trends across a time period. This study therefore attempts to look at the 
issue of corporate dividend policy decision across 14 African countries, including Botswana, 
Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. As the study also looks at the temporary effects (trends) of 
risks and shocks at specific times, it will therefore provide information for investors 
regarding the performance of firms in African countries over a period of time, and give a 
comprehensive understanding of how macro and micro factors impact on dividend policy 108 
 
decisions. The trends will again provide a clear direction for potential investors, and new 
entrants as well, and will go a long way to encourage firms and regulators in the individual 
countries to make decisions about dividend policies, especially when the relationships 
between the observed variables are taken into consideration. Furthermore, since most African 
countries have put in place measures to attract direct foreign investment and also encourage 
investors to invest in existing firms across Africa, this study will serve as basis for research 
into corporate dividend payout in the African context, which will enable investors to make 
informed decisions regarding their investments across Africa.   
The contributions of this study are that it covers a longer time period (18 years), and 
include 14 African countries, which the researcher believes to be the first of its kind. It will 
therefore provide a conclusive statement from the findings regarding the trends in dividend 
payout. Another important contribution is that the larger number of firms included in the 
study makes the sample more representative. A further contribution of the study is that it 
takes into consideration country specific factors in addition to the firm factors, which 
broadens the limited scope of previously conducted research into dividend payout in 
individual countries. This study could be used as a stepping stone for future research to help 
in understanding or explaining in detail how the country specific factors contribute to 
dividend payout as countries continue to develop. 
The paper has been organised into five sections. Section one introduces the area of 
research. This is followed by the background to the research in Section two. Section three 
describes the methodology, followed by a discussion of the results in Section four. The 
conclusions of the paper are presented in Section five. 
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5.2  Theoretical overview of dividend policy  
Al-Malkawi et al. (2010) have traced the background of dividend payout policy to the 
development of the corporate form itself. It was seen that the emergence of a dividend policy 
as being important to investors was, to some extent, driven by the evolving state of financial 
markets. Quoting from Frankfurter and Wood (2002), and Baskin (1987), Al-Malkawi et al. 
(2010), stated that investing in shares was initially seen as analogous to investing in bonds, so 
regularity of payments was important. It was also seen that in the absence of regular and 
accurate corporate reporting, dividends were often preferred to reinvested earnings, and often 
even regarded as a better indication of corporate performance than published earnings 
accounts. However, as financial markets developed and became more efficient, it was thought 
by some that a dividend policy would become increasingly irrelevant to investors. Why 
dividend policy should remain so evidently important has been theoretically controversial  
(Al-Malkawi et al., 2010). Several theories have been developed to explain dividend policy 
and these are discussed below. 
The first of the theories is the Dividend Irrelevance theory propounded by Miller and 
Modigliani (1961). Basing their argument upon idealistic assumptions of a perfect capital 
market and rational investors, where there are no differences between taxes on dividends and 
capital gains, no transaction and flotation costs incurred when securities are traded, all market 
participants have free and equal access to the same information, no conflicts of interest 
between managers and security holders, and all participants in the market are price takers, 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) maintain that dividend policy is irrelevant. The theory explains 
that‎in‎a‎perfect‎market‎dividend‎policy‎has‎no‎effect‎on‎either‎the‎price‎of‎a‎firm’s‎stock‎or‎
its cost of capital. Shareholders’ wealth is not affected by the dividend decision and therefore 
they would be indifferent about whether payment was in the form of dividends or capital 
gains.‎Miller‎and‎Modigliani‎(1961)‎s’‎main‎reason‎was‎that‎the‎wealth‎of‎the‎shareholder‎is‎
affected by the income generated by the investment decisions made by the firm and not by 
how it distributes that income. Miller and Modigliani (1961) argued that regardless of how 
the firm distributes its income, its value is determined by its basic earning power and its 
investment decisions. They stated that the policy firms decide to adopt over dividend 
decisions has an impact on the current price of its shares, not total returns to shareholders 
when investment is known (Miller and Modigliani, 1961). Another theory that was 110 
 
propounded as a result of the fallout from the Miller and Modigliani (1961) Irrelevant theory 
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  Ang (1987), and Al-Malkawi et al. (2010) explain the Signalling hypothesis as what 
occurs‎when‎investors‎can‎infer‎information‎about‎a‎firm’s‎future‎earnings‎through‎the‎signal‎
coming from dividend announcements, both in terms of the stability of, and changes in, 
dividends. However, for this hypothesis to hold, managers should firstly possess private 
information‎about‎a‎firm’s‎prospects,‎and‎have‎incentives‎to‎convey‎this‎information‎to‎the‎
market. Secondly, a signal should be true: that is to say, a firm with poor future prospects 
should not be able to mimic and send false signals to the market by increasing dividend 
payments. Thus the market must be able to rely on the signal to differentiate amongst firms. 
If these conditions are fulfilled, the market should react favourably to the announcements of 
dividend increase and unfavourably otherwise (Ang, 1987). 
The main argument of the Agency Cost theory of dividend policy is that because of 
the imperfect nature of managers, some of whom might have interests which differ from that 
of the shareholders, they might engage in such activities as consuming excessive perquisites 
or over-investing in managerially rewarding, but unprofitable, activities. This may lead to 
high agency costs being incurred by the shareholders. According to this theory, the payment 
of dividends might serve to align the interests and mitigate the agency problems between 
managers and shareholders, by reducing the discretionary funds available to managers 
(Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Alli et al., 1993). Easterbrook (1984) also 
argues in the same vein by maintaining that dividends could be used to reduce the free cash 
flow in the hands of managers and, in addition, oblige managers to approach the capital 
market to raise funds. 
Another explanation offered by Jensen (1986) was that dividend payment will reduce 
substantially NPV projects. His point was that firms with excess cash flow give managers 
more flexibility for using funds in a way that benefits themselves, rather than the 
shareholders. Jensen (1986) argues that extracting the excess funds from the control of 
management by increasing dividend payment will prevent investment in negative NPV of 
poor projects. According to this theory and the explanations of Jensen (1986), Easterbrook 
(1984), and Ali Khan and Ramirez (1993), paying more dividends will reduce the agency 
costs between managers and shareholders. 
A further theory relating to dividend payments is the Clientele Effect theory. Because 
there is no perfect capital market, investors face different dividend and capital gains tax rates 
and they therefore have different after-tax valuations for the same asset. Miller and 111 
 
Modigliani (1961) hypothesized that such differences lead to the formation of what they 
termed‎“dividend‎clienteles”, in which investors have tax-based preferences over equities that 
differ only in their dividend policies. According to Al-Malkawi et al. (2010) these clienteles 
will be attracted to firms that follow dividend policies that best suit their particular situations. 
Similarly, firms may tend to attract different clienteles by their dividend policies. For 
example, firms operating in high growth industries that usually pay low (or no) dividends 
attract a clientele that prefers price appreciation (in the form of capital gains) to dividends. 
On the other hand, firms that pay a large amount of their earnings as dividends attract a 
clientele that prefers high dividends. 
The Tax-effect hypothesis suggests that low dividend payout ratios lower the cost of 
capital and increase the stock price. In other words, low dividend payout ratios contribute to 
maximising‎a‎firm’s‎value.‎According‎to‎Al-Malkawi et al. (2010), this argument is based on 
the assumption that dividends are taxed at higher rates than capital gains. In addition, 
dividends are taxed immediately, whereas taxes on capital gains are deferred until the stock is 
actually sold. These tax advantages of capital gains over dividends tend to predispose 
investors who have favourable tax treatment from capital gains to prefer companies that 
retain most of their earnings rather than pay them out as dividends and they (the investors) 
are willing to pay a premium for low-payout companies. Therefore, a low dividend payout 
ratio will lower the cost of equity and increase the stock price (Al-Malkawi et al., 2010).  
Another theory offered to explain dividend‎policy‎decision‎is‎the‎‘Bird-in-the‎hand’‎
theory. According to this theory, due to their imperfections and uncertainty, dividends are 
valued differently from retained earnings or capital gains. According to the theory, investors 
prefer‎the‎“Bird‎in‎the‎hand”‎of‎cash‎dividends‎rather‎than‎the‎“Two‎in‎the‎bush”‎of‎future‎
capital gains (Al-Malkawi et al., 2010). Increasing dividend payments may then be associated 
with increases in firm value. As a higher current dividend reduces uncertainty about future 
cash flows, a high payout ratio will reduce the cost of capital, and hence increase share value. 
According to the so-called‎“Bird-in-the‎hand”‎hypothesis,‎high‎dividend‎payout‎ratios‎
maximize‎a‎firm’s‎value. 
The last of the theories considered in this study is the Catering theory, which states that 
the propensity to pay dividends depends on a dividend premium (or sometimes discount) in 
stock prices. This theory was formulated by Baker and Wurgler (2004), as a way of relaxing 
the market efficiency as defence against Miller and Modigliani (1961)s’ irrelevance theory. 
The essence of the Catering theory is that managers give investors what they currently want. 112 
 
In the case of dividends, catering implied that managers tended to initiate dividends when 
investors put a relatively high stock price on dividend payers, and tended to omit dividends 
when investors prefer non-payers. The theory has three basic ingredients. Firstly, it posits a 
source of uninformed investor demand for firms that pay cash dividends. Secondly, limits on 
arbitrage allow this demand to affect current share prices. Thirdly, managers rationally weigh 
the short run benefits of catering to the current mispricing against the long run costs and then 
make the dividend payment decision. 
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5.3  Empirical evidence of dividend policy: hypothesis development  
5.3.1  Investment opportunities and dividend payout 
Abor and Bokpin (2010) maintain that investment opportunities available to a firm constitute 
an important component of market value, and that it they affect the way the firm is viewed by 
managers, owners, investors, and creditors. Growth opportunities are also represented by the 
relative fraction of firm value that is accounted for by assets in place (plant, equipment, and 
other tangible assets), and that the lower the fraction of firm value represented by assets in 
place, the higher the growth opportunities (Gul and Kealey, 1999). Existing literature 
suggests a relationship between investment opportunities and dividend payout. In fact, Gul 
and Kealey (1999) found a negative relationship between growth options and dividends. 
Others support the fact that firms with higher market-to-book value tend to have good 
investment opportunities, and would retain more funds to finance such investment, thus 
recording lower dividend payout ratios (Rozeff, 1982). Empirical results obtained by Amidu 
and Abor (2006), Ahmed and Javid (2008), Al-Malkawi (2008) and Abor and Bokpin (2010) 
also found a negative relationship between investment opportunities and dividend policy. 
This study therefore hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 1: Investment opportunities are negatively related to dividend payout. 
5.3.2  Profitability and dividend payout  
Profits‎have‎long‎been‎regarded‎as‎the‎primary‎indicator‎of‎a‎firm’s‎capacity‎to‎pay‎dividends‎
(Amidu and Abor, 2006). Naceur et al. (2006) found that highly profitable firms with more 
stable earnings can manage larger cash flows, and because of this they pay larger dividends. 
Ahmed and Javid (2008) also maintain that firms with fast growth distribute the larger 
dividends in order to attract investors. Empirical evidence also attests to these findings. For 
example, Dickens et al. (2002), Amidu and Abor (2006), Abor and Bokpin (2010), Al-Ajmi 
and Hussain (2011), Turen and Salman (2012), Al-Kuwari (2009) and Kim and Gu (2009) all 
found a statistically significant and positive relationship between profitability and the 
dividend payout ratio. Based on both theory and empirical evidence, the study hypothesizes 
that: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between profitability and dividend payout.        
5.3.3  Firm size and dividend payout 
It has been noted by Jensen et al. (1992) and Fama and French (2001) that large firms 
distribute a higher amount of their net profits as cash dividends, than small firms do. Lloyd et 114 
 
al. (1985) considered size to be an important explanatory variable, and contended that large 
companies are more likely to increase their dividend payouts in order to decrease agency 
costs. Over the years, several studies have tested the impact of firm size on the dividend-
agency relationship. Fama and French (2002), Al-Kuwari (2009), Al-Malkawi (2008), and 
Manos (2001) all found a positive relationship between firm size and dividend policy. 
However, Amidu and Abor (2006) and Ahmed and Javid (2008) found a negative relationship, 
meaning that large-sized firms prefer to pay a lesser dividend. This study, however, 
hypothesizes that:  Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between firm size and 
dividend. 
5.3.4  Financial leverage and dividend payout 
The level of financial leverage negatively affects the dividend policy of a firm. This has been 
confirmed by several studies (Crutchley and Hansen, 1989; Jensen et al., 1992; Agrawal and 
Jayaraman, 1994; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Al-Malkawi, 2007). These studies made inference 
to the fact that highly levered firms look forward to maintaining their internal cash flow to 
fulfil duties, rather than distributing available cash to shareholders and protecting their 
creditors. The reason they adduced this was because highly levered firms carry a large burden 
of transaction costs from external financing and, in that case, firms need to maintain their 
internal source of funds to meet their duties, rather than distributing the available cash to 
shareholders as dividends. Also, Al-Kuwari (2009) found the leverage ratio to be strongly 
statistically significant and negatively associated with the dividend payout ratio. The 
implication of this, according to Al-Kuwari (2009), was that if the leverage ratio of a firm 
increased, the dividend payout ratio paid by the firm decreased. Based on the above empirical 
evidence, this study hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 4: Financial leverage is negatively related with dividend payout.  
5.3.5  Country specific factors and dividend payout 
Literature regarding the relationship between gross domestic product per capita, corruption 
and dividend payout is very sparse and, according to the best knowledge of the researcher, 
this study is the first to consider national factors in addition to factors at the firm level. In 
addition, this study included corruption levels as a governance indicator and gross domestic 
product per capita was used to measure economic development. This study hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis  5:  Country  level  factors,  such  as  gross  domestic  product  per  capital  and 
corruption, impact negatively on dividend payout of firms across African countries. 
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5.4  Empirical findings 
Table ‎5.1 Summary variables and definitions 
Variables  Label  Definition 
Dependent variable:     
Dividend policy  DPY3  Dividend per share divided by total assets  
Independent variables:     
Profitability  PROF  Earnings before tax and interest divided by total 
assets 
Financial leverage    FLEV  Total debt divided by total assets 
Investment opportunity  INV  Total market value of equity divided by total 
assets 
Firm size  SIZE  Natural logarithm of assets 
Corruption  COR  Perception of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain and others 
GDP per capita (log)  lnGDPperca  Log of gross domestic product per capita  
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5.4.1  Descriptive statistics 
Table ‎5.2 Descriptive statistics of dividend payout decisions 
Mean values are reported for the measurement of dividend payout (DPY3), profitability (PROF), 
investment opportunities (INV), financial leverage (FLEV), firm size (SIZE), gross domestic product 
per capital (lnGDPper cap), and corruption (COR) over the period 1994-2011. Dividend payout 
(DPY3) is defined as dividend per share to total assets. Profitability is defined as the ratio of earnings 
before interest and tax to the book value of total assets. Investment opportunity is measured as the 
total market value of equity divided by the total assets. Firm size is measured as natural logarithms of 
total assets. Financial leverage is defined as the total debt divided by total assets. The log of Gross 
Domestic Product per capita (lnGDPpercap) is a measure of economic development. Corruption 
(COR) is perception of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain and others. The 
table shows the approximate average from the investigated variables across firms during the period 
1994-2011.            
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
DPY3  5856   0.04  1.56   0  90.94 
ln_DPY3  4482  -7.74  2.56  -17.42  4.51 
PROF  6668   0.10  0.25  -13.69  1.37 
INV  6035   1.54  9.35  -0.46  491.26 
FLEV  6800   0.17  0.18   0.00  3.26 
SIZE  6901   4.97  2.10  -3.37  22.68 
lnGDPperc  10458   6.98  0.90   5.32  8.37 
COR  7553  -0.38  0.63  -1.36  1.25 
 
Table 5.2 above describes the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent 
variables. The data sample covers 14 African countries over a period of 18 years from 1994-
2011. It provides the mean, standard deviation of all the variables used in the study and the 
number of observations during the sample period. The mean value for dividend payout 
(dependent) is 0.04, indicating that for the firms across the sample African countries selected 
for the study, the average dividend payout is 0.04 percent. However, but a variation in the 
dependent variable across the selected African countries during the period is provided by the 
standard deviation of 1.56, with a minimum and maximum dividend payout of 0.00 and 90.94 
respectively. 
The mean investment opportunity is 1.54, with a variation of 9.35 and minimum and 
maximum values of -0.46 and 491 respectively. All the countries have both positive and 117 
 
negative investment opportunities. Financial leverage has a mean value of 0.17 and a 
variation of 0.18, with minimum and maximum values of 0.00 and 3.22 respectively. The 
profitability set has a mean value of 0.10 and a standard deviation of 0.25, with minimum and 
maximum values of -13.69 and 1.37 respectively. Firm size has a mean value of 4.97 and a 
standard deviation of 2.10, with minimum and maximum values of -3.37 and 2.68 
respectively. Gross Domestic Product per capita is measured as the log of GDP per capita and 
has a mean value of 6.98 and variation of 0.90, with minimum and maximum values 5.32 and 
8.37 respectively. Corruption shows a mean value of –0.38 and a standard deviation of 0.63, 
with minimum and maximum values of -1.36 and 1.25 respectively.  118 
 
Table ‎5.3 Trends in median dividend payout across African countries in the sample 
Country  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
Botswana  -  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Egypt  -  -  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.03  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03 
Ghana  -  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
Ivory C  -  -  -  -  0.02  0.06  0.02  0.04  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.05  0.03  0.01  0.04  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Kenya  -  -  -  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.03  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Morocco  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00 
Nigeria  -  -  -  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
South A  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Tanzania  -  -  -  -  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00 
Tunisia  -  -  -  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.03 
Uganda  -  -  -  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00 
Zambia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00 
Zimbabwe  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00 
Ivory C and South A denotes Ivory Coast and South Africa respectively 
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From Table 5.3 above, the dividend payout ratios from the selected African countries were 
very low and stable between 1994-2011. All the countries have a dividend payout ranging 
from 0 to 0.04. The general pattern of dividend payouts across all the countries under study 
provides a very low and stable dividend payout for all the countries. 
One reason for the low and stable dividend payout policy decision is the fact that 
agencies monitoring the supply of capital, and correct cash flow for companies are controlled 
by organisations not under government control, and therefore not properly managed, which 
again leads to high cost of capital and keeping money for selfish interests, thereby making it 
impossible for firms to pay high dividend payments to shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Xia and Fang, 2005). 
Another reason suggested by Chazi et al. (2010), Myers and Majluf (1984) and Miller 
and Rock (1985) is that high financial burdens are faced by firms in Africa, and consequently 
they prefer to finance a firm’s‎expansion‎with‎their‎low‎profit‎margin‎and‎retaining‎earnings‎
which may affect their capability to pay high dividends. Naceur et al (2006) mentioned that 
that low and stable dividend payout policy in Africa could mean that the firms are not 
expanding very fast to facilitate high retain earnings to support shareholders, since the 
available money is used‎for‎firm’s‎growth‎opportunities.‎Evbayowieru (2011) p. 62 stated 
that‎“capital‎gain‎seekers‎welcome‎low‎dividend‎payout‎policy‎because‎of‎low‎taxation”‎and‎
scrip‎issue‎benefits”.‎This‎could‎be‎the‎case‎in these selected African countries. 
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Table ‎5.4 Differentials of payers and non-payers of dividend across the countries 
COUNTRY  PROF  INV  FLEV  SIZE  RE 
BOTSWANA 
         
Nonpayers  0.07  1.45  0.00  2.68  0.24 
Payers  0.14  1.13  0.06  3.12  0.84 
EGYPT 
         
Nonpayers  0.04  0.86  0.23  4.89  0.32 
Payers  0.09  0.82  0.13  4.76  0.50 
GHANA 
         
Nonpayers  0.01  1.08  0.21  2.32  0.39 
Payers  0.09  0.93  0.14  3.43  0.53 
IVORY_COAST 
       
Nonpayers  0.02  0.65  0.25  3.88  0.28 
Payers  0.10  0.69  0.11  4.54  0.6 
KENYA 
         
Nonpayers  0.04  0.73  0.28  3.01  0.72 
Payers  0.09  0.91  0.07  4.03  0.81 
MOROCCO 
         
Nonpayers  0.05  0.94  0.28  4.13  0.28 
Payers  0.10  1.15  0.12  4.43  0.54 
NIGERIA 
         
Nonpayers  0.00  0.70  0.18  2.83  0.66 
Payers  0.122  1.08  0.06  4.08  0.70 
SOUTH_AFRICA 
       
Nonpayers  0.08  0.91  0.19  5.92  0.51 
Payers  0.13  1.15  0.12  6.26  0.75 
TANZANIA 
         
Nonpayers  -  -  -  -  - 
Payers  0.26  2.21  0.05  5.30  0.84 
TUNISIA 
         
Nonpayers  0.02  0.77  0.27  4.01  0.43 
Payers  0.08  0.88  0.14  3.69  0.51 
UGANDA 
         
Nonpayers  0.03  0.96  0.16  4.67  0.88 
Payers  0.14  0.89  0.04  4.67  4.76 
ZAMBIA 
         
Nonpayers  0.11  0.98  0.31  4.59  0.90 
Payers  0.16  0.92  0.08 
 
0.96 
ZIMBABWE 
         
Nonpayers  0.02  1.02  0.07  4.44  0.89 
Payers  0.18  1.46  0.07  6.01  0.97 
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Table 5.4 above describes the median values of the differentials of payers and non-payers of 
dividend. Profitability (PROF) is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to the 
book value of total assets. Investment opportunities (INV) are measured as the total market 
value of equity divided by the total assets. Financial leverage (FLEV) is measured as the total 
debt to total assets. Firm size (SIZE) is measured as the natural log of total assets. Retained 
earnings (RE) are measured as the ratio of retained earnings to total equity. 
Consistent with Fama and French (2001) and Denis and Osobov (2008), firms across 
the countries indicated that payers of dividends tended to have more profit margins and a 
larger firm size, with only Tunisia and Zambia having smaller firm sizes. Firm size was not 
homogenous across all countries, but it appeared that larger firms tended to pay more 
dividends. This is an indication that payers and non-payers of dividends differ in terms of 
firm size.  
The association established between dividend payments and investment opportunities 
was not the same across the countries. Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Uganda and Zambia had 
lower values for investment opportunities. Ivory Coast, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South 
Africa, Tunisia and Zimbabwe had higher values for investment opportunities. Looking at the 
investment outcome, it can be considered that payers of dividends tended to have higher 
values for investments. The results are consistent with the findings by La Porta et al. (2000), 
cited in  Denis and Osobov (2008).  It was also found that dividend payers had higher 
retained earnings than non-paying dividend firms, which is in line with findings by  Denis 
and Osobov (2008). A payer of dividends tended to have low financial leverage, whilst non-
payers tended to have more leverage across the selected countries, with the exception of 
Botswana, which had lower leverage.  122 
 
Table ‎5.5 Median differentials values of payers and non-payers of dividend payout across firms 1994-2011 
Variables  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
PROF                                     
Non Payers  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.06  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.05  0.04  0.02  0.03 
Payers  0.12  0.12  0.13  0.11  0.12  0.12  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.12  0.12  0.13  0.13  0.14  0.11  0.12  0.11 
INV 
                                   
Non Payers  2.24  1.29  1.54  0.83  0.89  0.69  0.74  0.73  0.72  0.77  0.92  0.99  1.16  1.16  1.06  0.98  0.81  0.85 
Payers  1.11  1.12  1.15  1.21  1.04  0.94  0.89  0.76  0.72  0.82  0.95  1.09  1.23  1.53  1.25  1.11  1.20  1.02 
FLEV 
                                   
Non Payers  0.23  0.21  0.15  0.13  0.15  0.23  0.24  0.25  0.28  0.27  0.22  0.13  0.19  0.15  0.11  0.16  0.18  0.13 
Payers  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.11  0.10  0.12  0.11  0.12  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.12  0.13  0.13  0.11  0.11 
SIZE 
                                   
Non Payers  5.09  3.28  4.26  4.58  4.23  4.17  3.99  4.15  4.42  4.03  3.61  3.71  4.09  4.24  4.42  4.52  4.41  4.46 
Payers  5.32  5.39  5.12  5.19  5.02  4.90  4.83  4.73  4.70  4.97  4.86  4.95  4.97  5.17  5.23  5.14  5.39  5.54 
COR 
                                   
Non Payers  -0.76  -0.65  -0.03  -0.29  -0.47  -0.23  -0.52  -0.66  -0.57  -0.71  -0.31  -0.56  -0.26  -  -  -  -  - 
Payers  -0.07  -0.25  -0.39  -0.29  -0.47  -0.54  -0.52  -0.66  -0.67  -0.71  -0.43  -0.56  -0.68  -  -  -  -  - 
lnGDPper 
                                   
Non Payers  7.98  7.99  8.01  8.02  7.99  7.99  7.29  7.31  7.32  7.33  7.32  6.09  7.39  7.45  7.53  7.56  7.52  7.55 
Payers  7.10  7.03  7.13  7.09  7.15  7.15  7.15  7.21  7.23  7.28  7.32  7.33  7.39  7.41  7.46  7.49  7.52  7.55 
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Table 5.5 above describes the time trends of both payers and non-payers of dividends. Over 
the time period of the study, dividend payers have a higher level of profitability, ranging from 
0.11 to 0.13, than non-payers of dividends, which ranged between 0.03 to 0.06. The gap 
between the profit margins for payers and non-payers was wide, which is consistent with 
Fama and French (2001). Investment opportunities differed across both payers and non-
payers of dividends, but it appears that payers of dividends tended to have more investment 
opportunities than non-payers. The range for payers was 0.82 to 1.53 and for non-payers 0.73 
to 2.24 across the years respectively. Financial leverage showed that non-payers of dividends 
had high-level leverage, ranging from 0.13 to 0.28, whilst payers had low level leverage, 
ranging from 0.10 to 0.13 over the timespan. With firm size, dividends payers were larger 
organisations than non-payers. The range was between 4 to 6 and 3 to 5 respectively. The 
findings are in line with Fama and French (2001). Payers of dividends had less gross 
domestic product per capita and lower levels corruption, whilst non-payers had high-levels 
respectively. 
Figure ‎ 5.1 Differentials in median profitability of payers and non-payers across firms 
 
                Source: Bloomberg‎and‎author’s‎calculation 
Figure 5.1 illustrates how payers of dividends had higher levels of profitability than non-
payers across the firms.  124 
 
Figure ‎ 5.2 Differentials in median investment for payers and non-payers across firms 
 
               Source: Bloomberg and authors calculation 
Figure  5.2  shows  how  investment  opportunities  differed  for  payers  and  non-payers,  and 
therefore with mixed results.  
Figure ‎5.3 Differentials in median firm size of payers and non-payers across firms 
 
                Source: Bloomberg and authors calculation 
Figure 5.3 illustrates how dividends payers had a larger firm size than non-payers during the 
period 1994-2011. 
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Figure ‎5.4 Differentials in median corruption of payers and non-payers across firms 
 
               Source:‎Bloomberg‎and‎author’s‎calculation 
Figure 5.4 depicts how non-payers of dividends were highly corrupt, although corruption 
levels across the firms dropped considerably during the period 1994-2011. 
Table ‎5.6 Pair wise correlation matrix coefficient between selected variables 
Pair wise correlation coefficient estimated on a sample of 608 firms across 14 African countries 
during the period 1994-2011.* indicates significance: Profitability (PROF) is defined as the ratio of 
earnings before interest and tax to the book value of total assets; Investment opportunity (INV) is 
measured as the total market value of equity divided by the total assets; Firm size (SIZE) is measured 
as a natural logarithms of total assets; Gross Domestic Product per capital is measured as the log of 
GDP per capita (lnGDPPc). Financial leverage (FLEV) is defined as total debt divided by total assets. 
Corruption (COR) and rule of law (ROL) are vectors of governance indicators. 
Variables  DPY3  PROF  INV  FLEV  SIZE  lnGDP   COR  GDP  ROL 
DPY3   1.00                 
PROF   0.01   1.00               
INV   0.86*   0.04*   1.00             
FLEV  -0.01  -0.08*   0.01   1.00           
SIZE  -0.06*   0.17*  -0.10*   0.07*  1.00         
lnGDPPc  -0.00   0.03*  -0.02  -0.01  0.36*  1.00       
COR  -0.00   0.04*  -0.03*   0.03*  0.30*  0.80*  1.00     
GDPcons  -0.03*   0.10*  -0.03*  -0.00  0.44*  0.68*  0.38*  1.00   
RoL  -0.01   0.03*  -0.05*  -0.00  0.28*  0.80*  0.88  0.42*  1.00 
Source:‎Datastream,‎World‎Bank‎Development‎Indicators,‎Bloomberg‎and‎Author’s‎calculation 
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5.4.2  Determinants of dividend policy 
Table ‎5.7 Summary results of fixed effect and general method of moment 
This table presents a summary of the regression results for both the firm and country specific factors 
using data from 1994-2011. Dividend policy (DPY3) is defined as dividend per share to total assets. 
Profitability is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to the book value of total assets. 
Investment opportunity is measured as the total market value of equity divided by the total assets. 
Firm size is measured as natural logarithms of total assets. Financial leverage is defined as the total 
debt divided by total assets. The log of Gross Domestic Product per capita (lnGDPPc) is a measure of 
economic development. Corruption (COR) is a vector for governance indicator. All regressions were 
estimated using panel data estimation, fixed effects and the general method of moments. The 
superscripts ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The 
following tests are also reported: (1) Observation, (2) The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation, which 
was significant for the first two models and, therefore, the null hypothesis of no serial correlation was 
rejected (3) The Sargan and Hansen test for over identification restriction, which confirmed the 
absence of an exogeneity problem (4) The Arellano-Bond test for second order serial correlation, 
which indicated no serial correlation. The Model 4 coefficients were used for interpretation. FE 
denotes fixed effect         
 
Variable  FE (1)  FE.(2)  FE.(3)  FE (4)  GMM(5) 
DPY3           
Lag_DPY3  -  -  -  -  -0.08 
PROF   0.25***   0.24***  -    0.20*   0.01 
INV   0.09***   0.09***  -   0.09***  -0.01 
FLEV  -  -0.01*  -  -0.17***  -0.02 
SIZE  -  -0.01  -   0.04  -0.01 
COR  -  -  -0.29**  -0.07*   0.01 
lnGDPPc(log)  -  -  -0.06  -0.23***   0.01 
Constant  -0.15***  -0.13***   0.53   1.45***   
Observation  5208   5165   4581   4087  2432 
R-squared:           
Within   0.78   0.78   0.00   0.77  - 
Between   0.60   0.60   0.00   0.68  - 
Overall   0.75   0.75   0.00  0.73  - 
AR (1)  0.08  0.08  0.00  0.14   0.18 
AR (2)  -  -  -  -   0.54 
Sargan test over rest.  -  -  -  -   0.00 
Hansen test over rest.  -  -  -  -   0.07 
 
The results show that Profitability (PROF), Investment opportunities (INV), Financial 
leverage (FLEV), Corruption (COR) and Log of gross domestic product per capita 
(lnGDPPc) are significantly associated with corporate dividend policy. Model 4 coefficients 
were used for interpretation, since the results showed an R-squared value of 0.73 and the first 
order test of autocorrelation proved insignificant, indicating that the model was appropriate. 
The estimated parameters were interpreted holding all other variables in the model constan 127 
 
5.4.2.1  Profitability and dividend payout 
From Table 5.7, Model 4 provided the regression results, with dividend payout as the 
dependent variable. The coefficient of profitability was 0.20 and was statistically significant 
at the 10% level, implying that firms with profit will have more dividend payout policies, 
which supports this‎study’s prediction of a positive relationship between profitability and 
dividend payout. The interpretation is that a unit increase in profitability increased the 
dividend by 0.20, when all other factors were fixed. Empirically, the positive findings are in 
line with Fama and French (2002), Al-Kuwari (2009) and Al-Malkawi (2008), who maintain 
that firms with less investment, but high profit, are more likely to pay high dividends. 
However, the results contradict the findings by Abor and Bokpin (2010), that firms with high 
profits tend to pay lower dividends, as they may keep their retained earnings in order to 
finance future growth and investment opportunities.. 
5.4.2.2  Investment and dividend payout   
From Table 5.7 Model 4, the results of the regression analysis for the investment 
opportunities variable produced a positive coefficient of 0.09, at the significant level of 1%, 
implying that high investment opportunities in African countries would have more impact on 
dividend payments. The implication is that a unit increase in investment increased the 
dividend by 0.09, when all other factors were fixed. In absolute terms, the coefficient value 
has less impact on dividend payout. Theoretically, the positive significant relationship 
between investment opportunities and dividend payout signified that an increase in 
investment increases the dividend payout. The positive result rejects Hypothesis 1 of a 
negative relationship between investment opportunities and dividend payout, but is consistent 
with the study of Fama and French (2002), who argue that firms with more investments tend 
to have lower dividend payouts in the long term. However, the result is not in line with the 
findings of Abor and Bokpin (2010), Amidu and Abor (2006), Ahmed and Javid (2008) and 
Al-Malkawi (2008) 
5.4.2.3  Financial leverage and dividend payout   
The regression analysis from Table 5.7 Model 4 showed that financial leverage produced 
negative coefficients of -0.17 at the significant level of 1%, meaning that firms in African 
countries with high financial leverage will have a significant reduction in dividend payout. 
The interpretation is that a unit increase in financial leverage decreased the dividend by 0.17, 
when all other factors were fixed. The impact of financial leverage on dividend policy 
decision is very high, since the magnitude of the absolute value of the coefficient is large. 128 
 
Theoretically, the result, showing a strong negative relationship, supports this‎study’s 
predictions of a negative relationship between financial leverage and dividend payout 
(Hypothesis 4), which means levered firms are less likely to pursue dividend payment. The 
result is in line with previous studies by Jensen et al. (1992) and Al-Malkawi (2007). They 
maintained that highly levered firms look forward to maintaining their internal cash flow to 
fulfil duties, rather than distributing available cash to shareholders and protecting their 
creditors. Fama and French (2002) again found a negative relationship between leverage and 
dividend payout. Al-Kuwari (2009) also found a negative leverage ratio, with the implication 
that if the leverage ratio of a firm increases, the dividend payout ratio paid by the firm 
decreases. The results confirm previous studies and support the hypothesis. 
5.4.2.4  Firm size and dividend payout  
In this study, the regression result for firm size, indicated in Table 5.7 Model 4, showed a 
coefficient of 0.04 but statistically insignificant. The established relationship demonstrated a 
direct relationship between firm size and dividend payout, which strongly provided 
theoretical support for Hypothesis 3, of a positive relationship between firm size and dividend 
payout, suggesting that diversifications of firms will lead to high dividend payout. 
Theoretically, the result is consistent with, and also confirms, the findings of Fama and 
French (2002), Al-Kuwari (2009), Al-Malkawi (2008), Manos (2001) and Jensen et al. 
(1992), who emphasized that large firms distribute a higher amount of their net profits as cash 
dividends, than do small firms. The results, however, are not in line with the studies of 
Amidu and Abor (2006), and Ahmed and Javid (2008), who found a negative relationship. 
The results are in line with the established Hypothesis 3, which supports previous findings 
5.4.2.5  Corruption and dividend payout   
For the governance issue of corruption, it was difficult to find previous studies about how 
country specific factors affect the dividend payout. The results of the regression from Table 
5.7 Model 4 indicated negative coefficients of -0.07 at the significant level of 10%, which 
supported Hypothesis 5, of a negative relationship between corruption level and dividend 
payout, and indicated that African countries with high levels of corruption will impact 
inversely on dividend payment. The implication is that a unit increase in the corruption index 
decreased the dividend by -0.07, when all other factors were held constant. The magnitude of 
the coefficient shows that corruption has a larger impact on dividend payment. The results 
indicated that firm experiencing high corruption tend to have low dividend payout. This 
means that corruption, as a vector for government indicators, did affect the dividend payouts 129 
 
of firms in Africa. This may imply that corruption levels in African countries affected the 
firms’‎ability‎to‎pay‎dividends,‎hence,‎the‎higher‎the‎corruption‎level,‎the‎lower‎the‎dividend‎
payout. The findings support the established hypothesis 
5.4.2.6  Log of GDP per capita and dividends payout  
From Table 5.7 Model 4, the results of the regression analysis gave a negative significant 
relationship between dividend payout and log of gross domestic product per capita, with 
coefficients of -0.23 at the significant level of 1%, indicating that the higher the GDP per 
capita, the lower the dividend payout. The interpretation is that a unit increase in the log of 
GDP per capita (measured in US$) decreased the dividend payout by 0.23, all other things 
being constant. The absolute coefficient demonstrated that log GDP per capita impacted 
strongly on dividend payout when compared with the firm factors. This finding contradicts 
that of Abor and Bokpin (2010), who found no established relationship. The negative 
significance implies that, in a country where GDP per capita is high, shareholders are less 
likely to consider or expect dividend payments. The results confirm the hypothesis of a 
negative relationship between GDP per capital and dividend payout. 
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5.5  Conclusion and implications  
This study examined the trends in dividend payout and differentials in firm and country level 
specific factors for payers and non-payers of dividends. The study also examined the 
predictions of the amount of dividends paid by listed non-financial firms in Africa. Applying 
regression analysis and a partial standard adjustment model (dynamic panel regression), the 
study measured the relationship between the dependent (dividend payout) and independent 
variables, which were profitability, investment opportunities, financial leverage, and firm size 
as firm specific factors. The study also considered the relationship between dividend payout 
(dependent) and country specific factors, which were corruption and Gross Domestic Product 
per capita.  
The study found that dividend payers were more profitable, had larger firm size, more 
investment, high retaining earnings and less financial leverage than non-paying firms. The 
findings also show that in countries where GDP per capita is low, firms were more likely to 
pay dividends. Corruption was highly associated with non-payers of dividends. 
The study also found a positive relationship between dividend payout and investment 
opportunities, firm size and lagged of dividend. However, negative relationships were 
identified between dividend payout and financial leverage, profitability, corruption and gross 
domestic product per capita. Profitability was positive and significant when only firm factors 
were regressed, but became negative when both firm and country factors were regressed 
together.  
In general, lag dividend payout, profitability, investment opportunities, financial 
leverage, firm size, corruption and Gross Domestic Product per capita were the significant 
determinants of dividend payout in these selected African countries at levels of 1%, 5% and 
10%. The findings indicated that the hypotheses or the predictions stated are applicable and 
explained dividend policy decisions in the context of African countries.  
In conclusion, dividend payout in the selected Africa countries was stable across the 
time period under study, with the exception of Ivory Coast, which had surprisingly high 
dividend payouts. Because the selected countries were mixed with high and low incomes, 
high and low populations and war and non-war countries, the data length provided 
comprehensive understanding regarded policy decisions for the countries. The study also 131 
 
concluded that dividend payout is affected by firm and country specific factors, and that the 
results of the findings are consistent with the literature about firm specific factors. 
This current study has shed light on the significance of profitability, investment 
opportunities, financial leverage, and firm size as firm specific factors, and corruption and 
Gross Domestic Product per capital as country-specific factors, in explaining the dividend 
payout policy of firms in Africa. These findings suggest that large and profitable firms with 
higher investment opportunities would retain adequate financing for future investments as 
long as such investment projects yielded positive net present values. However, profitable 
firms that operate in countries where corruption is high tend to pay lower dividends.  
One implication of these findings is that pro-growth policies generate more profitable 
investment opportunities and stimulate the financing needs of the corporations, which leads 
the firms to distribute less and use the retained earnings for expanding the corporations. 
Therefore, large sized firms with more profitable investment opportunities want to rely less 
on external financing and more on retained earnings. The study will again provide 
information to managers, financial consultants and the state with regard to the distribution of 
dividends, and ways to attract foreign investors across these African countries.  
The implications of dividend policy have been discussed in relation to the development of the 
stock market of a country. This is also directly related to the stock value of a firm. According 
to the Bird-in-hand hypothesis of dividend policy, firms that pay high dividends increase 
stock value (Al-Malkawi et al., 2010). That‎is‎to‎say,‎according‎to‎the‎so‎called‎“Bird-in-the 
hand”‎hypothesis,‎high‎dividend‎payout‎ratios‎maximize‎a‎firm’s‎value.‎Studies that provide 
support‎for‎the‎“Bird-in-the‎hand”‎include‎‎Gordon and Shapiro (1956) and Lintner (1956). 
Fisher (1961) also used data from Britain for the period between 1949 and 1957 to conclude 
that dividends have greater impact on share prices than retained earnings. 
Another hypothesis that‎strictly‎contradicts‎the‎“Bird-in-the‎hand”‎is‎the‎Tax-effect 
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, low dividend payout ratios lower the cost of capital 
and increase the stock price. In other words, low dividend payout ratios contribute to 
maximising‎the‎firm’s‎value.‎According‎to‎Al-Malkawi et al. (2010), this argument is based 
on the assumption that dividends are taxed at higher rates than capital gains. In addition, 
dividends are taxed immediately, while taxes on capital gains are deferred until the stock is 
actually sold. These tax advantages of capital gains over dividends tend to predispose 
investors, who have favourable tax treatment with capital gains, to prefer companies that 132 
 
retain most of their earnings, rather than pay them out as dividends, and are willing to pay a 
premium for low-payout companies. Therefore, a low dividend payout ratio will lower the 
cost of equity and increase the stock price.  
What is the implication of high firm value and high share price? The significance can 
be traced to its impact on the stock market. Once many firms with high value and higher 
prices are listed on the stock market, it signals a stronger and more robust stock market that 
will attract many more investments. It is also a known and established fact that stock markets 
relate positively to economic development of any country (Antonios, 2010). For example, 
according to Pagano (1993), stock markets contribute to the mobilization of domestic savings 
by enhancing the set of financial instruments available to savers to diversify their portfolios, 
providing an important source of investment capital at relatively low cost. He maintains that a 
well-functioning and liquid stock market, that allows investors to diversify away from 
unsystematic risk, will increase the marginal productivity of capital (Pagano, 1993). Antonios 
(2010) argues that rising share prices tend to be associated with increased business 
investment and vice versa and, also, share prices also affect the wealth of households and 
their consumption. Higher household consumption also engenders economic growth, if the 
consumption is of locally produced commodities.  
According to Obstfeld (1994), another important aspect through which stock market 
development may influence economic growth is risk diversification. Obstfeld (1994) suggests 
that international risk sharing, through internationally integrated stock markets, improves the 
allocation of resources and accelerates the process of economic growth. 
Furthermore, the evolution of stock markets, according to Khan and Sendahji (2000), has an 
impact on the operation of banking institutions and, hence, on economic promotion. This 
means that stock markets are becoming more crucial, especially in a number of emerging 
markets and their role should not be ignored (Khan and Sendahji, 2000). Levine and Zervos 
(1998) argued that a well-established stock market not only can mobilize capital and diversify 
risks between market agents, but it is also able to provide different types of financial services 
than the banking sector to stimulate economic growth. 133 
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6.1  Overview  
The focus of this thesis was on the capital structure, corporate cash holding, and dividend 
policy of listed non-financial firms in African countries. This has become necessary since 
firm growth, high profitability and, consequently, an efficient finance system and economic 
growth and development, can only be achieved when investors have a firm grasp and 
understanding of capital structure dynamics, corporate cash holding determinants, and are 
convinced about dividend policy. This last chapter offers general conclusions for each of the 
three main chapters. It provides the contributions of each chapter to the previous studies, 
discusses the limitations of the methodology and techniques used, provides the policy 
implications of this study and, finally, identifies areas for further research. 
6.2  Chapter Three: Capital structure trends in selected Africa countries 
Chapter Three was the first part of the thesis and contains an empirical examination of 
leverage trends (capital structure), and the independent effects of governance, banking and 
economic development (country factors) and firm level factors on capital structure in Africa. 
The chapter, therefore, measures the relationship between leverage, firm factors (investment 
opportunities, profitability, non-debt tax shield, firm size and target pay out) and country 
specific factors (gross domestic product, domestic credit of banks, corruption and the rule of 
law). Capital structure is necessary for the growth of firms and economic development. 
Capital structure has been defined as the mix of securities and financing sources used by 
firms to finance real investment (Myers 2001). Ever‎since‎the‎‘irrelevance’‎propositions‎by‎
Modigliani and Miller (1958), interest in studies about capital structure has grown, with many 
divergent views reported about the relationships between the characteristics of firms, such as 
profitability, tangibility, firm size, investment opportunities, the non-debt tax shield and 
target pay out, as determinants of leverage. 
Employing a panel dataset of 608 non-financial listed firms from 14 selected African 
countries (covering the period from 1994-2011), this chapter showed a positive relationship 
between leverage, investment opportunities, non-debt tax shield, firm size, the domestic 
credit of banks, and the rule of law. However, a negative relationship was established 
between leverage, profitability, target pay out, gross domestic product and corruption levels. 
The study found that lagged leverage, investment opportunities, profitability, firm size, 
domestic credit of banks, gross domestic product, corruption and the rule of law were 
significant in determining the capital structure of firms in the selected African countries. The 
study also found that the leverage trends across the countries under examination were very 136 
 
low and stable. The conclusion, therefore, indicates that although firm specific factors are 
important in Africa in determining leverage, country specific factors, such as the institutional 
environment and governance, play a very significant role in determining the level of leverage. 
The signs of these relationships suggest that the Pecking Order and Trade-off theories of 
capital structure models, derived from the developed countries, provide help in explaining the 
financial behaviour of firms in African countries, and that the results are in line with previous 
studies. The key implications from the findings are that managers should understand the 
relationship between leverage and firm factors in managing their businesses to increase 
productivity, leading to economic development and growth. Also, strengthening governance 
and other institutions by policy makers will invariably have a positive effect on business and 
industry. 
6.3  Chapter Four: Corporate cash holdings in African countries 
Chapter Four examined the trends in corporate cash holdings. It also empirically analysed the 
impact of firm and country level factors (rule of law, gross domestic product and domestic 
credit of banks) on cash holdings. The study found stable trends in cash holdings, the reasons 
for which were due to the fact that firms in Africa lacked research and development 
expenditures and, therefore, were not compelled to hold large amounts of cash as preparation 
against future shocks. They were also due to lack of acquisition, which indicated no 
movement of cash, which necessitated stability. Furthermore, applying regression analysis 
and a partial standard adjustment model using fixed effects and the application of a 
generalised method of moments models, the study measured the relationship between the 
cash holdings, and firm and country specific factors. The study found a positive relationship 
between cash flow, net working capital, capital expenditure, firm size, return on asset, rule of 
law, gross domestic product and the domestic credit of banks. However, a negative 
relationship was reported between leverage, market to book ratio and cash holding. The 
results provided evidence that cash holdings in these selected countries were significantly 
determined by net working capital, capital expenditure, return on asset and financial leverage. 
Firms with financial leverage tended to hold less cash. Firms with capital expenditure, net 
working capital and return on asset held large amounts of cash. The results of the coefficients 
suggested that both the Trade-off and Pecking Order theories were applicable for explaining 
differentials in cash holdings in firm factors in African countries, but they were more 
supportive of the Pecking Order theory. The results from the analysis support previous 
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in determining corporate cash holding, while country specific factors are insignificant. The 
results suggest that the expansion of the financial sectors will enable firms to obtain finance, 
and also progress the functioning of trade credit as a short-term financing instrument, which 
implies that the continued expansion of the financial environment by governments in Africa 
countries‎will‎ease‎firms’‎financing‎constraints,‎and‎thus‎boost‎economic‎efficiency.‎Also,‎the‎
result is useful to firms for knowing whether to hold less, or more, cash during a financial 
crisis or period of high inflation. 
6.4  Chapter Five: Dividends policy across African countries 
Chapter Five of this thesis examined the trends in dividend policy and differentials in firm 
and country specific factors for payers and non-payers of dividends. Secondly, it examined 
the predictions concerning the amount of dividends paid by listed non-financial firms in 
African countries. Using a panel dataset of 608 listed non-financial firms in African countries 
covering the period 1994-2011 and employing fixed effects and applying a generalised 
method of moments models, the study found that dividend payers were more profitable, had 
larger firm sizes, greater investment, high retention of earnings and less financial leverage 
than non-dividend paying firms. The results also showed that in countries where the gross 
domestic product per capita is low, firms are more likely to pay dividends. The level of 
corruption was high for non-payers of dividends. The results demonstrated that the selected 
countries relied on both current earnings and past dividends to determine the dividend 
payment. The study further found a positive significant relationship between dividend policy, 
profitability, investment opportunities and firm size. However, a significant negative 
relationship was identified between dividend policy, financial leverage, corruption and gross 
domestic product per capita. The study further found that the dividend trends across the 
countries under examination were very low and stable. The reasons for this were that 
financial burdens were faced by firms in Africa, and consequently they preferred to finance a 
firm’s‎expansion‎with‎their‎low‎profit‎and by retaining earnings, which may have affected 
their capability to pay high dividends. It was also due to the fact that firms were not 
expanding very fast in Africa to facilitate earnings to support shareholders, since the available 
money‎was‎used‎for‎the‎firm’s‎growth‎opportunities.‎The‎conclusion,‎therefore,‎indicates‎that‎
although firm specific factors are important in Africa in determining dividend policy 
regarding payout, country specific factors, such as corruption and the GDP per capita, play 
very significant roles in determining the dividend payout of African firms.  138 
 
6.5  Summary and public policy implications 
This study has contributed to the advancement of research into capital structure, corporate 
cash holdings and dividend policy of firms, and their implications. The study employed a 
large panel dataset of 608 firms sampled from 14 African countries covering a period from 
1994-2011. Time was spent collecting data about both firm factors and country-level 
(governance and development indicators) secondary data, to assess their impact on capital 
structure, corporate cash holdings and dividend policy in African countries. Following Fama 
and French (2002) and Bates et al. (2009) s’‎approach, panel data regression models were 
developed to measure the impact of the firm and country specific factors on capital structure, 
cash holdings and dividend policy. In the estimation, the following regressions models were 
used: fixed effect and the application of the general method of moments (GMM). Although 
the thesis focused on‎African‎countries’ non- listed firms finance, and how the firms operated 
regarding their capital structure, cash holdings and dividend decisions as well as investment, 
its benefits could be extended to other emerging, developing and developed countries. 
The findings from the thesis are summarised as follows: Firstly, from the capital 
structure, the leverage trends across the selected African countries under examination were 
very low and stable. Country and firm specific factors play a significant role in determining 
the level of leverage. Secondly, corporate cash holdings in the countries are significantly 
determined by leverage, net working capital, capital expenditure, and return on asset and, 
therefore, firm specific factors are important determinants of cash holdings, implying that 
corporate‎cash‎holding‎is‎a‎firm’s‎internal‎decision.‎Thirdly,‎dividend‎payers‎are‎more‎
profitable, have larger firm size, greater investment, high retention of earnings and less 
financial leverage than non-paying firms. In countries where GDP is low, firms are likely to 
pay dividends and non-payers of dividends have high levels of corruption. Country and firm 
factors are significant in determining dividend.  
The thesis therefore provides the following public policy recommendations from the findings:        
Governments in Africa must put effort into strengthening the institutional framework 
for good governance and the rule of law and support the capital and stock markets, ensuring 
efficient management of the banking sector operations, in order to reduce interest rates, 
thereby boosting the financing of firms and private sector development to create more job 
opportunities and to increase growth. This will also create an enabling environment for trust 
and confidence, which will encourage the private sector to invest as much as possible. Also, 139 
 
since the bottom line is the availability of capital, the strengthening of the capital and stock 
markets and the financial systems, in order to attract the needed investment, will go a long 
way to boost the financing of firms and economic growth.   
Furthermore, governments in Africa, in consultation with the private sector, must 
enact laws for the retention of sizeable amounts of its earnings to boost domestic bank 
deposits. With the right institutional framework and development of the stock markets, firms 
will feel comfortable financing with equity, which will, in turn, grow the capital market. The 
growth of the capital market will then provide the needed finance for the growth of firms. 
One major reason adduced for the low retention of funds was the very low investment 
in research and development and innovation. This is one area that stifles the growth of firms. 
Firms in Africa should strengthen their research departments to develop innovative ideas. 
This will be sufficient reason for firms to retain more cash for such investments. Moreover, 
attractive innovations in a stable environment will attract the needed finance from both 
internal and external sources. It is only through innovation that investment opportunities will 
be realised and funded, leading to firm growth. Therefore, a great deal of attention must be 
given to research and development by firms in Africa.   
Governments in Africa can help in this regard by setting up special funds that young 
firms can tap into for research and development. Countries in Asia have been successful in 
boosting growth through the direct support by their government for research and development. 
Finally, governments of African countries should provide very strong measures against 
political instability, corruption and conflict over natural resources and political manipulation 
of regimes, to ensure total economic growth. 
6.6  Limitations of the thesis 
Although the current thesis reveals a very strong and extensive range of implications for 
regulatory authorities, policy makers and organisation of firms by corporate managers, a 
detailed analysis and evaluation of the techniques and methods selected is in order. 
Firstly, the measurement of capital structure (leverage) was consistent with Fama and 
French (2002)s’ approach, defined as total debt to total assets, which provides a general idea 
about‎firms’‎use‎of‎leverage‎in‎operations.‎Also‎the‎construction‎of‎corporate‎cash‎holdings‎
was in line with Bates et al. (2009), measured as cash and marketable securities to total assets, 
which indicates how liquid the firm is in terms of paying it short term obligations when due. 140 
 
Dividend policy was based on Fama and French (2002), defined as dividend to total assets, 
which demonstrates a‎company’s‎performance‎to‎its‎investors.‎Based‎on‎previous‎studies,‎the 
study defined economic growth as real GDP growth per capita, to identify the relative 
performance of countries. The thesis considered these measurements for the study because 
they provided close evaluations, because they are progressively use in empirical research and 
are so far considered as best measurements.  
Secondly, numerous techniques were used in the estimations of chapter III, IV and V, 
such as fixed effect and the application of the generalized method of moment  
Thirdly, using the simple fixed effects regression could not provide accurate results 
for chapter III, IV and V, and so there was the need to consider the application of the general 
method of moments. The general method of moment (GMM) model provided a consistent 
and accurate coefficient, which was further tested to see whether the results were affected by 
serial correlation. The test indicated that serial correlation was not an issue, Sargan and 
Hansen test were insignificant. 
Fourthly, in chapters III, IV and V, the general method of moment estimator 
developed to tackle dynamic panel data by Arellano and Bond (1991) were used. The method 
is complex and automatically generates the test for Sargan and Hansen over-identifying 
restrictions. It was adopted to solve the problems of: (1) the presence of unobserved firm-
level effects, and (2) the autoregressive process in the data (Gonzalez and Gonzalez, 2012). 
The general method of moment further determined if the result of the lag model was 
unaffected by serial correlation. It offers an efficient estimate of the models and was used to 
identify whether the lags model used was not serially correlated, by describing the test 
statistics of the validity of the variables. It enables researchers to test hypothesis about the 
parameters of the econometric model and provides straightforward results of the first order 
and second order autocorrelation. The study also considered a check for serial correlation to 
ensure that the data was free from serial correlation. 
Finally, the difficulty of getting data, as well as the possibility of incomplete data, 
with the resultant regression having outliers about listed firms in African countries, raised 
more concern. The selection of listed firms might cause more than just sample bias. This 
thesis avoids the selection bias due to the fact that only listed non-financial firms were 
considered, and the selection of the 14 African countries were based on the availability of 
data and mixed with middle and low income countries, high and low populations, war and 141 
 
non-war countries to provide general and comprehensive results. Other countries were not 
considered because of the unavailability of data. As the study focuses on corporate finance by 
examining firm and country level factors in firms’ operations and economic growth, firm and 
country level data was selected. Corporate governance factors were not considered because 
there was no data on the variables to be examined. To avoid outliers from the data, all 
financial institutions were excluded from the sample, because their financial base and 
operations are different from non-financial firms. Also all financial firms and utilities were 
not considered as their financial decisions are affected by different factors and the rules 
undertaken by non-financial firms. This is supported by Gonzalez and Gonzalez (2012) and 
Wiwattanakantang (1999). All the data was transformed using logarithms, application of lag 
values and the general method of moments to ensure the reliability of the dataset used in this 
thesis. 
6.7  Areas for further research 
This thesis offers the following areas for further research. 
Firstly, considering the capital structure, cash holding and dividend policy, future 
work could be done to extend the analysis by disaggregating the firms into sectors, such as 
service and industry. Such an analysis would assist in identifying the sectors whose firms 
hand out the greatest or the least dividend, which have cash holdings and have the best capital 
structure. 
Secondly, a hand collecting (survey) technique should be considered for asking the 
opinions of practitioners, more importantly top managers of firms whether capital structure, 
cash holdings and dividend policies influence corporate finance operations. Furthermore, it 
could be investigated whether these firm factors impact on economic growth and finance in 
African countries using the survey methodology. 
Thirdly, further research is needed to compare the countries in terms of cash holdings, 
dividend policy and capital structure and economic growth by using time series data rather 
than pooling. In addition, the topic could involve a the comparison between three regions 
Africa, Asia and the West for comprehensive understanding in terms of capital structure, cash 
holdings, dividend policy and economic growth to draw lessons for areas of improvement. 
Fourthly, the research could be extended to establish the relationship between 
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context. This will broaden the literature about economic growth in Africa and bring a clear 
idea about whether corporate governance also impacts on economic growth in African 
countries. 
Finally, looking at the results and the need for rapid economic growth in African 
countries, different characteristics to establish broader areas of growth may be exploited for 
additional empirical work regarding technology, innovation and economic growth and 
finance to see how they impact on growth. This will broaden the policies that are needed to 
ensure rapid economic growth and finance in Africa.  143 
 
Appendix A: Bloomberg list of fields, fields mnemonic, filed description/definition & measurement 
Bloomberg 
fields 
Bloomberg field description/definition  Bloomberg fields/Mnemonic  Measurement / calculations  
EBIT   Earnings before interest and taxes  EBIT  Net sales + other operating 
income – Cost of goods sold 
(COGS) – Selling, general and 
administrative expenses 
(Operating profit (loss)) 
Total Asset  The total of all short & long-term assets as 
reported on the balance sheet 
BS_TOT_ASSET  Total of short and long term 
assets on balance sheet 
Total Debt   Sum of Short term debt and  & long term debt   SHORT_AND_LONG_TERM_DEBT  Short term + Long term debt 
 
Total Market 
Value 
Total market value  TOT_MKT_VAL  Market capitalization + 
Preferred Equity + Short-Term 
& Long-Term Debt + Other 
Long-Term Liabilities – Cash 
& Equivalents 
Dividend paid  Includes dividends actually paid out as cash 
disbursements including both common stock of 
the parent company & preferred stock of all 
companies consolidated  
CF_DVD_PAID  Dividend paid 
Earnings per 
share 
Bottom-line earnings per share. Includes the 
effects of all one –time, Non-recurring and 
extraordinary gains/losses. Uses Basic Weighted 
Average shares excluding the effects of 
convertibles.  
IS_EPS  Computed as Net Income 
available to common 
shareholders divided by the 
Basic weighted average shares 
outstanding 
Source: Bloomberg144 
 
Bloomberg list of fields, fields mnemonic, filed description/definition & measurement (cont.) 
Bloomberg fields  Bloomberg field description/definition  Bloomberg fields/Mnemonic  Measurement / calculations 
Depreciation  
expenses  
Amount of expenses charged against earnings to 
write off the cost of plant or machine over its useful 
life, giving consideration to wear & tear, 
obsolescence, & salvage value. Includes depreciation 
that is directly related to or associated with tangible 
fixed assets. Including amortization of fixed assets 
that are of PP&E such as leased assets, leasehold 
improvements, & internal use of software 
IS_DEPR_EXP  Depreciation Expenses 
Cash & Marketable 
Securities  
Includes cash and liquid securities that can be 
converted into cash quickly at a reasonable price 
CASH_AND_MARKETABLE
_SECURITIES 
Cash and Near cash + ST 
investment + LT Marketable 
securities 
Dividend payout 
ratio 
Payout ratio (in percentage)   DIV_PAYOUT_ 
RATIO 
(Cash Common Dividends / 
Income before XO - Minority 
Interest – Cash Pref Dvd) * 100 
Total equity  Total equity (also known as total book value, 
Shareholders equity or net assets) 
 
TOTAL_EQUITY  Total Common Equity + 
Minority Interest + Preferred 
Equity 
Net Income  The profit  after all expenses have been deducted. 
Includes the effects of all one –time, non-recurring, 
and extraordinary gains, losses, or charges, 
discontinued operations, changes in accounting 
standards and minority intersts. 
NET_INCOME   Operating Profit (loss) 
EBITDA  Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation & 
amortization 
EBITDA  Operating profit (loss) + 
Depreciation and amortization 
Retained  earnings  Cumulative undistributed earnings. Includes merger 
reserve, unrestricted equity and revaluation and legal 
reserves 
 BS_RETAINED_EARN   Reserves 
Source: Bloomberg145 
 
Bloomberg list of fields, fields mnemonic, filed description/definition & measurement (cont.) 
Bloomberg fields  Bloomberg field description/definition  Bloomberg fields/ Mnem  measurement/ calculations 
Dividend per share  Returns the latest reported annual dividend per share. 
Override fields equity fundamental year 
EQY_DPS  Dividend per share 
Long term 
borrowing 
All interest –bearing financial obligations that are not 
due within a year. Includes convertible, redeemable, 
retractable debentures, bonds, loans, mortgage debts, 
sinking funds, & long term bank overdrafts. Includes 
subordinated capital notes, long term hire purchase & 
finance lease obligation, long term bills of exchange & 
bankers acceptances 
BS_LT_BORROW  Long term debt 
Short term 
borrowing 
Includes bank drafts, short-term debt & borrowings, 
repurchase agreements (repos) & reverse repos, short-
term portion of long term borrowings, current 
obligations under capital (finance) leases, current 
portion of hire purchase creditors, trust receipts, bills 
payable, bills of exchange, banks acceptances, interest 
bearing loans, & short term mandatory redeemable 
preferred stock 
BS_ST_BORROW  Short term borrowings 
Working capital  Current assets reported minus current liabilities  WORKING_CAPITAL   
Current Assets – Current 
Liabilities 
Capital expenditure 
 
Amount the company spent on purchases of tangible 
fixed assets. May include intangible assets when not 
disclosed separately 
CAPITAL_EXPEND 
  Capital Expenditures 
Dividend yield  Indication of the income generated by share of stock    DIVIDEND_YIELD 
 
Calculated by dividing Dividend 
Trailing 12M Dividend per share 
for single share companies , by 
the last price 
Source: Bloomberg146 
 
Appendix B: Country factors (macroeconomic factors) from World Bank Development Indicators 2012. 
Indicator factors  Description  Measurement 
GDP constant 
price 2000 U.S. $  
(Real GDP) 
Gross domestic product at constant price.  
GDP‎at‎purchaser’s‎prices‎is‎the‎sum‎of‎gross‎value‎added‎
by all resident producers in the economy plus any product 
taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of 
the products 
It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation 
of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of 
natural resources. Data are in constant 2000 U.S. dollars. 
Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic 
currencies using 2000 official exchange rates. 
GDP per capita 
constant 2000 U.S 
$ (Real GDP) 
Gross domestic product per capital at constant 2000 U.S. $. 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by 
midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added 
by all resident producers in the economy plus any product 
taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of 
the products 
It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation 
of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of 
natural resources. Data are in constant U.S. dollars 
 
 
 
 
Domestic credit 
provided by 
banking sector as 
percentage of 
GDP  
Domestic credit provided by the banking sector includes all 
credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the 
exception of credit to the central government, which is net. 
The banking sector includes monetary authorities and 
deposit money banks, as well as other banking institutions 
where data are available (including institutions that do not 
accept transferable deposits but do incur such liabilities as 
time and savings deposits). 
 
Domestic credit by banking sector (percentage of GDP) 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators Database 2012. 
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Appendix C: Country factors (governance factors) from World Bank (2012) Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Governance 
Indicators/Indexes 
  Description/Definition                  Measurement 
Rule of law  Reflects perception of the extents to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, 
and in particular the quality of contract of 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence 
Estimates are in units of a standard normal 
distribution, with a mean zero, standard deviation of 
one, and running from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 
2.5 (strong) with high values corresponding to 
better or governance performance.  
Control of corruption  Reflects perception of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
“capture”‎of‎the‎state‎by‎elites‎and private interests. 
Estimates are in units of a standard normal 
distribution, with a mean zero, standard deviation of 
one, and running from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 
2.5 (strong) with high values corresponding to 
better or governance performance 
 
 
Source:Worldwide Governance Indicators  2012. 149 
 
Appendix D: Distributional properties for all selected variables in each 
country. 
Distributional properties for Botswana 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  JB Statistic 
Leverage  0.08  0.03  0.11  0.00  0.81  846.37 
Innopp  1.83  1.23  2.03  -0.03  12.82  1114.26 
Prof  0.02  0.05  0.31  -1.59  1.37  796.73 
Size   3.33  2.91  2.41  -0.67  11.19  203.69 
TargPayout  365.87  0.00  4635.90  0.00  58823.5  167506.80 
NDTS01  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.00  0.14  79.79 
CASHR  0.22  0.16  0.21  0.00  0.92  69.48 
MKTBR  1.83  1.23  2.03  -0.03  12.82  1114.26 
CF  0.05  0.11  0.33  -1.58  1.39  463.56 
NWC  183.14  2.06   1158.09  -4363.06  10686.84  15447.51 
CE  -0.09  -0.04  0.26  -3.15  0.01  110223.60 
DIV  9.78  2.09  27.11  0.00  216.35  6855.63 
ROA  -0.09  0.05  0.83  -7.88  0.49  24097.58 
DPY3  0.56  0.00  7.12  0.00  90.95  173906 
GDP (real GDP)  6.38  6.56  1.61  3.77  8.83  25.86 
DcBasperGDP  17.02  17.82  4.74  9.39  25.75  15.34 
lnGDPpercap (log)  8.14  8.19  0.19  7.79  8.38  31.78 
Cor  0.89  0.9  0.19  0.59  1.25  5.34 
RoL  0.60  0.61  0.06  0.50  0.67  24.35 
 
Distributional properties for Egypt 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  JB Statistic 
Leverage  0.19  0.14  0.20  0.00  2.02  1632.75 
Innopp  1.08  0.84  1.32  -0.31  20.23  286403.8 
Prof  0.09  0.08  0.09  -0.53  0.39  1116.963 
Size   4.96  4.79  1.41  1.46  9.75  50.55 
TargPayout  1.14  0.54  16.86  -1.13  457.97  16434387 
NDTS01  0.02  0.12  0.03  0.00  0.15  793.71 
CASHR  0.16  0.12  0.15  0.01  0.95  498.61 
MKTBR  1.08  0.84  1.32  -0.31  20.23  28640.8 
CF  0.13  0.12  0.11  -0.53  0.51  565.11 
NWC  33.74  12.71  444.94  -2129.31  13080.91  23062804 
CE  -0.05  -0.02  0.08  -0.89  0.01  26361.93 
DIV  2.31  0.58  6.39  0.00  89.15  418159.2 
ROA  0.09  0.09  0.09  -0.57  0.68  2789.47 
DPY3  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.25  2469459 
GDP (real GDP)  113.00  108.00  27.80  74.10  163.00  118.01 
DcBasperGDP  44.12  46.04  8.97  27.90  54.93  158.69 
lnGDPpercap (log)  7.35  7.3  0.15  7.10  7.59  83.73 
Cor  -0.48  -0.52  0.18  -0.71  -0.07  97.94 
RoL  -0.07  -0.03  0.14  -0.42  0.09  291.18 150 
 
Distributional properties for Ghana 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  JB Statistics 
Leverage  0.19  0.16  0.23  0.00  2.37  9395.72 
Innopp  1.36  0.96  1.17  0.09  7.66  530.04 
Prof  0.09  0.07  0.18  -1.10  1.33  3032.42 
Size   3.87  3.27  3.06  -0.77  17.45  59.20 
TargPayout  0.35  0.21  0.71  -2.09  5.45  5562.51 
NDTS01  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.00  0.31  989.80 
CASHR  0.09  0.06  0.11  0.00  0.63  720.72 
MKTBR  1.36  0.96  1.17  0.09  7.66  530.03 
CF  0.13  0.12  0.19  0.00  1.37  1310.85 
NWC  104.16  1.33  1283.70  -2107.97  15597.86  133329.5 
CE  -0.09  -0.07  0.09  -0.49  0.01  398.37 
DIV  17.67  1.64  59.15  0.00  585.90  20831.41 
ROA  0.04  0.05  0.17  -1.07  0.86  1423.344 
DPY3  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01  1669.62 
GDP (real GDP)  6.02  5.55  1.73  3.87  10.00  43.100 
DcBasperGDP  11.85  12.53  3.54  5.07  15.88  48.101 
lnGDPpercap (log)  5.65  5.61  0.15  5.46  5.99  38.27 
Cor  -0.09  -0.07  0.15  -0.36  0.13  24.95 
RoL  -0.09  -0.07  0.14  -0.44  0.09  77.17 
 
Distributional properties for Ivory Cost 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  JB Statistics 
Leverage   0.18  0.14  0.17  0.00  0.77  106.35 
Innopp  7.67  0.69  51.38  -0.04  491.27  34625.79 
Prof  0 .09  0.08  0.11  -0.65  0.44  1237.98 
Size    4.13  4.41  1.57  -3.37  7.64  438.48 
TargPayout   6.17  0.69  56.36  -7.78  652.74  103331.99 
NDTS01   .056  0.05  0.036  0.01  0.19  25.975 
CASHR   .092  0.06  0.09  0.00  0.69  689.45 
MKTBR   7.67  0.69  51.38  -0.04  491.27  34625.79 
CF  102 .15  0.13  0.14  -0.41  0.41  25.56 
NWC   16.66  7.61  33.16  -79.05  224.99  2036.22 
CE   -.05  -0.03  0.04  -0.22  0.01  66.88 
DIV   41220.11  2.33  337821  0.00  3363630  52990.11 
ROA   .06  0.05  0.11  -0.69  0.60  2636.27 
DPY3   .61  0.02  5.42  0.00  58.67  90743.53 
GDP (real GDP)   10.40  10.40  0.77  8.33  11.60  115.49 
DcBasperGDP   16.05  15.94  1.59  13.62  18.52  33.31 
lnGDPpercap (log)   6.39  6.36  0.06  6.31  6.51  43.81 
Cor  -.91  -1.09  0.41  -1.24  0.20  220.95 
RoL   -1.29  -1.38  0.21  -1.5  -0.82  68.37 
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Distributional properties for Kenya 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  JB Statistics 
Leverage  0.16  0.10  0.18  0.00  1.08  306.23 
Innopp  1.06  0.89  0.77  0.13  5.33  1046.61 
Prof  0.10  0.09  0.12  -0.22  1.16  6412.40 
Size   4.18  3.89  1.68  -0.51  8.26  0.28 
TargPayout  0.42  0.32  2.33  -20.83  36.93  538299.56 
NDTS01  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.00  0.15  489.65 
CASHR  0.09  0.06  0.09  0.00  0.50  117.04 
MKTBR  1.07  0.89  0.77  0.13  5.33  1046.61 
CF  0.13  0.11  0.10  -0.14  0.53  73.58 
NWC  8.66  4.94  32.69  -227.14  316.43  16591.86 
CE  -0.06  -0.04  0.06  -0.34  0.01  377.56 
DIV  8.51  0.81  74.44  0.00  1391.67  1580018 
ROA  0.06  0.05  0.074  -0.31  0.36  210.58 
DPY3  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.19  211661.8 
GDP (real GDP)  14.5  13.40  2.71  10.90  19.80  72.54 
DcBasperGDP  28.74  27.64  3.48  24.60  38.15  230.21 
lnGDPpercap (log)  6.06  6.03  0.06  5.99  6.18  98.01 
Cor  -0.95  -0.95  0.08  -1.07  -0.80  27.63 
RoL  -0.97  -0.97  0.08  -1.13  -0.86  37.25 
 
Distributional properties for Morocco 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  JB Statistics 
leverage  0.19  0.14  0.21  0.00  1.34  422.82 
Innopp  1.39  1.11  0.81  -0.02  4.44  248.85 
Prof  0.11  0.09  0.09  -0.34  0.46  83.73 
Size   4.48  4.32  1.47  0.98  8.67  3.95 
TargPayout  0.59  0.53  2.23  -30.27  39.71  1284745.37 
NDTS01  0.06  0.05  0.04  0.01  0.29  256.35 
CASHR  0.07  0.04  0.12  0.00  0.69  1100.17 
MKTBR  1.39  1.10  0.81  0.02  4.44  248.85 
CF  0.16  0.14  0.11  -1.06  0.53  20597.61 
NWC  21.54  11.13  118.20  -1261.53  731.00  51559.79 
CE  -0.07  -0.04  0.067  -0.39  0.01  540.41 
DIV  3.20  0.90  10.57  0.00  190.12  858379 
ROA  0.07  0.06  0.09  -1.14  0.30  105756.5 
DPY3  0.051  0.01  0.11  0.00  0.71  7206.65 
GDP (real GDP)  44.30  42.40  9.82  30.70  62.60  88.43 
DcBasperGDP  48.67  46.92  12.08  28.22  71.21  34.87 
lnGDPpercap (log)  7.27  7.25  0.15  7.02  7.55  82.71 
Cor  -0.14  -0.21  0.24  -0.39  0.41  222.33 
RoL  -0.06  -0.12  0.17  -0.26  0.24  88.62 
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Distributional properties for Namibia 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  JB Statistics 
leverage  0.12  0.09  0.12  0.00  0.73  106.31 
Innopp  2.07  1.06  4.66  -0.16  44.62  34200.07 
Prof  -0.08  0.08  0.99  -13.69  0.51  219882.4 
Size   6.01  6.28  3.21  -3.33  11.61  11.58 
TargPayout  0.14  0.32  1.81  -22.72  2.64  312200.43 
NDTS01  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.00  0.16  117.84 
CASHR  0.16  0.11  0.18  0.00  0.96  830.29 
MKTBR  2.07  1.06  4.66  -0.16  44.62  34200.07 
CF  -0.03  0.12  1.00  -13.67  0.54  221643 
NWC  389.56  21.15  1149.65  -4363.05  10686.84  11563.23 
CE  -0.05  -0.04  0.06  -0.45  0.01  1697.41 
DIV  0.65  0.07  3.98  0.00  59.96  391218.1 
ROA  -0.08  0.04  0.82  -11.02  1.47  217880.2 
DPY3  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01  1488.42 
GDP (real GDP)    .           
DcBasperGDP    .           
lnGDPpercap (log) 
 
. 
     
 
Cor 
 
. 
     
 
RoL 
 
. 
     
 
NB: No country data was available for Namibia. 
Distributional properties for Nigeria 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  JB Statistics 
Leverage  0.17  0.10  0.24  0.00  3.26  59131.57 
Innopp  1.40  1.00  1.34  -0.46  11.70  2754.98 
Prof  0.09  0.10  0.14  -1.33  0.55  6952.66 
Size   3.72  3.80  2.01  -1.97  9.96  6.28 
TargPayout  0.52  0.35  3.14  -1.58  84.21  14228517 
NDTS01  0.60  0.03  14.92  0.00  392.16  13569146 
CASHR  0.08  0.04  0.10  0.00  0.68  2651.14 
MKTBR  1.40  1.00  1.34  -0.46  11.70  2758.98 
CF  0.14  0.14  0.13  -0.66  0.57  532.44 
NWC  35.47  0.88  333.68  -1415.85  5033.21  703686.5 
CE  -0.08  -0.06  0.09  0.89  0.01  7530.41 
DIV  12.89  1.27  59.27  -25.88  916.28  382376.1 
ROA  0.04  0.05  0.20  -2.93  2.26  220435.7 
DPY3  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  130146 
GDP (real GDP)  57.20  50.60  16.40  38.60  91.30  221.78 
DcBasperGDP  17.27  13.20  8.46  8.93  38.59  640.10 
lnGDPpercap (log)  6.03  5.95  0.15  5.88  6.33  237.00 
Cor  -1.11  -1.13  0.14  -1.33  -0.81  16.53 
RoL  -1.26  -1.25  0.14  -1.52  -1.1  126.54 
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Distributional properties for South Africa 
 
Distributional properties for Tanzania 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  JB Statistic 
Leverage  0.08  0.05  0.08  0.00  0.31  4.32 
Innopp  2.19  2.21  1.27  0.45  4.64  1.88 
Prof  0.28  0.26  0.18  0.08  1.15  264.12 
Size   5.07  5.30  0.78  3.59  6.32  2.15 
TargPayout  0.66  0.60  0.29  0.07  1.41  0.91 
NDTS01  0.05  0.05  0.01  0.01  0.08  0.01 
CASHR  0.12  0.07  0.10  0.00  0.33  4.44 
MKTBR  2.19  2.21  1.27  0.45  4.64  1.88 
CF  0.32  0.31  0.11  0.12  0.60  2.24 
NWC  29.68  14.44  46.65  -54.29  147.93  5.41 
CE  -0.09  -0.07  0.05  -0.25  -0.01  12.69 
DIV  0.82  0.83  0.50  0.04  2.44  7.79 
ROA  0.15  0.15  0.08  0.01  0.36  0.94 
DPY3  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  3.81 
GDP (real GDP)  13.00  12.00  4.20  7.96  21.20  4.89 
DcBasperGDP  9.33  8.66  4.94  3.09  17.8  4.95 
lnGDPpercap (log)  5.85  5.82  0.17  5.64  6.15  5.06 
Cor  -0.64  -0.58  0.25  -1.03  -0.22  2.77 
RoL  -0.37  -0.36  0.09  -0.52  -0.25  2.60 
 
 
 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  JB Statistic 
Leverage  0.16  0.12  0.14  0.00  0.69  457.09 
Innopp  1.30  1.11  0.80  -0.04  7.50  4185.28 
Prof  0.13  0.13  0.09  -0.59  0.73  4177.16 
Size   6.22  6.20  1.62  -0.67  11.54  33.43 
TargPayout  0.35  0.34  1.87  -28  30.15  3422475.75 
NDTS01  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.00  0.62  2045151.75 
CASHR  0.11  0.09  0.09  0.00  1.00  6560.73 
MKTBR  1.30  1.11  0.80  -0.03  7.50  4185.28 
CF  0.17  0.16  0.09  -0.50  0.79  2793.32 
NWC  153.27  47.81  619.47  -4363.05  12091.86  2299511.70 
CE  -0.07  -0.05  0.05  -0.86  0.01  49585.09 
DIV  41.06  0.13  1760.58  0.00  76418.95  277745376 
ROA  0.08  0.08  0.09  -0.96  1.17  55086.95 
DPY3  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  159096.90 
GDP (real GDP)  150.00  144.00  26.60  112.00  193.00  213.523 
DcBasperGDP  132.98  134.08  14.66  114.25  161.98  150.27 
lnGDPpercap (log)  8.09  8.04  0.09  7.98  8.24  292.95 
Cor  0.37  0.39  0.22  0.03  0.76  115.30 
RoL  0.08  0.09  0.05  -0.01  0.23  231.99 154 
 
Distributional properties for Tunisia 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  JB Statistic 
Leverage  0.22  0.17  0.21  0.00  1.28  238.69 
Innopp  1.12  0.86  0.89  0.07  6.59  1861.13 
Prof  0.06  0.06  0.07  -0.22  0.30  18.12 
Size   3.90  3.72  1.06  2.07  7.01  99.57 
TargPayout  0.31  0.39  1.13  0.00  1.77  254723.59 
NDTS01  0.05  0.04  0.08  0.01  1.23  206563.85 
CASHR  0.12  0.08  0.13  0.01  0.71  443.65 
MKTBR  1.12  0.86  0.89  0.07  6.59  1861.13 
CF  0.12  0.11  0.09  -0.13  1.1  24605.47 
NWC  15.21  7.71  35.23  -83.67  246.04  1654.71 
CE  -0.06  -0.04  0.05  -0.46  -0.02  1437.34 
DIV  2.80  1.86  3.40  0.00  30.06  4222.89 
ROA  0.04  0.05  0.07  -0.29  0.23  63.11 
DPY3  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.15  1200.10 
GDP (real GDP)  24.40  23.50  5.64  16.00  33.20  39.66 
DcBasperGDP  62.31  60.36  4.82  57.32  76.41  260.97 
lnGDPpercap (log)  7.79  7.781  0.18  7.50  8.05  37.86 
Cor  -0.01  -0.09  0.22  -0.22  0.55  121.95 
RoL  0.03  0.1  0.14  -0.20  0.22  44.73 
 
Distributional properties for Uganda 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  JB Statistic 
Leverage  0.11  0.04  0.14  0.00  0.54  25.32 
Innopp  1.38  0.89  1.11  0.30  4.64  27.64 
Prof  0.17  0.13  0.15  -0.02  1.15  1369.90 
Size   4.73  4.67  1.20  2.10  7.11  1.97 
TargPayout  0.44  0.38  0.31  -0.11  1.5  16.45 
NDTS01  0.04  0.05  0.02  0.05  0.09  0.55 
CASHR  0.08  0.03  0.09  0.03  0.35  22.58 
MKTBR  1.38  0.89  1.11  0.30  4.64  27.64 
CF  0.18  0.16  0.10  0.00  0.446  3.44 
NWC  28.18  15.36  41.37  -39.65  147.93  18.94 
CE  -0.06  -0.04  0.09  0.53  0.01  523.79 
DIV  1.16  0.60  1.58  0.00  9.19  442.30 
ROA  0.08  0.07  0.06  -0.07  0.23  2.68 
DPY3  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.01  44.70 
GDP (real GDP)  7.99  7.31  2.85  4.14  13.60  12.25 
DcBasperGDP  8.80  8.00  3.90  4.36  17.89  20.13 
lnGDPpercap (log)  5.65  5.63  0.19  5.32  5.97  7.81 
Cor  -0.83  -0.85  0.09  -0.94  -0.6  22.02 
RoL  -0.52  -0.54  0.13  -0.79  -0.35  7.14 
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Distributional properties for Zambia 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  JB Statistic 
Leverage  0.15  0.09  0.16  0.00  0.66  34.07 
Innopp  1.36  0.96  1.58  0.01  11.09  1499.49 
Prof  0.19  0.15  0.17  -0.09  0.91  180.15 
Size   4.32  4.35  1.62  1.32  8.02  2.41 
TargPayout  0.47  0.36  1.11  -0.82  11.11  27456.97 
NDTS01  0.04  0.04  0.02  0.01  0.17  150.06 
CASHR  0.09  0.06  0.10  0.00  0.66  352.43 
MKTBR  1.36  0.96  1.58  0.01  11.09  1499.48 
CF  0.22  0.19  0.17  -0.06  1.02  265.29 
NWC  1.23  2.04  27.68  -153.06  68.70  664.03 
CE  -0.11  -0.08  0.10  -0.61  -0.001  223.36 
DIV  5.54  0.69  23.02  0.00  227.44  30797.23 
ROA  0.12  0.09  0.12  -0.11  0.61  96.16 
DPY3  0.01  0.01  0.001  0.00  0.01  609.10 
GDP (real GDP)  3.91  3.60  0.95  2.82  5.92  27.90 
DcBasperGDP  9.09  8.25  2.39  6.26  14.96  31.61 
lnGDPpercap (log)  5.86  5.81  0.10  5.74  6.08  31.66 
Cor  -0.71  -0.73  0.17  -1.03  -0.47  10.77 
RoL  -0.51  -0.52  0.06  -0.65  -0.4  6.23 
 
Distributional properties for Zimbabwe 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  JB Statistic 
Leverage  0.13  0.07  0.15  0.00  0.69  76.35 
Innopp  1.62  1.34  1.18  -0.39  5.34  15.86 
Prof  0.17  0.17  0.13  -0.03  0.74  53.79 
Size   5.80  5.85  2.60  0.49  22.68  1373.14 
TargPayout  2.24  0.48  29.77  -100  250  11875.15 
NDTS01  0.03  0.03  0.01  0.00  0.07  0.39 
CASHR  0.08  0.07  0.07  0.00  0.32  31.11 
MKTBR  1.62  1.34  1.18  -0.39  5.34  15.86 
CF  0.18  0.18  0.10  -0.02  0.44  1.05 
NWC  73.80  7.51  567  -1797.17  4350.00  7723.91 
CE  -0.09  -0.05  0.10  -0.42  0.01  41.57 
DIV  43.63  0.21  366.60  0.00  3132.99  14920 
ROA  0.10  0.10  0.09  -0.09  0.37  1.89 
DPY3  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.14  5613.36 
GDP (real GDP)  5.42  5.55  1.20  3.49  6.96  25.41 
DcBasperGDP  37.66  33.83  21.80  15.79  103.63  229.43 
lnGDPpercap (log)  6.05  6.10  0.24  5.63  6.34  26.21 
Cor  -1.13  -1.3  0.32  -1.36  -0.25  136.53 
RoL  -1.55  -1.75  0.35  -1.82  -0.71  79.25 157 
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